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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the retrodictive mentalising abilities 
(a kind of backwards inference from a mental state to its causal antecedent in 
order to make sense of others’ behaviours) of people with and without 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). A new experimental paradigm was 
developed in order to examine people’s ability to make sense of others’ 
behaviours in a way that closely resembles the intricacies of real-world 
settings. The stimuli utilised in this thesis portrayed people’s spontaneous 
and genuine responses during four specific events (scenarios). People were 
told a joke in the Joke scenario whereas in the Story scenario the researcher 
related a series of unfortunate mishaps that she experienced earlier in the 
day. In the Compliments scenario, people were told a series of compliments 
while in the Waiting scenario the researcher performed irrelevant tasks 
during an experiment whilst the person was kept waiting.  Participants 
viewed brief videoclips of these behavioural responses and were asked to 
determine which event had previously occurred to the people in the 
videoclips. Participants eye movements were recorded to ascertain the visual 
strategies used. Typically developing individuals successfully inferred the 
events that occurred by viewing brief samples of behavioural reactions of 
typically developing individuals (Experiment 1).  It was found that scenario 
experienced did not impact how targets self-reported their level of empathic 
ability (Experiment 2). While people with ASD were able to infer people’s 
behavioural responses, their performance on the task was inferior as 
compared to typically developing individuals (Experiment 3). Participants 
varied their gaze strategies depending on the event experienced by the 
people in the videoclips and they had a tendency to focus more on the mouth 
compared to the eye region of the face (Experiment 1 and 3). When 
participants viewed videoclips of behavioural responses of people with and 
without ASD to the same events, they were more successful at inferring the 
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reactions to the events which occurred when viewing videoclips of 
neurotypical individuals as opposed to individuals with ASD (Experiment 4). 
Furthermore, participants were unable to identify the reactions to two of the 
four events when viewing videoclips of people with ASD.  
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CHAPTER 1 
                              Mentalising 
1.1 The origins and development of mentalising 
 
 The problem of other minds is an epistemological issue concerning 
how we can know that there are minds other than our own. People directly 
experience their own minds from a first-person subjective perspective, 
allowing direct access to feelings and beliefs. In contrast, interpreting and 
understanding another mind is something we can only do by making 
inference from clues in external, observable behaviour. The connection 
between the mental and physical worlds has been questioned by 
philosophers and scientists for centuries, often being termed the ‘mind-body’ 
problem. The early modern philosopher Descartes coined the term 
substance-dualism which states that the mind and the body are distinct 
elements with independent existence.  The body encompasses space and 
does not have thought. On the other hand, thought is the core feature of the 
mind, without an extension in the physical world.  Substance-dualism 
presents a challenge for understanding of others’ minds; if the mind and 
body are separate entities, how can we make inferences about the mind from 
clues in behaviour? Being able to make such inferences implies that, contrary 
to the view expressed by Descartes, the mind has physical embodiment or at 
the very least a physical counterpart. Although bodily expressions can be 
perceived, it is fair to assume that the individual has better knowledge of 
his/her own mind compared with a mere observer, for the individual has 
first-person subjective access to his/her own inner states.  
 Nevertheless, because others’ bodies and behaviours are visibly 
similar to one’s own body and behaviours, it is fair to assume that they too 
have thoughts and feelings. However this simplistic reasoning is an 
overgeneralisation due to its use of induction (Lacewing, 2009). While 
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deductive reasoning uses generalisations to reach certain conclusions, 
inductive reasoning on the other hand uses specific observations to 
formulate generalisations. As such the inferences made from inductive 
reasoning are probable rather than conclusive (hence we can only suppose 
that it is probable but not definite that others have minds). Furthermore, the 
prominent philosopher Wittgenstein’s take on the mind-body problem was 
that philosophy (i.e. mind) and science (i.e. body) are different ‘languages’ 
which cannot be compared or questioned on the same plane.  
The philosophy of mind debate has evolved from focus on 
understanding sensations such as pain to the understanding of social 
communication skills and psychological states such as emotions and beliefs. 
Barresi and Moore (1996) suggested that “the evolution of intelligence in 
primates that ultimately led to human beings was driven in part by the 
demands of social information processing”. Hence the significance of social 
communication has been a key research area in recent years. 
There is much value in describing behaviours in mentalistic terms as it 
potentially offers explanatory and predictive significance. Daniel Dennett is a 
key philosopher who brought together the disciplines of philosophy and 
developmental psychology. He suggested the use of mental concepts as a 
viewpoint exclusive to specific kinds of complex behaviours. Dennett’s 
prominent idea is that one is able to mindread another person by 
‘rationalisation’, using what he called the intentional stance. The primary use 
of intentional stance is to ascribe beliefs to a system for the purpose of 
predicting its future behaviour.   `Intentional systems are, by definition, all 
and only those entities whose behaviour is predictable/explicable from the 
intentional stance' (Dennett, 1996, p. 34). It was proposed that the 
intentional stance is a functional approach in order to predict the behaviours 
and actions of human beings, plants, monkeys, along with various other 
systems to which intentions are not typically attributed (Dennett, 1987). 
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With that in mind; imagine seeing a woman walking towards the 
cashier in a grocery store and then stopping and looking through her 
handbag. One could assume that she is searching for her purse. This 
interpretation is made possible by drawing upon one’s intentional 
understanding abilities. In developmental psychology, this process of 
assigning mental states to oneself and others is known as ‘theory of mind’ 
(Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988). Premack and Woodruff (1978) initially 
devised this term in order to highlight the indiscernible nature of mental 
states. Throughout the years, ‘theory of mind’ has been used interchangeably 
with other terms such as ‘mentalising’, ‘intentional stance’ and 
‘mindreading’. The term mentalising will be used in this dissertation as it 
widely encompasses relevant aspects associated with the subject matter. In 
the paper titled “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?”, Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) essentially questioned the ability of the mind of the 
chimpanzee to function like a human mind, with the abilities to make 
suppositions that the behaviours and actions of others are established by 
their attitudes, desires and beliefs. Their ground-breaking research included 
several studies which investigated whether chimpanzees implicitly knew that 
others have different thoughts and mental states. In one experiment, 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) showed a chimpanzee video-recordings of an 
actor experiencing certain difficulties (e.g., reaching for bananas hung from a 
ceiling or trying to escape from a cage). These videos were stopped before 
the actor in the video-recording found a solution to the problem. The 
chimpanzee was then shown two pictures in which only one portrayed the 
actor solving the problem previously depicted. It was found that the 
chimpanzee reliably picked the picture of the actor solving the problem, 
implying that the chimpanzee ascribed mental states to the actor. However 
some critics (e.g. Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh, 1979) have suggested that 
the chimpanzee might have simply linked familiar behaviours and 
consequences. Compared to the ambiguity surrounding mentalising abilities 
in nonhumans, the development of these abilities in humans is presumed to 
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be somewhat natural. A key question that arises about the development of 
this undoubtedly proficient ability is; how and when does this skill develop? 
 
Dennett's (1978) commentary on Premack and Woodruff’s paper 
further fuelled the debate around the ‘mind-readers’ or ‘behaviour-readers’ 
paradigm. He proposed several ideas for future research in order to make a 
clearer distinction between the two abovementioned groups. Dennett 
contended that an unequivocal test of mental state ascription calls for the 
chimpanzee to predict that the actor would engage in an incorrect behaviour. 
A measure of false-belief attribution in essence was what Dennett stated was 
lacking in Premack and Woodruff’s study. Dennett offered a recommendation 
around this issue based on the popular puppet show characters, Punch and 
Judy. He proposed a scenario in which Punch has an incorrect belief about 
Judy’s location; would observing children be able to predict Punch’s incorrect 
and fruitless search for Judy? If so, then they have an understanding of false 
belief and should be duly credited with a theory of mind. This is because in 
order to understand that a mind can represent, one must appreciate that it 
can misrepresent (i.e. hold a false belief) and will consequently have an 
impact on the attributor’s behaviours in a way that will determine the actor’s 
behaviour (Griffin & Baron-Cohen, 2002). Additionally, the need to inhibit 
one’s natural inclination to ascribe a true belief make false belief tasks more 
difficult than straightforward true belief tasks (Roth & Leslie, 1998).   
Thus began the onset of mentalising research, initiated by Wimmer 
and Perner (1983). Inspired by Dennett, they devised the classic ‘unexpected-
transfer test’ where children are told a story of a child named Max (see 
Figure 1.1). Max puts a bar of chocolate in the green cupboard then goes out 
to play. In his absence, Max’s mother moves the chocolate from the green 
cupboard to the blue cupboard. The child is asked where Max will look for his 
chocolate when he returns back home. In order to successfully pass this task, 
the child must understand that another person (in this case, Max) can have a 
false representation of the world. The findings revealed that none of the 3 to 
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4 year-olds were able to accurately state where Max would look for his 
chocolate (all children stated that Max would look in the blue cupboard) 
while 57% of the 4 to 6 year-olds responded accurately. Almost all the 6 to 9 
year-olds correctly pointed to green cupboard. The success in this task 
necessitates the understanding that other people's beliefs may differ from 
one’s own as well as to envisage how others will respond based on their 
different beliefs. 
 
    Figure 1.1: The chocolate story (adapted from Perner & Lang, 1999). 
 
The ‘unexpected contents task’ is another false belief task which was 
devised as an alternative to the ‘unexpected transfer task’ to reduce the 
demands of advanced language skills required (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 
1986) (see Figure 1.2). The children are shown a candy container with an 
unanticipated item inside (e.g., crayon). The children are then asked what 
they initially thought was inside the container as well as what someone else 
may think is inside the candy container. The findings revealed that 3-year-
olds did not understand that only the person who had previously looked 
inside the container is aware of the true contents of the container. 
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Additionally the 3-year-olds even failed to acknowledge their own prior false 
beliefs about the contents of the candy container. Both the ‘unexpected 
transfer’ and ‘unexpected contents’ tasks are known as first-order 
mentalising tasks (Baron-Cohen, 2000).  
 
Figure 1.2: An illustration of the unexpected contents task (adapted from 
www.autismservice.org). 
 
A meta-analysis of 178 false belief studies found that the age at which 
50% of children are able to pass false belief tasks is 3 years, 8 months 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). They stated that younger children’s 
failure of the false-belief tasks was due to a lack of conceptual understanding 
suggesting that performance in false-belief tasks reflect the developmental 
trajectory and the actual changes in children’s conception of others. They 
stated that as age increased, children’s performance on false-belief tasks 
progressed from incorrect to significantly correct on both easy and more 
complex tasks. In general, researchers who believe in the radical conceptual 
shift  claim that at approximately 4 years of age a conceptual change occurs 
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where children are able to comprehend and predict the behaviours of others 
by attributing mental states to them (e.g., Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). 
Researchers then developed more complex false-belief tasks to assess 
older children with more superior mentalising abilities. This was done so as to 
evaluate children’s progression of false belief understanding with increased 
age and task difficulty. Second-order mentalising tasks were designed to tap 
into one’s ability to attribute a belief about another person’s belief (Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Second-order mentalising abilities is 
developed at approximately seven years of age, whereupon children are 
capable of knowing that another person understands something about 
someone or something else (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Mentalising 
abilities evidently progress with age (beyond the benchmark  notions of 
desire, intention and belief)  as children begin to acquire a better 
understanding of faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 
1999), social deception such as white lies (Happé, 1994) as well as the 
understanding of sarcasm, metaphor and irony (Happé, 1994).  
 It has been established that children’s ability to pass false belief tests 
emerges at about age four (e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988) even across 
different cultures (Callaghan et al., 2005) and henceforth continues to 
advance. However does this imply that children below the age of four have 
no understanding of others’ mental states? It has been shown that prior to 
being able to pass a false belief task, infants have the ability to predict others’ 
actions and preferences (Meltzoff, 1995). Furthermore, studies have found 
that infants as young as seven months may have the capability of thinking 
about someone else’s mental states and false beliefs (Baillargeon, Scott, & 
He, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). Other researchers have found 
evidence of infants and toddlers between the ages of 13 to 25 months 
showing low-level mentalising abilities in tasks involving false beliefs about 
location and/or identity, as well as false perceptions using violation-of-
expectation (VOE) and anticipatory-looking (AL) models of testing (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 
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2007). In Onishi and Baillargeon's (2005)  nonverbal task, 15-month-old 
infants were shown videos of a toy being hidden while the actor watched. 
Then the toy is moved to another location, unknown to the actor as his view 
was blocked by a partition. The findings revealed that when the partition was 
removed, infants looked longer at the original rather than the current 
location of the toy. This seems to demonstrate that the children’s gaze 
pattern reflected their anticipation of the actor’s behaviour based on the 
actor’s belief and not their own belief. This finding was also replicated among 
two-year-olds in Southgate et al. (2007).  Nonetheless these findings have 
been challenged by contentions that the infants and toddlers merely used 
either a behavioural rules system (Penn & Povinelli, 2007) or a ‘person-
object-location’ association (Perner & Ruffman, 2005).  
On the other hand, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed that there 
are two ‘mindreading systems’ to account for the discrepancies in the 
literature in regards to infants’ ability to pass false belief tasks contrasting 
with the later development of false belief understanding at age four. They 
hypothesised that the first approach consists of a low-level system which 
functions efficiently, automatically and is inflexible (e.g. a primitive system 
for tracking belief-like states which guides children’s gaze behaviour). The 
second system supposedly operates at a high-level, is more flexible but is less 
efficient due to its demands on executive systems such as working memory 
and cognitive control (e.g.  an advanced system which supports children’s 
explicit appraisals about beliefs.) Though the literature is mixed between 
findings of false-belief abilities appearing before age four (Chandler, Fritz, & 
Hala, 1989) and others reporting the emergence after age four (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992), the findings reveal that the ability to implicitly attribute false 
beliefs to others may be present by the age of two years. Moreover the 
capacity to ascribe false beliefs is said to be one of many antecedents in 
developing full-fledged mentalising abilities. Hence the next question to ask is 
what are the other building blocks that contribute to the development of 
mentalising abilities? 
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 Studies have shown that children below the age of three start to 
develop various socio-cognitive abilities vital for grasping future mental state 
understanding. Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, and Brockbank (1999) found 
support for nine to 12 month old infants being able to perceive another’s 
action as goal oriented.  Callaghan et al. (2005) reported pretend play, joint 
attention, awareness of intentional actions, and imitation as some of the 
building blocks of mentalising abilities. Tomasello and Haberl (2003) 
investigated 12 and 18 month old infants and found that infants of both ages 
demonstrated understanding of others as intentional and attentional agents. 
It was found that 13-month olds have the ability to attribute a false belief to 
another person about the location of an object (Surian et al., 2007). Findings 
from Song and Baillargeon's (2008) study illustrated that 14.5 month old 
infants could attribute to another person a false perception of an object. 
Furthermore, perspective taking abilities have been found to  emerge within 
the first 18 months of life (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007). Similarly, 
Carpenter, Nagell, and Tomasello (1998) reported that infants begin to share 
the experience of focusing on something with others by nine months of age. 
Infants tend to naturally follow another person’s gaze as if attending to that 
person’s point of interest. Related to the concept of joint attention, social 
referencing (i.e. when infants assess their mother’s expression before moving 
towards or away from a novel object) has also been associated with 
development of mentalising ability (Repacholi, 1998). In their study, 
Carpenter et al. (1998) also showed that infants imitated purposeful and not 
accidental actions, which suggests that they are able to make a distinction 
between someone’s intention and their action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 
2002). During the second year of life, children begin to engage in pretend 
play where a child decouples reality (‘a nonliving doll’) from a pretend state 
(‘my baby‘), which denotes the presence of meta-representation (Leslie, 
1994). There also has been some evidence supporting the understanding of 
emotions, desires and perception in two-year-olds (Wellman, Phillips, & 
Rodriguez, 2000). The above mentioned components among others play a 
vital role for further advancement in mental state reasoning. 
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Perspective taking abilities are another precursor related to mentalising 
development (Flavell, 2004). For example, consider the understanding 
needed to grasp that a piece of paper laid flat on a table will appear 
differently to the people seated around the table.  Children also show the 
understanding about desire at around age two as they seem to understand 
and reason non-egocentrically that people’s preferences, emotions and 
attitudes about things around them can be used to predict their future 
behaviours (Wellman et al., 2001).  
 
Language development is also thought to assist in the advancement of 
later mentalising abilities (e.g., pragmatics- the appropriate use of language 
in social settings; Farrar & Maag, 2002). Farrar and Maag (2002) found strong 
links between early language development and later theory of mind 
performance in typically developing children.  Furthermore, children begin to 
acquire emotional understanding at a young age. Studies have shown that 
important changes take place between the ages of three to five (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Three-year olds generally are able to identify basic 
emotions and can comprehend that others may experience different 
emotions compared to themselves in similar situations (Denham et al., 2003). 
By the age of four, children have an understanding that beliefs and desires 
are private and variable entities (Frith & Frith, 2003). Most typically 
developing children pass the first-order Max-chocolate task by the age of four 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A second-order belief task developed  by Sullivan, 
Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994) consisted of person A not being updated 
about person B’s newly learned information. Their findings revealed that 
children over the age of five were able to pass this task.  Tests were then 
developed to assess advanced levels of mentalising such as the Strange 
Stories Task (Happé, 1994), Faux Pas Test (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, 
Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) and more recently the Meta Photograph Test (Egeth 
& Kurzban, 2009). 
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  The various components mentioned above (among others) all play a role 
in the formation and progression of the multifaceted mentalising sphere. 
Furthermore, there are striking similarities between the building blocks of 
mentalising abilities and their close relationship to overall successful social 
communication abilities. In consequence, these building blocks play a vital 
role in social functioning as we learn about the world around us in mentalistic 
terms.  
 
As previously mentioned, research suggests that one’s mentalising 
abilities gradually progress with age  extending to more advanced levels of 
proficiency from preschool to young adulthood (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & 
Taylor, 2002). Literature in regards to mentalising proficiency in adulthood is 
varied.  Some studies have found no differences between younger and older 
adults in mentalising story comprehension tasks (Keightley, Winocur, 
Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006) while Slessor, Phillips, and Bull 
(2007) reported that older adults generally performed rather poorly in 
mentalising tasks as compared to their younger counterparts. Though still 
debatable, much research has shown that people’s mentalising abilities tend 
to decline from younger to older adulthood, irrespective of age-related 
changes of cognitive functioning such as processing speed and memory 
(Bernstein, Thornton, & Sommerville, 2011). 
1.2  Theories of mentalising 
1.2.1 Theory-theory 
 
 Theory-theory is an account of the development of children’s 
understanding of the mind which states that it originates from innate ‘naïve’ 
abilities that form the foundation of the theories of mind which the child 
creates (Meltzoff, 1999). This theory postulates that as the child learns and 
experiences new things (i.e. from the environment and people around), 
he/she continues to build upon and modify existing theories (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992). Accordingly, theory-theory has also been known as the 
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‘child scientist’ theory as the structure in which theories are formed seems 
somewhat scientific in manner: information is acquired, hypotheses made 
and tested, and subsequent revision of the theory occurs if hypotheses are 
not supported, ranging from simple to more complex theories. Social 
environment plays a large role in mentalising development according to 
theory-theory, as a child who experiences an enriched and diverse social 
environment will acquire mentalising skills faster than a child from a less 
enhanced background (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Due to the heavy influence 
of environment on mentalising progression, Hughes and Leekam (2004) 
noted that there could be cultural differences in children’s understanding of 
mental states. On the whole, theory-theory was a prominent account of 
mental state development in the 90’s; however the  ‘conceptual deficit’ 
paradigm was heavily challenged when new methods of investigating  false 
belief understanding in younger children revealed that even 15 month-olds 
were able to pass nonverbal false belief tasks (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). 
This paints a picture of mental state reasoning much earlier than that 
proposed by theory-theory. 
 
1.2.2 Modularity theory 
 
Proponents of modularity theory suggest that mentalising is a central 
and inherent biological ability composed of modules which ‘mature’ over 
time, hence age is a critical feature and social experiences on the other hand, 
play a smaller role in its development (Leslie, 1987) . These modules are 
made up of domain-specific frameworks (i.e. to be used in limited areas and 
restricted contexts) as opposed to a domain-general structure (i.e. can be 
used to solve problems in various subject matter and contexts) proposed in 
theory-theory. Though these modules are  triggered by the environment, the 
environment in itself does not control or modify the maturation process of 
mentalising abilities (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leslie, 1987). Leslie (1994) 
proposed three main modules involved in the maturation process. The first 
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module is Theory of Body which develops in the first year of life. At this stage, 
infants learn to understand and recognise that people have an internal 
mechanism that enables them to move on their own i.e. mechanical agency. 
Then he described the Theory of Mind Mechanism which emerges in two 
phases which make up the second and third modules. The first phase of 
Theory of Mind Mechanism explains events in terms of goals and intentions 
i.e. actional agency. This stage is often characterised by attention to eye gaze. 
Then the third module (i.e. second phase of Theory of Mind Mechanism) 
describes events in terms of propositional attitudes and beliefs i.e. attitudinal 
agency.  Flavell (1999) defined propositional attitudes as mental states such 
as ‘believing that, imagining that, pretending that, and desiring that’. As such 
the third module is essential for the understanding that other people can 
hold beliefs that differ from our own. 
 
1.2.3 Simulation theory 
 
Another account of the development of mentalising ability is called 
simulation theory. The basic premise of simulation theory is that mentalising 
ability develops when an individual is able to simulate what he or she thinks 
another person’s thoughts, feelings or behaviours might be.  Perner and 
Howes (1992) pointed out that the concept of simulation can be related back 
to Piaget’s view on perspective-taking. Among those who have championed 
simulation theory are Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, Jane Heal and Paul 
Harris. “What would I do if I were in that person’s situation?”- Gordon (1986) 
proposed that individuals predict the behaviours of others by answering the 
above question. He states that simulation requires not just a ‘transfer’, rather 
a ‘transformation’, implying that when person A simulates person B, person A 
‘transforms’ to person B during simulation. Goldman (1989) on the other 
hand, suggested that mentalising occurs when individuals ‘simulate’ another 
person by attempting to form comparable mental states in order to 
represent the mental state of the other person in question. The individual 
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then utilises these new representations to create more mental states, some 
of which would be attributed to the other person. In essence, Goldman’s 
view postulates that people ascribe mental states by acting as if being in the 
other person’s shoes. Proponents of simulation theory suggest that abilities 
required to ‘simulate’ others are influenced by one’s own social experiences 
(e.g. Harris, 1992). Though there are several versions of simulation theory, all 
concur in presenting it is a valuable heuristic mechanism with predictive and 
explanatory function. 
1.2.4 Mirroring and simulation mentalising 
 
Mirror systems were first discovered in macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) and subsequently in humans (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Mirroring systems have been associated with imitation and 
empathy (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006), evolution of language (Giacomo 
Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) as well as the facilitation of mentalising skills ( 
Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Additionally, mirroring processes have been found 
in areas such as emotion and perception (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006).  
In the macaque monkey, mirror neurons were discovered in the 
prefrontal cortex and activated when engaged in a goal oriented action such 
as grasping (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The neurons are also activated when the 
macaque observes another monkey or human performing the same action. In 
other words, the attributor ‘mirrors’ an action in his or her brain similar to 
what is perceived of the target’s action. Hence, researchers have suggested 
that mirror neurons provide the foundation for people’s ability to simulate 
and understand the mental states of others.  
 
 Gallese and Goldman (1998) stated that mirror neurons may function 
as a mechanism to detect mental states of others, hence possibly acting as a 
precursor or being a part of overall mentalising capabilities. Wicker et al. 
(2003) demonstrated a case of mentalising (via face processing) of disgust.  
They conducted an fMRI study in which participants first viewed videoclips of 
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people smelling the contents of a glass (disgusting, pleasant, neutral) and 
subsequently displaying the relevant facial expressions. Then the participants 
inhaled rancid, pleasant and neutral odours through a mask. The results of 
the study revealed that the same areas in the brain (i.e. anterior insula and 
anterior cingulate cortex) were activated during both the video observation 
of disgusted facial affect and during the smelling of the rancid odour. The 
authors conclude that just as watching others’ motor movements (such as 
hand actions) activates one’s own representation of the action, the same can 
be applied when observing an emotion as the neural instantiation of that 
emotion is activated in the observer’s mind (see Figure 1.3 for an example of 
mentalising and disgust). 
 
 
Figure 1.3: An example of simulation and low-level (face-based) mentalising 
of disgust (adapted from Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
  
 Gallese & Goldman (1998) also state that this type of simulation can 
be used to retrodict and predict others’ mental states. Retrodiction means 
that people work backwards to make an inference about a prior mental state 
based on currently observed behaviour. Similarly, people may utilise the 
same processes in order to predict someone’s future behaviours. In the same 
line of thought, the ‘reverse simulation’ heuristic was developed by Goldman 
and Sripada (2005); a process in which the attributor processes the relevant 
emotional responses in the reverse direction. Gallese (2003) noted that basic 
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mirror simulation is often ‘automatic, unconscious, and pre-reflexive’ and 
involves the attribution of simple mental states (e.g., those associated with 
facial expressions such as disgust, happiness and fear).  If mirroring processes 
are utilised in mentalising, there should be consequences in the form of 
intention attribution and not just the prediction of actions or direct mimicry 
(Goldman, 2009). In other words, simply mirroring someone else’s emotional 
state, for instance, does not reflect upon actual emotion attribution of the 
particular state. Rather mirroring processes may be viewed as one of the 
starting points of assigning attribution. Iacoboni et al. (2005) conducted a 
study using fMRI to investigate people’s intention and prediction of future 
action. Twenty-three participants were presented with three kinds of video 
stimuli: action videoclips (grasping hand action on a teacup); context 
videoclips (only objects prepared for tea); and the intention videoclips 
(grasping hand action on a teacup within the during-tea or post-tea 
conditions). After imaging data was collected, participants were debriefed 
about the videoclips they watched. Participants subsequently reported the 
intention of drinking when observing grasping behaviour in the during-tea 
condition, while they reported the intent to clean-up when observing the 
grasping behaviour in the post-tea condition. Furthermore, only the intention 
videoclips produced increased activation in participants’ premotor mirror 
neuron systems. These findings demonstrated that whilst mirroring processes 
are being utilised, intentional attributions were being made, and not mere 
imitation or action prediction. Hence,  low-level mentalising could be viewed 
as an expansion of basic automatic behavioural and mental mimicry 
processes, both essential components of social cognition (Goldman, 2012). 
1.2.5 Simulation and high-level mentalising 
 
 Arguably, low-level mentalising is composed of basic mirroring 
simulation processes; however not all mentalising processes can be explained 
by mirroring strategies.  High-level mentalising, on the other hand, is more 
complex and often includes propositional attitudes. It is also said to be 
relatively slower, introspective and controlled (Goldman, 2012). In addition 
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high-level mentalising generally works with the support of known prior 
knowledge (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). The general notion of mental 
simulation lies upon the attributor trying to ‘re-experience’ a certain mental 
event (Goldman, 2009). Subsequently, Goldman (2012) proposed  a concept 
he termed ‘enactment imagination’ which encapsulates the notion of mental 
pretense. According to him, enactment imagination assists in generating in 
one’s mind a mental state that is not explicitly observable.   Shanton and 
Goldman (2010) provided a comprehensive example of how imagination may 
be used in a more complex context of mentalising (also refer to Figure 1.4).  
 
If you seek to predict someone’s decision—for example, the choice of 
a main dish by your dinner companion at a restaurant—how could 
you use imagination to make this prediction? The first step is to put 
yourself in your target’s shoes, or take her ‘perspective’. Taking 
someone’s perspective here means adopting, as far as feasible and in 
light of what you know about her, the mental states she starts with. 
This includes her preferences about food in general, what she liked at 
this restaurant on previous occasions, how hungry she is on the 
present occasion (did she have a light lunch, no lunch, or a heavy 
lunch today?), and so forth. Using the imagination, you can simulate 
being in her various dinner-relevant states. Such pretend states can 
then be fed into your decision-making mechanism, which generates a 
decision to order a particular main dish. Having used this simulation 
process to generate a (pretend) choice, you don’t order this dish 
yourself but attribute the choice to your companion (p. 31). 
 
 
    
Figure 1.4: An example of attribution based on imagination driven 
simulation (adapted from  Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
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Based on the example provided above, the difference between 
mirroring and enactment imagination is evident. Mirroring involves the 
automatic re-enactment in the attributor’s mind of another person’s 
experience. On the other hand, in enactment imagination, one endeavours to 
re-create the experience devoid of direct observation of the other person. 
Therefore, enactment imagination may be effectively utilised to read others’ 
minds. An apparent overlap of theory-theory and simulation theory principles 
are present in the abovementioned high-level mentalising processes, creating 
a ‘hybrid’ approach (Goldman, 2006). 
 1.3 Mental state recognition 
1.3.1 Emotion recognition 
 
The classic study carried out by Ekman and Friesen (1971) 
demonstrated the presence of six universally identified basic emotions- 
happy, sad, angry, fear, disgust, and surprise (see Figure 1.5).  Infants as 
young as four months are able to distinguish several basic facial expressions 
such as happiness and sadness (Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1992), and their 
ability to accurately identify emotional facial expressions progresses with 
age.  According to Felleman, Carlson, Christopher, Rosenberg, and Masters 
(1983) children are able to identify all basic emotions by the age of five but it 
is not until adolescence that the ability is fully developed (Gao & Maurer, 
2010; Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater, 2007).    
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Figure 1.5: The six basic emotions adapted from Ekman & Friesen (1971).  
       (from top left: anger, fear, disgust, surprised, happiness and sadness) 
 
It is widely known that emotions are often initiated by some sort of 
social experience (Salovey, 2003) and that these social experiences influence 
the way in which emotions are formed  and vice versa (Parkinson, Fischer, & 
Manstead, 2004). The connection between the social world and emotions are 
manifold; researchers have found evidence for a subset of emotions now 
termed social emotions (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Embarrassment (see Figure 
1.6), shame and jealousy are examples of social emotions; it has been 
contended that social emotions differ from other emotions as they require 
the representation of others’ mental states (Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & 
Blakemore, 2008) and often involve some understanding of social 
conventions. Researchers have thus indicated that deficits in mentalising may 
relate to difficulties in identifying social emotions, also known as self-
conscious emotions  (Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003).  
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 Figure 1.6: Display of embarrassment adapted from Keltner and Buswell 
(1997). 
 
1.3.2 Facial expression recognition 
 
The awareness of another person’s emotions typically encompasses 
multimodal sensory processing. Klucharev & Sams (2004) reported that 
feelings and emotions of others are processed through a variety of sources 
such as facial expressions, body gestures as well as speech prosody. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that faces alone have the capacity to convey a 
rich source of personal information. For example, it is known that infants 
process facial expressions as the primary source in identifying the emotional 
states of others (Woodhead, Barnes, Miell, & Oates, 1995). Typically 
developing individuals are able to automatically attend to and perceive the 
intricate set of information in a face, recognise the mental states as well as 
the social context, which in turn aids in the interpretation and 
comprehension of the entire social situation. Past research has illustrated the 
importance of face processing abilities and its association with the 
identification of facial expressions and facial identities (Bruce & Young, 1986). 
For instance, O’Donnell and Bruce (2001) demonstrated that the eye region 
of the face is important when learning to recognize new faces. Many face 
processing and emotional recognition studies have looked at recognition of 
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emotions from facial expressions; some research has also examined the 
ability to identify other mental states from the facial region. 
 
 Premack and Woodruff (1978) believed that cognitive mental states 
are private phenomena which have no exterior features, hence implying that 
interpreting mental states from one‘s facial region would be challenging. 
However, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997) reported that 
mental states are visible from the face and stated that ―the ‘eyes are the 
windows to the soul’, implying that the eye region displays cognitive mental 
states previously thought to have no external attributes. Decades before they 
suggested that the eyes contain vital information relating to mental states, 
Nummenmaa (1964) developed the Language of the Face‖ construct. He 
reported that simple emotions could be recognised either by the eye or 
mouth region whereas complex emotions (blends of simple emotions) were 
recognized more from the eye compared to the mouth region. As an 
extension to this area of research, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised‖ 
test was developed which suggested that the eyes convey salient mental 
state information (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
The task consisted of 36 images depicting pictures of the eyes with four 
possible answer choices. The investigators found that typically developing 
children and adults were capable of attributing mental states to the whole 
face as well as the eyes. Many other researchers have replicated Baron 
Cohen et al.‘s findings (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Hernandez et al., 
2009).  
 
In contrast, a classic study by Hanawalt (1942) showed that the mouth 
is the most important area of information to recognise the emotion of 
happiness whereas the eyes are more useful in recognising the emotions of 
fear and surprise. Although current research (i.e., Baron-Cohen et al.) seems 
to suggest that the eye region is most vital in receiving and interpreting 
salient information from the face, there has been contradictory evidence as 
to which region of the face (i.e., eyes or mouth) discloses more pertinent 
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information in regards to the identification of mental states. It is now 
generally accepted that facial expressions may differ from one another with 
regards to where relevant information is available in the facial region (Smith, 
Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005). For example, Nusseck et al. (2008) found 
that the mouth region was most useful in the identification of happiness and 
surprise while the eye region was vital for recognition of the thinking 
expression.   
1.3.3 Limitations of prior research 
 
An abundance of research on mental state recognition has employed 
the use of static stimuli even though the intricacies of facial expressions 
cannot be captured in fullness in these images.   Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, 
and Cohen (2002) suggested that the use of dynamic facial stimuli as opposed 
to static images provides a more holistic and appropriate representation of 
real life day-to-day experiences. However it can be argued that dynamic 
stimuli are simply a combination of a series of static images, hence the 
increased performance when using dynamic stimuli may actually be 
attributed to information from the ‘additional static images’. Ambadar, 
Schooler, and Cohn (2005) argued that this was not the case on discovering 
that participants were significantly better at identifying subtle facial 
expressions when viewing dynamic stimuli as opposed to multi-static images.  
This finding adds to the evidence that dynamic stimuli encapsulate certain 
information not available in static images. 
 
 Furthermore, Lander and Chuang (2005) demonstrated that 
individuals perform better in identity recognition tasks when presented with 
dynamic compared with static visual stimuli. It is also not surprising that 
findings have shown that dynamic expressions are perceived as being more 
intense and realistic as compared to static images of facial expressions 
(Weyers, Mühlberger, Hefele, & Pauli, 2006). Research in emotional 
recognition tasks also supports the notion that accurate identification is 
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increased when people are presented with dynamic as opposed to static 
visual stimuli (Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000). This may be 
explained by the supplementary information which accompanies dynamic 
facial visual stimuli when compared with static images. For instance people 
have the opportunity to appreciate the onset and offset of a particular facial 
expression (Schmidt, Cohn, & Tian, 2003). Moreover,  the onset and offset of 
expressions (e.g. smile) have also been associated with accurate judgments of 
genuine or fake smiles (Ambadar, Cohn, & Reed, 2009). In their review of the 
impact of dynamic aspects of facial expressions, Krumhuber, Kappas, and 
Manstead (2013) highlighted the importance for future research of using the 
dynamic properties of facial expressions and its relation to everyday social 
interactions; they counsel against using static and prototypical images of 
facial expressions. They further highlighted the imperative role of the 
dynamic features in the perception of facial expressions. For instance; 
increased coherence for subtle expressions, the benefits of temporal 
sequence of unfolding expressions, as well as the activation of superior 
temporal sulci and amygdala which are associated with the processing of 
social and emotional information found only when viewing dynamic as 
opposed to static stimuli. 
 
In the social world, facial expressions are typically subtle, 
spontaneous, transient, context-specific and are often present along with 
other expressions, behaviours and words (Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady, 
2002). It seems that most researchers have not taken this into account and 
have often portrayed emotional responses at the very apex of the specified 
emotion, hence displaying emotions in an exaggerated (such as the Ekman 
faces) and in a less naturalistic manner (e.g.  large standardised images; 
Corden et al., 2008). Stimuli are often void of context, static and posed, which 
in consequence is bound to influence the interpretation of the expressions. 
Facial expressions are not displayed in this manner in real-life conditions; as 
such, ecologically valid measures reflecting facial expressions in the real 
world are needed. In recognition of this, Matsumoto, Olide, Schug, 
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Willingham, and Callan (2009) investigated cross-cultural judgements of 
emotions in spontaneous facial expressions amongst 548 American, British, 
Japanese and other international students based in the United States. They 
captured photographic images of Olympic Judo athletes immediately at end 
of a match which determines gold, silver or bronze medal as well as two 
other points during the medal ceremonies. All images were cropped so that 
only head and face could be seen. Participants were told that they would be 
presented with images of athletes who had just completed a match for a 
medal and were not told anything about the outcome of the match. They 
judged the athletes’ expressions using a fixed-choice response task with 
options such as happiness, sadness, contempt, anger and surprise. The 
outcome of the study demonstrated that participants were able to   ascribe 
emotions (as coded and produced by the Facial Action Coding System, FACS) 
significantly above chance level. Furthermore, it was found that participants’ 
judgement of emotions were also predictive of match outcomes. Though this 
study captured spontaneous reactions, they were nonetheless static stills. 
Furthermore, the task of identifying the athletes’ mental states is arbitrary at 
best as they may be experiencing a range of mental states which cannot 
easily be put into words. 
This chapter introduced the research area in question. The origins and 
development of mentalising as well prominent theories of mentalising were 
discussed. Facial expression-based mental state recognition was also 
reviewed. Finally the limitations of prior mentalising research were 
considered. The next chapter details a key area of interest in this thesis- 
mentalising and its association with autism spectrum disorder.  
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CHAPTER 2 
   Autism Spectrum Disorder 
2.1 Mentalising and clinical disorders 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, mentalising consists of a series of 
processes individuals utilise in order to understand and make sense of 
themselves, others and the world. There is the notion that people have 
evolved a framework to construct mental representations of others’ beliefs, 
desires, thoughts, emotions, intentions and goals.   That said, being in tune 
with others’ mental states has a fundamentally inherent social function. 
Numerous clinical disorders encompass deficits in mentalising (Brüne & 
Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). In this section a few of these will be discussed.  
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is marked by a pervasive 
pattern of difficulties in the areas of emotion regulation, impulse control, 
interpersonal relationships as well as self-image (Skodol et al., 2002). Suicidal 
behaviours and self-harm are often noted in individuals with BPD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Furthermore Schneider et al. (2008) reported 
that 69-80% of individuals with BPD exhibit recurrent suicidal behaviours. 
Frequently reported comorbid disorders include anxiety disorders, 
depression and substance abuse and dependency (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). One of the hallmarks of BPD is a tenuous ability to 
mentalise as evidenced in struggles in social and interpersonal relationships. 
Fonagy and Bateman (2007)  integrated corresponding ideas from fields of 
developmental psychology, psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience to 
propose a multifarious association between BPD and early attachment, 
physical, mental or emotional trauma, environmental factors (e.g. neglect), 
hyperarousal and inhibition of the orbitofrontal cortex.  
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Past research assessing social cognition in individuals with BPD often 
utilised static images such as the Ekman faces (e.g. Domes et al., 2008) and 
while some studies have suggested that individuals with BPD have difficulties 
in affect recognition in complex tasks (Dyck et al., 2009) others have not 
(Domes et al., 2008). In fact studies have also reported that individuals with 
BPD score better than control participants in classic mentalising tasks such as 
Baron-Cohen’s ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test’ (RMET) and Happe’s 
advanced mentalising task (Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot, & Schobre, 2009; 
Fertuck et al., 2009). Nonetheless it must be noted that the above mentioned 
experiments were limited in that they did not reflect real-world social 
contexts.  Preissler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren, and  Roepke (2010) addressed 
these limitations by investigating the social-cognitive abilities of individuals 
with BPD using a naturalistic video-based tool called the  “Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition” (MASC) as well as the RMET. Participants 
were required to evaluate the movie characters’ emotions, thoughts and 
intentions (see Figure 2.1). Results revealed that participants showed no 
deficits in the RMET task but were significantly impaired in the MASC task 
compared to healthy controls, suggesting that participants with BPD 
exhibited difficulties in complex real-life tasks such as this which entailed the 
comprehension of both verbal (literal and metaphorical) and nonverbal 
(facial expression and body language) communications. 
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Figure 2.1:  An example of a multiple choice question in the MASC. Sandra 
stated that the recipe called for 2 cups of cream. Then Michael said to Betty 
“I bet if it was left to you, you’d go for 5 cups of cream, right?”  The four 
likely answers signify varying levels of mentalising: (a) excessive 
mentalising; (b) no mentalising; (c) accurate response; (d) inadequate 
mentalising. 
 
 
A recent study by Franzen et al. (2011) examined the identification of 
emotional signals and intentions as well as the  recognition of fairness from 
facial expressions of others in a virtual social game. Results showed that 
individuals with BPD displayed superior mentalising ability as they were less 
influenced by emotional signals and were able to objectively   detect subtle 
social pretexts.  These results point to hypermentalising; that is mentalising 
inaccuracies due to over-interpretive mental state reasoning or over-
attribution of intentions (Frith, 2004). This is in accordance with evidence for 
hypermentalising in BPD linked with hypersensitivity to social and emotional 
stimuli, hypervigilance as well as difficulties suppressing knowledge of 
unrelated aversive material (Domes et al., 2008; Lynch et al., 2006).  In 
essence, what may seem like enhanced abilities, i.e. ‘hypermentalising’ in 
individuals with emotional instability may be just as maladaptive as having 
deficits in mentalising (i.e. undermentalising or no mentalising).  
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Another clinical disorder known to have deficits in mentalising is 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is characterized by disjointed  thoughts, affect, 
perception and behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The 
symptoms of schizophrenia fall into three categories; positive symptoms (e.g. 
hallucinations, delusions), negative symptoms (e.g. blunted affect, social 
withdrawal,   and cognitive symptoms (e.g. difficulties in working memory, 
executive functioning and attention; Sadock & Sadock, 2007).  Studies have 
shown that positive symptoms respond well to medication while negative 
symptoms are not easily treated (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Furthermore even if individuals with schizophrenia reach symptom remission, 
high relapse rates are frequent with up to 35% of individuals experiencing 
relapse within 2 years following the onset of the disorder (Zhang, Wang, Li, & 
Phillips, 1994). Frith (1992) first proposed an association between mentalising 
and schizophrenia, suggesting that several symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. 
social withdrawal as well as delusions of reference and persecution) can be 
explained by deficits in mentalising.  
A meta-analysis of schizophrenia studies conducted by  Sprong, 
Schothorst, Vos, Hox, and Engeland (2007) revealed a  large and statistically 
significant effect size showing mentalising deficiency in all symptom 
subgroups. Numerous other studies have reported social cognition difficulties 
in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (Addington, Penn, Woods, 
Addington, & Perkins, 2008; Taylor, MacDonald, & Cognitive Neuroscience 
Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia, 2012). Previous 
research has shown that individuals with schizophrenia have impairments in 
emotion recognition (Kohler et al., 2008; Linden et al., 2010; Tseng et al., 
2013). Furthermore, it has been suggested that these deficits in emotion 
identification may play a part in their  difficulties in interpersonal and social 
functioning (Pan, Chen, Chen, & Liu, 2009). Interestingly, Harrington, 
Langdon, Siegert, and McClure (2005) explained some of the positive 
symptoms such as paranoid delusions as types of hypermentalising, that is, a 
tendency to over-attribute mental states and intentions or to ascribe 
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intentions when in fact there are none. On the other hand, negative 
symptoms have been interpreted as a form of impaired mentalising, 
(Tordjman, 2008). Considering the paradox of findings, Langdon, Coltheart, 
Ward, and  Catts (2001) put forward that hypermentalising is a result of the 
incapacity to take appropriate perspectives; hence the deficits in typical 
mentalising give rise to the development of their own paranoid doubts onto 
people around them.  
A number of other disorders have been linked with mentalising 
impairments, including major depression (Fischer-Kern et al., 2013); bipolar 
disorder (Montag et al., 2010); Huntington’s disease (Brüne, Blank, Witthaus, 
& Saft, 2011), Parkinson’s disease (Bodden, Dodel, & Kalbe, 2010) and 
multiple sclerosis (Pöttgen, Dziobek, Reh, Heesen, & Gold, 2013). However, 
one of the most prominent disorders often associated with mentalising 
deficiencies is Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which will be the focus of the 
following sections.  
2.2 Background of autism spectrum disorder  
2.2.1 Historical accounts 
 
ASD was first identified and characterised by two different clinicians 
at around the same time period, describing the condition at a behavioural 
level. In 1943, Leo Kanner studied 11 children whom he described as having 
the following shared features: difficulties in social interactions, extreme 
autistic aloneness, excellent rote memory, difficulty adapting to changes in 
routine, hypersensitivity to certain stimuli such as sound, echolalia, feeding 
difficulties, limited range of spontaneous activity, poor eye contact, and 
repetitive behaviours.   Kanner categorised this set of symptoms as ‘infantile 
autism’. However it was not Kanner who first coined this term; about 20 
years prior to Kanner’s description, psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler used the word 
‘autistic’ to define the self-absorbed characteristics of patients with 
schizophrenia. It was derived from the Greek word ‘autos’ which means self.  
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Below is the original excerpt about Donald T (the first of Kanner’s 11 
child participants) illustrating some of the observed traits of ASD: 
"Eating," the report said, "has always been a problem with him. He 
has never shown a normal appetite. 
At the age of 1 year "he could hum and sing many tunes accurately." 
Before he was 2 years old, he had "an unusual memory for faces and names, 
knew the names of a great number of houses" in his home town. He quickly 
learned the whole alphabet "backward as well as forward" and to count to 
100 
The parents observed that "he was learning to ask questions or to 
answer questions unless they pertained to rhymes or things of this nature, 
and often then he would ask no question except in single words." 
It was observed at an early time that he got happiest when left alone, 
almost never cried to go with his mother, did not seem to notice his father's 
homecomings, and was indifferent to visiting relatives. The father made a 
special point of mentioning that Donald even failed to pay the slightest 
attention to Santa Claus in full regalia. 
He seems to be self-satisfied. He has no apparent affection when 
petted. He does not observe the fact that anyone comes or goes, and never 
seems glad to see father or mother or any playmate. He seems almost to 
draw into his shell and live within himself.  
In his second year, he "developed a mania for spinning blocks and 
pans and other round objects." At the same time, he had a dislike for self-
propelling vehicles, such as Taylor-tots, tricycles, and swings. 
There was a marked limitation of spontaneous activity. He wandered 
about smiling, making stereotyped movements with his fingers, crossing them 
about in the air. He shook his head from side, whispering or humming the 
same three-note tune. He spun with great pleasure anything he could seize 
upon to spin. He kept throwing things on the floor, seeming to delight in the 
sounds they made. He arranged beads, sticks, or blocks in groups of different 
series of colours. Whenever he finished one of these performances, he 
squealed and jumped up and down. Beyond this he showed no initiative, 
requiring constant instruction (from his mother) in any form of activity other 
than the limited ones in which he was absorbed. 
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There were also innumerable verbal rituals recurring all day long. 
When he desired to get down after his nap, he said, "Boo[his word for his 
mother], say 'Don, do you want to get down?'"  His mother would comply, 
and Don would say: "Now say 'All right.'"  
                                                                                (adapted from Kanner, 1943) 
Hans Asperger in 1944, while working independently of Kanner 
described a group of children he studied as ‘autistic psychopaths’.  
Interestingly, they bore a striking resemblance to Kanner’s account. The key 
differences in Asperger’s description was the absence of delayed echolalia, 
instead he portrayed the children as having the ability to speak like ‘little 
grown-ups’ as well as some of the children’s extraordinary abilities in areas 
such as mathematics and art (Asperger & Frith, 1991). Both Kanner and 
Asperger essentially described the same condition which manifested itself in 
different degrees of severity and some varying symptoms. They both 
asserted that ASD was inherent and pervasive. Five central attributes of ASD 
were put forward by Kanner and Eisenberg (1957): autistic aloneness, lack of 
spontaneous activity, repetitive speech and behaviours, obsessive desire for 
sameness, and islets of ability. Islets of ability are a unique skill set  that 1 in 
10 individuals with ASD have (Treffert, 2007) and are also commonly known 
as ‘savant’ or ‘splinter’ skills.  These superior cognitive or visuomotor skills 
may be present despite significant delays in other areas. Perhaps the most 
prominent examples are exceptional abilities in art, music, calculation, and 
memory.  
 It was only in the 1960s and 70s that ASD was established as a 
syndrome of its own and independent of other disorders such as mental 
retardation and schizophrenia (Happé & Frith, 1996). A large epidemiological 
study conducted by Wing and Gould (1979) examined children below 15 
years of age who presented with acute social interaction dysfunction, 
language anomalies, and repetitive and stereotyped behaviours. They 
introduced the notion of a 'triad of impairments' often seen in people with 
ASD; which refers to the social symptoms i.e. deficits in communication, 
socialisation and imagination.  
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2.2.2 Changes in concept and definition over the years 
 
Many of the symptoms described are still used to this day to explain 
the behavioural components of ASD and play a large role in our 
understanding of the disorder.  Though ASD was recognised as a distinct 
disorder in the 60s, it was only in 1980 that it was included in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (Third Edition) as a diagnosable 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). However at this time 
‘infantile autism’ was the only form of ASD included along with 6 key criteria. 
A revised version was produced as the manual underwent  vast changes to  
include more concrete diagnostic criteria of ASD suggesting that impairments 
should signify abnormalities in relation to one’s developmental level 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). It included the triad of impairments 
previously mentioned as well as features of repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviours. In total, sixteen criteria were proposed in this edition out of 
which eight must be met in order to qualify for a diagnosis of ASD. The next 
editions (Fourth and Fourth-Revised) of the manual once again revealed 
variations in diagnostic criteria. A distinct category called pervasive 
developmental disorders was introduced and subtypes of the disorder were 
established (i.e. autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, Rett’s disorder, 
childhood disintegrative disorder and pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified). As opposed to the prior edition, the manual now stated 
that only six of 16 symptoms need to be fulfilled in order to be diagnosed 
with autism. For a diagnosis of autism, two of the six symptoms must be 
obtained from the qualitative impairment in social interaction category, one 
from the qualitative impairment in communication and one from the 
restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  For a diagnosis of Asperger disorder, at least 
two of the social interaction criteria and one criterion from the repetitive and 
restricted behaviours domain must be met, with no delays in language 
development as well as average or above average  intellectual functioning 
(with the latter two points being the key differentiating criteria between 
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autism and Asperger’s). The remaining two criteria to be met are that delays 
and abnormal functioning should be apparent prior to three years of age; and 
the symptoms are not better accounted for by Rett’s disorder or childhood 
disintegrative disorder.  
 The latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders 
(Fifth Edition) was released in 2013. Many changes have occurred once again 
in the domain of ASD in view of increasing diagnostic reliability and 
sensitivity. This new model does away with the subtypes of autism (i.e. 
Asperger’s disorder and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise 
specified) to form a more universal diagnosis with just one diagnosis of 
‘autism spectrum disorder’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
rationale for change to a single umbrella disorder is that though evidence 
shows that clinicians are able to reliably differentiate between ASD and 
typically developing children, much less reliability has been found in 
distinguishing between autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder and pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified. Furthermore differences of 
the three conditions have been lacking consistency and have been linked to 
level of language ability, intelligence, and severity as opposed to distinct 
symptomatology specific to each condition. Studies also indicate that the 
clinical presentation of high-functioning autism and Asperger’s disorder is 
fundamentally comparable (Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000).  
 
The symptom domains now have two main areas as opposed to three; 
the first being, persistent deficits in social communication and social 
interaction (in which all three of the criteria must be met: deficits in social-
emotional reciprocity, nonverbal communicative behaviours, and developing 
and maintaining relationships). The second symptom domain is restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behaviours in which two of four criteria must be met 
(stereotyped and repetitive speech, excessive adherence to routines, highly 
restricted and fixated interests, and hyper/hypo reactivity to sensory stimuli). 
The DSM-5 criteria also cover a larger age range. Furthermore, symptom 
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severity ratings and specifiers such as intellectual disability can be defined for 
a clearer picture of the presentation of disorder. Hence, people with an ASD 
diagnosis would be described in terms of severity of social-communication 
signs and severity of restricted or repetitive behaviours or interests. Many 
have criticised the merging of the subtypes of autism into one diagnostic 
category; however, the latest findings have shown that DSM-5 criteria 
successfully identified 91% of individuals who have previously established 
DSM-IV pervasive developmental disorder diagnoses (Huerta, Bishop, 
Duncan, Hus, & Lord, 2012) suggesting that those with past diagnoses would 
still retain their diagnosis of ASD under the new DSM-5 criteria.  
 
2.2.3 Autism spectrum disorder explained 
 
ASD refers to a complex and pervasive neurodevelopmental 
syndrome with core deficits in the areas of reciprocal social interaction and 
communication, and restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests 
and activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The reason why ASD 
is recognised as a spectrum disorder is because the manifestation of the 
disorder can range from severe, low functioning to able, high-functioning.  
The prevalence of the disorder is estimated to be more than 1 in 100 in the 
United Kingdom, that is approximately 700000 individuals (National Autistic 
Society, 2013). In the United States of America, the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC; 2012) estimated a prevalence of 1 in 88. A 
review of ASD prevalence rates in six Asian countries (China, Japan, Israel, 
Indonesia, Iran and Taiwan) between 1980-2008  revealed an average of 14.8 
per 10000 people (Sun & Allison, 2010). Matson and Kozlowski (2011) put 
forward that the increasing prevalence of ASD around the globe can be 
attributed to factors such as heightened awareness of the condition, 
expanded diagnostic criteria, earlier age of diagnosis as well as the 
understanding that ASD is a lifelong condition.  
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  ASD typically emerges in children by 3 years of age, though 
developmental delays (e.g. speech and language) and other indicators may 
seem apparent at an earlier age. For instance poor eye contact and joint 
attention, not responding when name is called, poor imitation and pretend 
play abilities, as well as difficulties in language and nonverbal communication 
(Johnson & Myers, 2007). However some children on the spectrum appear to 
develop typically and then go through a sudden regression and stop using 
previously learned language, play or social skills  (Stefanatos, 2008).  
 
Individuals with ASD share a continuum of clinical features. One of the 
most striking and core difficulties is in the area of social communication and 
social interaction. They often have trouble in social-emotional reciprocity, for 
instance having unusual social initiations and imitation; poor understanding 
of the pragmatic use of language, difficulty initiating conversation, while in 
other cases conversations may be very one-sided (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Research has also shown that individuals with ASD often 
show reduced sharing of interests and emotions (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). People with ASD also have deficits in nonverbal 
communicative behaviours relevant for successful social interaction. Some 
examples include poor eye contact and understanding of gestures and body 
postures as well as inappropriate use of affect expression (may be limited or 
inflated). Furthermore, they face many challenges in developing and 
maintaining meaningful relationships as they may have difficulties in making 
friends, properly adapting to social contexts, and often show a general lack of 
interest in others.  
 
The impairments described above contribute to the notion that there 
may be mentalising difficulties within this population. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that the combination of these complexities results in difficulties in 
attributing mental states to others as well as interpreting social behaviours 
and situations. In addition, people with ASD also have a range of non-social 
clinical symptoms ranging from stereotyped or repetitive speech, motor 
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movements or use of objects (e.g. idiosyncratic speech, mannerisms such as 
flicking or rocking); extreme adherence to routine and ritualised patterns (e.g. 
insistence on travelling the same route); restricted, fixated interests  (e.g. 
preoccupations with maps or timetables); and under or over reactivity to 
sensory input in the environment (e.g. high tolerance for pain,  licking or 
sniffing of objects). In order to qualify for a diagnosis according to the DSM-5, 
individuals should meet a number of the symptoms mentioned above. In 
addition, the symptoms should be present in early childhood and together 
result in impairments in daily functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
 
 Though it has been over 60 years from the time ASD was first 
described, the causes of this disorder are yet to be known though research 
suggests a multitude of factors. A great deal of evidence supports a genetic 
basis (e.g. mutations, deletions) for the development of the disorder (Muhle, 
Trentacoste, & Rapin, 2004). In addition to studies which have started to 
reveal specific biomarkers for autism, a number of behavioural genetics 
studies, looking at familial risk indicate a definite genetic basis to the 
condition. Among families who already have a child with ASD, there is a 2% to 
8%  likelihood that another sibling will also have the condition (Ozonoff et al., 
2011). A large number of individuals diagnosed with ASD also often have 
Fragile X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis and other related genetic and 
chromosomal conditions (Sadock & Sadock, 2007), although there is debate 
whether individuals with a genetic disorder of known etiology should be 
given a diagnosis of ASD if they meet DSM criteria. 
 
Although genetic factors have proven to play a large role in this 
disorder, studies suggest that the manifestation of the genetic predisposition 
may be influenced by various environmental factors; for example the 
exposure to teratogens such as thalidomide in early pregnancy (Landrigan, 
2010). Other risk factors include increased maternal and paternal age 
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(Grether, Anderson, Croen, Smith, & Windham, 2009) as well being born 
extremely preterm (Johnson et al., 2010).  
 
Certain neuroanatomical differences have also been reported in the 
ASD population. Pickett and London's (2005) review reported atypical growth 
of the forebrain limbic system and reduced number of Purkinje cells in the 
cerebellum.  The following three brain structures have been implicated in 
playing key roles in social cognition deficits in ASD; amygdala, the superior 
temporal sulcus region and the fusiform gyrus (Pelphrey, Adolphs, & Morris, 
2004).  Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman, and Bookheimer (2004) reported that 
children with ASD showed significantly less activity compared to healthy 
controls in the fusiform gyrus in an emotion matching task and that amygdala 
activity was not moderated by task demands.  Reduced activity in the left and 
right superior temporal sulci and gyri have also been reported (Gervais et al., 
2004). Furthermore, in Critchley et al.'s (2000) study with implicit and explicit 
emotion processing tasks, it was revealed that adults with ASD failed to 
activate the amygdala in the implicit (unconscious) task while they failed to 
activate the fusiform gyrus in the explicit (conscious) task. On the whole, 
studies have suggested that people with ASD may utilise different neural 
networks in processing everyday tasks and information.   
In addition, studies have demonstrated that certain subgroups are at 
higher risk for developing ASD than others. Data has revealed that boys are 
five times more likely to have ASD compared to girls (Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2012). Volkmar, Cook, Pomeroy, Realmuto, & 
Tanguay (1999) reported that about 70%-75% of individuals with ASD 
function in the borderline to mentally disabled range of intellectual 
functioning while about 30% are in the average range (Sadock & Sadock, 
2007).  
 
 While ASD is a pervasive condition, various methods of intervention 
have been developed over the years to improve the overall quality of life as 
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well as to promote integration into the community. Examples of intervention 
models often utilised within the ASD population are behaviour management, 
early intervention, educational and school based therapy, occupational 
therapy, social skills training and speech therapy (Volkmar et al., 1999). Many 
of the intervention models are targeted at children with ASD as research has 
shown that early intervention greatly improves therapeutic outcomes 
(Volkmar et al., 1999).  
2.2.4 How is autism spectrum disorder diagnosed? 
 
 As many characteristic behaviours of ASD are apparent in the early 
years, children are often diagnosed with ASD at around 3 years of age. At the 
initial stage, clinicians frequently rely on behavioural traits to evaluate the 
presence of the condition.  Multiple ASD screening tools have been 
developed to briefly assess children’s social and communication 
developmental levels. These tools are commonly used in paediatric and 
sometimes even educational settings, such as the Modified Checklist for 
Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT;  Robins, Fein, Barton, & Green, 2001); while the 
Autism Spectrum Screening Questionnaire is used for older children (ASSQ; 
Ehlers, Gillberg, & Wing, 1999). These screeners are designed to signal any 
possible indicators of an ASD and to warrant a comprehensive evaluation 
should it be necessary.  The following step involves a wide-ranging 
assessment in order to accurately ascertain the presence or absence of ASD 
or any other developmental condition.  A thorough evaluation is often 
conducted by a multidisciplinary team of professionals some of whom may 
be psychologists, developmental paediatricians, neurologists, speech 
therapists, psychiatrists and other relevant professionals involved in the 
diagnoses of people with ASD. Complete case histories are evaluated in order 
to get a clear understanding of the individual’s developmental, medical and 
family background. Tests of intellectual functioning are often conducted to 
determine current level of cognitive reasoning ability, to understand 
preferred learning styles and to guide intervention initiatives.  Other areas of 
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psychological evaluation are day-to-day adaptive functioning, play skills, 
motor and visuomotor skills as well as social cognition (Klin, Saulnier, 
Tsatsanis, & Volkmar, 2005). Another crucial aspect in the diagnosis of ASD is 
the assessment of speech, language and communication ability. The 
assessment is not only limited to the technical components of speech and 
language development such as phonology, syntax and vocabulary; as socially 
relevant communicative areas such as prosody, metalinguistics, pragmatics, 
and social reciprocity are also examined.  
 In addition to the various evaluations noted above, there are two 
instruments which have been designed for use as ASD diagnostic tools and 
are now considered the 'gold standard' of ASD diagnostic procedure 
(Falkmer, Anderson, Falkmer, & Horlin, 2013)- the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R;  Rutter, Le Couteur, & Lord, 2003) and the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). The ADI-R is a 
semi-structured interview to be administered to parents or primary 
caregivers and can be used for diagnostic purposes for individuals with a 
mental age of at least 18 months. The interview consists of four core domains 
being early development (e.g. developmental milestones), social 
communication (e.g. reciprocal conversation, nonverbal communication, 
echolalia) social development and play skills (e.g. eye contact, pretend play, 
prosocial behaviours), and repetitive and restricted patterns of interests and 
behaviours  (e.g. bizarre preoccupations,  motor mannerisms ritualistic 
behaviour, unusual sensory interests). Information obtained from the 
interview about an individual's developmental history and present 
behaviours is then converted into a scoring algorithm which is compatible 
with the DSM-IV criteria for ASD (a new algorithm consistent with DSM-5 is 
presumably in the pipeline).   
 While the ADI-R looked at obtaining comprehensive information 
relevant to ASD from caregivers, the ADOS operates on a direct observational 
structure with the primary goal of assessing spontaneous communication, 
reciprocal social interaction, and play skills in an informal and naturalistic 
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manner (but within a clinical context). It can be used for both children and 
adults and is also suitable for use with individuals who are nonverbal as well 
as those who have fluent speech. Typical administration of the ADOS requires 
approximately 30-45 minutes. There are four modules in the ADOS, with the 
appropriate module being selected based on the individuals’ level of verbal 
language and chronological age. The minimum expressive language 
requirement for Module 1 is no speech, while the maximum being simple 
phrases. Module 2 requires a minimum of flexible three-word phrases up to a 
maximum of verbally fluent. Module 3 is typically administered to verbally 
fluent children or young adolescents whereas Module 4 is intended for 
verbally fluent adolescents and adults. The expressive communication 
subdomain of the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale (VABS; Sparrow, Balla, 
& Cicchetti, 1984) is a useful guide in gauging module appropriateness. In 
general children who obtain an expressive language score of at least 30 
months can be administered Module 2 while Module 3 and 4 are suited for 
individuals who are functioning verbally at least at the 48 months level.   
 Module 1 consists of 10 activities which can be administered flexibly 
with an emphasis on the use of toys and other items relevant to children 
below the age of three.  It includes a series of fun and playful ‘presses’, that 
is, conditions created specifically to scrutinise spontaneous behaviours in the 
respective conditions. Some of the activities in Module 1 are free play (e.g. to 
observe independent use of toys, and presence of repetitive behaviours); 
bubble play (e.g. to elicit eye contact and verbalisation) and birthday party 
(e.g. to see the child’s capacity to engage in functional and symbolic play). 
Module 2 contains 14 activities again with an emphasis on the playful use of 
toys, aimed at children who have phrase speech. Examples of Module 2 
activities include conversation (e.g. to examine the child’s capacity to have a 
simple verbal reciprocal exchange); snack (e.g. to observe the child’s ability to 
make requests) and demonstration task (e.g. to view the child’s proficiency in 
relating a common sequence of actions through gestures). The activities in 
Module 3 and 4 on the other hand focus on social, communicative and 
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language behaviours. Module 3 includes activities such as emotions (e.g.  to 
probe the individual’s description, understanding and instance of 
experiencing at least two emotions) and social difficulties and annoyance 
(e.g. to examine the individual’s awareness of social difficulties and sense of 
responsibility for their own actions).   Examples of activities in Module 4 are 
friends and marriage (e.g. to acquire the individual’s explanation of personal 
friendship experiences and to ascertain the individual’s understanding of the 
concept of friendship, steady couple relationships and starting a family) and 
plans and hopes (e.g. to probe the individual’s ambitions and aspirations).  
The observations are then coded in accordance with meticulous 
criteria whilst taking into account vital diagnostic components such as facial 
expressions, social reciprocity, prosody, gestures, idiosyncratic use of 
language as well as imagination and creativity (Klin et al., 2005). All ADOS 
modules have Communication, Reciprocal Social Interaction, 
Imagination/Creativity and Stereotyped Behaviours and Restricted Interests 
subscales. However, only the Communication and Reciprocal Social 
Interaction scores contribute to the overall diagnostic scores; with the autism 
cut-off being 10 and the autism spectrum cut-off being 7. Similar to the ADI-
R, the diagnostic algorithm of the ADOS is compatible with DSM-IV. The ADI-R 
and ADOS are frequently used together by clinicians in the diagnostic process 
in order to gain pertinent information from these complementary sources. In 
2012, the ADOS-2 was released with an additional Toddler module enabling 
the assessment of children as young as 12 months old.   
2.3 Autism spectrum disorder and the theory of mentalising 
 
Mentalising was discussed in detail in Chapter 1; in this section 
mentalising is considered in relation to ASD.  This theory fundamentally 
states that  individuals with ASD fail to “impute mental states to themselves 
and others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). Similarly, Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith (1985) stated that individuals with ASD have difficulties in 
understanding the minds of others i.e. mentalising. The problems people with 
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ASD have in comprehending the mental states of others could explain some 
of the symptoms characteristic of the disorder. If there is no understanding 
that different minds have varying mental states and that people act upon 
them accordingly, it would prove to be extremely arduous to apprehend and 
anticipate the behaviour of others, resulting in problems with meaningful 
social relationships and interactions.  Difficulties in social communication can 
also be related to deficits in mentalising as the understanding of social 
reciprocity and body language (among others) is vital in successful 
communication. The mentalising theory of autism however does not extend 
to explain other ASD symptoms i.e. restricted and repetitive patterns of 
behaviour as well as savant skills (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Impairments 
in executive functioning have been proposed to account for the non-social 
features of ASD such as repetitive and restricted behaviours as well as 
insistence on sameness. Executive functioning refers to a set of higher-order 
control processes often utilized in complex or novel situations. These include 
set-shifting, the use of working memory, observing and planning behaviours, 
and inhibiting automatic responses (Happé, 1999).  On the other hand, savant 
skills in ASD may be explained by the cognitive model of weak central 
coherence. Frith (2003) described central coherence as a form of information 
processing aimed at drawing together material to create a ‘cohesive’ model 
which enables the selecting of only relevant information and disregarding the 
rest. While typically developing people are able to do this, individuals with 
ASD may have a ‘weak’ central coherence, hence perceiving information 
disjointedly without bearing in mind context and the meaning of the 
information at hand. Thus it is clear that none of the three cognitive accounts 
(i.e. mentalising, executive function, weak central coherence) adequately 
explain all facets of ASD individually. As ASD is a multifarious condition with 
some individuals displaying certain aspects and others not, Baron-Cohen and 
Swettenham (1997) proposed that the cognitive accounts should be ascribed 
independently.  
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 A great deal of research has examined people’s ability to mentalise 
using a variety of false belief tasks (e.g. Max-chocolate and crayon-candy 
tasks as detailed in Chapter 1). Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) first 
investigated mentalising abilities of children with ASD with the seminal Sally-
Anne task. In the task, the children are told a story of a character called Sally 
who places a marble in a basket, then leaves the room. Then another 
character called Anne moves the marble from the basket to a box, resulting 
in Sally’s false belief about the location of the marble when she returns to the 
room looking for the marble. Children are then asked where Sally thinks the 
marble is located or to guess where Sally will first look for the marble (i.e. 
belief question) (see Figure 2.2). Children were also asked two control 
questions in order to establish that they understand where the marble was 
originally placed (i.e. memory question) and understand where the marble’s 
current location is (i.e. reality question).  Essentially, this is the same problem 
devised by Wimmer and Perner in the 'Max' task - however, the story is 
adapted a little to further simplify the narrative for children with ASD. In 
order to pass this task, children must comprehend that Sally has a false belief 
and select the basket as the location where she will look, although in reality 
the children themselves should be aware that the marble is now placed in the 
box. The findings revealed that although the mental age of the children with 
ASD was higher than the comparison children with Down Syndrome and 
healthy controls, and certainly higher than the age of four years (at which 
typically developing children tend to succeed at this task) about 80% of 
children with ASD failed to predict accurately where Sally would look for the 
marble while the majority of children in comparison groups were able to. As 
children with Down's Syndrome could appreciate the protagonist's false 
belief, the findings have been interpreted as suggesting that children with 
ASD have a specific deficit in comprehending the mental states of others. 
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      Figure 2.2: The Sally-Anne task (adapted from Frith, 2003). 
 
Perner, Frith, Leslie, and Leekam (1989) investigated false belief attribution 
using the deceptive box paradigm (i.e. unexpected contents task as described 
in Chapter 1). They found that almost 85% of the children with ASD aged 
between 3 to 13 years of age showed difficulties recognising false beliefs by 
predicting that another child would state that a pencil was inside the 
container; conversely the comparison participants successfully acknowledged 
another child’s false belief by predicting that he/she would think that 
container had sweets inside (see Figure 2.3).   
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Figure 2.3: An illustration of the Smarties Task (adapted from Happe & 
Frith, 1999). 
 
 Though the above-mentioned studies provide convincing evidence 
that children with ASD have difficulty understanding false beliefs, it must be 
noted that a minority of the group with ASD in fact passed the false belief 
tasks, which led some critics to suggest that if there is a deficit in mentalising 
in ASD, this may not be universal. To combat this criticism, Baron-Cohen 
(1989) then put forward the notion of mentalising impairments in individuals 
with ASD as a delay rather than a deficit. In other words, he suggested that 
some individuals with ASD may acquire the ability to mentalise, but that this 
acquisition would occur at a later age than for individuals of typical 
development or those with other types of developmental disorders. However 
a range of subsequent studies examining false belief understanding in 
children, adolescents and adults with ASD revealed that individuals with high-
functioning ASD i.e. those with average or above average intelligence were 
able to pass first-order (i.e. acknowledge another person’s false belief with 
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regards to real events) as well as second order false belief tasks (i.e. ‘he 
thinks she thinks’, to assign false belief to one person based on the thoughts 
of another person; Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994).  Nevertheless proponents of the mentalising 
deficit account of ASD have argued that even passing more complex false 
belief tasks should not be taken as a valid indication of having proficient 
mentalising abilities as it has been shown that these tasks have a ceiling rate 
which parallels a mental age range of between 4 to 8 years (Perner & 
Wimmer, 1985; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001).   
 Consistent with this analysis,  Happé (1995) demonstrated a strong 
correlation between false belief task performance, IQ and verbal language 
ability; children with ASD with a verbal mental age of 12 years and above 
were able to pass first-order false belief tasks. The age at which children with 
ASD almost always pass these first-order tasks signifies a vast delay as 
compared to neurotypical children who successfully accomplish this task at 
about the age of four (Wellman et al., 2001). In light of the association 
between verbal language ability and performance on false belief tasks, it is 
within reason that people with ASD who have strong verbal ability or are high 
functioning may perform at ceiling level in given first-order and second-order 
false belief tasks. Essentially, it has been suggested these individuals may be 
able to develop strategies which they can use to reason through the tasks 
and respond with the correct answer, albeit perhaps through a different 
process than that routinely used by typically developing individuals. Frith, 
Happé, and Siddons (1994) proposed that individuals with ASD are perhaps 
passing these tasks by ‘hacking’ out solutions. Though ‘hacking’ is not clearly 
outlined, they appear to suggest that people with ASD solve first and second-
order false belief tasks through rule-based learning in what they may 
comprehend as logical problem solving. Hence it is conceivable that people 
with ASD have universal difficulties in mentalising even though standard 
simplistic false belief tasks are not sensitive enough to uncover these 
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difficulties within the subgroup of high functioning, verbally able individuals 
with ASD.   
2.3.1 Advanced tests of mentalising  
 
 Numerous 'advanced' mentalising tasks were then developed in order 
to address the shortcomings of the previous tasks with the aim of creating 
more sensitive measures for examining mental state attribution in the ASD 
population. It is notable that these generally do not involve false belief 
attribution and in fact they differ widely in terms of their nature.   One of the 
foremost advanced tasks of mentalising to be developed was the Strange 
Stories task (Happé, 1994). The task comprised 24 short stories or vignettes 
about simple everyday situations in which people say things which are not 
meant to be taken literally. The participants are required to read the story 
and then answer questions about why protagonists in the stories said what 
they did. The naturalistic quality of this task was expected to prove to be 
challenging for people with ASD as it required understanding of the relevant 
social contexts presented in the stories. The results of the study showed that 
the participants with ASD were worse compared to neurotypical and mentally 
disabled controls at offering mental state descriptions of the characters in 
the stories that were appropriate for the given social context.  It was also 
demonstrated that individuals with ASD who passed first and second-order 
belief tasks nevertheless provided inaccurate mental state explanations for 
some of the stories as compared to healthy controls who made no such 
errors. This therefore appears to provide some support for the notion that 
individuals who pass second-order false belief tasks might still have residual 
impairment in mentalising. Other studies utilising the Strange Stories task 
have replicated these findings  that children, adolescents and adults with high 
functioning ASD and Asperger syndrome perform less well compared to 
neurotypical individuals (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kaland et al., 2005). 
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Another widely used advanced test of mentalising is the ‘Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes ‘ test which involves attributing mental states to the eye 
region of the face (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). The task, which is 
also described in Chapter 1, consisted of presenting a series of static pictures 
depicting simple and complex mental states from the eye region of the face. 
Participants selected which of four words they thought best portrayed what 
the person in the photograph was feeling or thinking (see Figure 2.4). The 
emphasis on the eye region was established as a prior study (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Jolliffe, & Therese, 1997) demonstrated that although people 
with ASD were able to identify what they described as basic mental states or 
'emotions' (e.g. sad, happy), they were impaired at identifying something 
they described as 'complex  mental states' (e.g. shy, guilt)  when only the 
eyes were exhibited.  The findings in the 2001 study revealed that individuals 
with ASD performed poorly at identifying mental states when presented 
pictures of the eyes as compared to controls. Again, these findings have been 
interpreted as suggesting that while high functioning individuals with ASD 
may be able to pass false belief tests, they still have impairments imputing 
mental states which can be made apparent if a task of sufficient difficulty is 
devised.  
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Figure 2.4: A sample of the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test 
(adapted from Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The answers are (from top 
down); playful, upset and desire. 
 
Part of the appeal of Baron-Cohen’s et al.’s (2001) findings was that 
they seem to accord well with anecdotal reports that individuals with ASD 
tend to have unusual eye contact, and in particular to avoid eye contact. 
Indeed, one of the indicators taken into account in the ADOS is having 
abnormal eye contact behaviour. If people with ASD do not like to look at the 
eye region of the face, and if this same region has crucial information for 
identifying others' mental states, then this could explain how some of the 
social difficulties in ASD come about. Following Baron-Cohen's study, there 
has been an increasing number of studies investigating face perception in 
individuals with ASD, including studies involving eye tracking techniques 
which aim to identify how individuals with ASD attend to social stimuli, and in 
particular the eyes.  
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2.3.2 Mentalising and the eye region  
 
 Hernandez et al. (2009) studied the eye gaze behavior of 11 adults 
with ASD and 23 neurotypical individuals in a face processing task involving 
neutral faces (with direct or averted gaze), faces portraying an emotion (i.e. 
happy or sad) and a range of computer-generated faces. A total of 50 static 
images of models depicting neutral, happy and sad expressions along with 
the computer-generated images were presented to participants for 4 seconds 
each.   They reported that although individuals with ASD spent more time 
looking at the eye region compared to the other areas of interest i.e. mouth 
and nose, they spent less time looking at the eye region as compared to the 
neurotypical participants.   
Instead of using static images, Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, and 
Cohen (2002) created an elegant experiment using intense emotional 
excerpts from the classic  1966 film entitled ‘Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?’.  
Fifteen participants with ASD and 15 healthy controls viewed 5 digitized 
videoclips of social scenes (ranging between 30-60 seconds each) from the 
movie while being eye-tracked (see Figure 2.5). Consistent with Hernandez et 
al. (2009), they found participants with ASD visually fixated less on the eye 
region of the face as compared to healthy controls. They also demonstrated 
that individuals with ASD spent more time fixating on the mouth region and 
that was linked with improved social adaptation and a lesser degree of social 
impairment related to ASD. In contrast, findings also revealed that individuals 
with ASD spent more time looking at the objects in the social scenes as 
compared to healthy controls and this was associated with lower social 
adaption and a higher degree of ASD-related social impairment.  
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Figure 2.5: Sample visual fixation of a person with ASD (red) and 
neurotypical (yellow) while watching a social scene depicting a shocked 
actor (adapted from Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002a). 
 
 Rutherford and Towns (2008) investigated the looking patterns of 22 
people with (n=11) and without (n=11) ASD in an emotion recognition task, 
using images sourced from Baron Cohen et al. (1997). Participants were 
shown 20 images of a female face portraying various simple emotions (e.g. 
happy, angry, surprise) and complex emotions (e.g. scheming, flirting, 
arrogant). Participants were presented with the images twice through 
(totalling 40 trials) followed by 2 emotion words, with only one emotion word 
being the correct response (see Figure 2.6 and 2.7 for a sample of 
participants’ eye gaze path).  They reported that both ASD and neurotypical 
participants looked significantly longer at the eye region as compared to the 
mouth. Nonetheless participants with ASD were found to look less at the 
eyes compared to neurotypicals paricularly when viewing complex emotions.  
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Figure 2.6: Visual gaze patterns for ‘happy’ facial expression of 4 
neurotypical  participants (adapted from Rutherford & Towns, 2008). 
 
                                                
Figure 2.7: Visual gaze patterns for ‘happy’ facial expression of 4 
participants with ASD (adapted from Rutherford & Towns, 2008) . 
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To further investigate how people with ASD process information from 
the eye region of the face, Freeth, Chapman, Ropar, and Mitchell (2010) 
investigated the eye gaze behaviours of 24 individuals with high-functioning 
ASD and 24 matched healthy controls. Individuals were presented with 
complex photo images containing one person either looking directly at the 
camera or looking at an object within the scene (see Figure 2.8). All images 
depicted daily and familiar settings such as an office or living room. 
Individuals were presented with 8 different images, in four of which the 
person in the photo had straight gaze while the remaining four showed the 
person looking towards an object. Freeth et al (2010) conducted two 
experiments wherein images were displayed for 5 seconds in Experiment 1, 
while they were displayed for 2 seconds in Experiment 2. The findings 
revealed that both ASD and neurotypical participants spent a considerable 
amount of time  fixating on the face of the person in the images, specifically 
the upper part of the face containing the eyes.  They also found that typically 
developing participants were quicker to fixate on the face as opposed to 
individuals with ASD, who were faster to fixate on objects in the image. In 
addition, results showed that individuals with ASD responded to eye gaze 
signals as did neurotypical individuals by looking at the object when the 
person in the photo was gazing towards it. However, they did not 
concentrate as much on the object looked at by the person in the image as 
the neurotypical individuals did.  
                    
 
Figure 2.8: An example of an image showing the person gazing towards an 
object (adapted from Freeth et al. 2010). 
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Nonetheless, findings that individuals with ASD demonstrate reduced 
fixation to the eye region has been inconsistently found in subsequent 
studies. A recent study showed that individuals with and without ASD spent 
longer time looking at the eye region as compared to the mouth region of the 
face in both basic and complex emotion recognition tasks although the 
accuracy rates of individuals with ASD in the emotion recognition task were 
poorer than healthy controls (Sawyer, Williamson, & Young, 2012). This 
suggests that the traditional view of mental state recognition impairment and 
its link to eye gaze aversion may not sufficiently explain these difficulties.  
 In contrast to previous findings, Song, Kawabe, Hakoda, and Du 
(2012) demonstrated evidence of the ability of children with ASD to interpret 
information from the eye region. Using the ‘Bubbles’ method, 15 children 
with high-functioning  ASD and 18 typically developing children were asked to 
judge identity and emotions based on images of facial features. It was 
reported that similar to the typically developing controls, children with ASD 
inferred information from the eyes for both the identity and emotion 
judgement tasks. Additionally, they performed as well as their counterparts 
in both tasks, contesting the premise that people with ASD cannot pay 
attention to the eye region or obtain pertinent information from the eyes of 
others. In addition, Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse (2008) contributed to the range 
of studies which have illustrated the challenge of reliably establishing a 
relationship between mentalising performance and eye gaze behaviour in an 
experimental task. In their study, 42 participants (21 with ASD and 21 healthy 
controls) completed the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect recognition in 
which they were presented with 60 emotionally expressive face images in 
two phases. The first being the ‘free-viewing’ phase with no experimental 
task and the second phase called for a judgement of the emotion being 
expressed in the images. The images were shown in randomised order in the 
first phase of the eye-tracking experiment while it was shown in the 
standardised order in the second phase. The findings of this study revealed 
that the difficulty individuals with ASD have in fixating in the eye region was 
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only reflected in their impairment in identifying the expression of fear in 
faces and not the recognition of the other presented facial expressions. 
While the studies reviewed above had an emphasis on eye region and 
mentalising ability, the following section discusses mentalising ability and 
studies related to face processing in general. Literature on mental state 
recognition via face processing studies involving individuals with ASD has 
been variable. While some studies have reported that individuals with ASD 
have no difficulties in affect recognition tasks (e.g. Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 
2001; Rutherford & Towns, 2008) others have demonstrated that they have 
deficits in identifying certain mental states such as disgust, surprise and anger 
(Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010) as well as fear 
(Corden et al., 2008). Studies of children with ASD revealed that they had 
deficits in detecting anger and needed more time compared to typically 
developing children to accurately detect other mental states (Bal et al., 
2010). Similarly, Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew, and Strauss (2009) 
demonstrated that the children with ASD in their study were impaired in 
identifying negative emotions particularly anger and fear. They also reported 
that while emotion recognition performance increased with age in the 
typically developing group, the performance of individuals with ASD was 
relatively comparable in all age groups. The paradoxical findings may be 
related to the strength at which these mental states are displayed, as people 
with ASD  show difficulties in identifying mental states shown at lower 
intensity (Law Smith et al., 2010). The need for higher intensity facial 
expressions for correct emotion identification (Wallace et al., 2011) can be 
related to daily social interactions as most facial expressions are understated 
which could offer an explanation for the difficulties people with ASD have in 
day-to-day interactions. Furthermore, in real-life people typically display a 
mixture of facial expressions conceivably making this task more difficult for 
individuals with ASD. 
 If individuals with ASD have trouble recognising basic emotions, how 
would they fare in the identification of social emotions (as described in 
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Chapter 1)? As social emotions require the understanding of social rules and 
the representation of another person’s mind, mentalising tasks using social 
emotions should reveal deficits within the population with ASD. Golan, 
Baron-Cohen, and Golan's (2008) study found that children performed worse 
in the identification of complex social emotions in the ‘Reading the Mind in 
Films’ task. On the whole, the literature suggests that although individuals 
with ASD may be able to recognise basic mental states, the identification of 
both basic and complex mental states is more demanding particularly in real-
life settings with displays of instantaneous behavioural responses. 
2.3.3 Mentalising tasks using dynamic and naturalistic stimuli  
 
Speer, Cook, McMahon, and Clark (2007) examined the eye gaze 
patterns of individuals with ASD while watching dynamic social scenes and 
static pictures from the film ‘Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?’  Participants 
were presented with four kinds of stimuli; social dynamic, social static, 
isolated dynamic and isolated static. It was found that ASD and typically 
developing individuals gaze patterns varied only for dynamic stimuli, but not 
for static stimuli. Findings also revealed that individuals with ASD differed 
from their neurotypical counterparts only when viewing the social dynamic 
stimuli, gazing less at the face and more at the body regions. The results 
suggest that individuals with ASD may have a tendency to show different 
visual gaze patterns for dynamic, realistic and socially intricate stimuli though 
it must be noted that the stimuli presented was adapted from a film over 40 
years old with extremely intense and larger-than-life emotional expressions.   
Similarly, Back, Ropar, and Mitchell (2007) further provided evidence 
for the difficulty people with ASD have in interpreting mental states from 
dynamic facial stimuli. Their study investigated the ability of people with ASD 
to infer mental states from static and dynamic facial stimuli. They developed 
a technique called ‘freezing’ in which either the eyes or mouth sections of the 
face were fixed on a static and neutral expression. Participants were then 
presented with a series of stimuli in different combinations of ‘freezing’, 
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which enabled further examination of which parts of the face was used to 
infer mental states.    In one experiment, they studied 18 individuals with ASD 
aged between 10-14 years of age and found that although individuals with 
ASD were able to attribute a range of mental states to static and dynamic 
facial expressions, they were not as successful as typically developing 
controls (for instance in inferring complex mental states such as worry from 
dynamic faces). It was also found that individuals with ASD performed better 
in the task when the eyes and mouth regions were not ‘frozen’ (i.e. conveyed 
information), suggesting that people with ASD do make use of information 
from the eye region. 
Perhaps the reason why group differences are more often found using 
dynamic stimuli is because such tasks more closely approximate the 
mentalising requirements of everyday life. Various studies using stimuli that 
have real-life social relevance have found group differences, such as the 
Social Attribution Task (Klin, 2000), the Faux Pas test (Spek, Scholte, & 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2009), and the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery 
(Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006). It is worth noting that Baron Cohen et 
al.’s (2001) findings were not replicated in a study conducted by Roeyers, 
Buysse, Ponnet, and Pichal (2001) as they found that adults with ASD were 
not impaired in the  ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes ‘ test. Interestingly 
however, these participants had difficulties in deducing emotions from videos 
of people in real-world social interactions. Other studies have demonstrated 
consistent findings whereby adults with ASD showed impairments in 
identifying complex mental states such as 'admiring' from social scenes in 
films  as indexed through the ‘Reading the Mind in Films’ task (Golan, Baron-
Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006). Similarly, the Awkward Moments Test (Heavey, 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000) was designed to approximate the 
demands of real-life mentalising in people with ASD. Participants were 
presented with film excerpts obtained from television advertisements and 
were required to answer two questions; one in regards to a character’s 
mental state and another non-social question. The findings once again 
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revealed that participants with ASD scored significantly worse than 
neurotypical controls in questions that required mentalising ability. Hence it 
may be that individuals with ASD have more difficulty inferring mental states 
from dynamic (moving) as opposed to static stimuli whereby the former 
consists of behavioural responses which are often fleeting and understated.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that all the mentalising tasks reviewed 
above depict dynamic yet ‘acted’ facial expressions and behavioural 
responses. Though more efficient than static stimuli to investigate 
mentalising ability, the use of ‘posed’ dynamic stimuli nevertheless 
introduces the risk of losing the true sense of real-world interaction.  In 
addition to this, correct answers to the acted stimuli are often decided by 
means of consensus, which by extension suggests that the true mental state 
of the actor is unknown, as the actor merely followed directions and 
portrayed what was instructed of him or her. Perhaps the only published 
study that has used non-posed stimuli was conducted by  Boraston et al. 
(2008), who investigated the ability of people with ASD to distinguish 
between images of people displaying either posed smiles or spontaneous 
genuine smiles. They found that people with ASD were impaired in 
determining posed vs. genuine smiles and that performance on the task 
correlated with social interaction competence as measured by the ADOS. 
While this study successfully revealed that individuals with ASD have 
difficulties in recognising between posed and fake smiles, their ability in 
distinguishing between a wider array of naturalistic situations is not yet 
known.  
On the whole, the dynamic qualities of facial behaviour are especially 
imperative to face processing studies as it has been associated with increased 
performance in emotion identification tasks, particularly for subtle stimuli 
(Krumhuber, Kappas, & Manstead, 2013). To the researcher’s knowledge 
there is no published study that has efficiently investigated mentalising 
abilities in individuals with ASD using the essential components mentioned 
above. In recognition of this, one of the primary goals of this thesis was to 
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create a paradigm to tackle these limitations, specifically to create stimuli 
which are dynamic, naturalistic and spontaneous.  
 
2.4 Significant components of studying difficulties in 
mentalising  
2.4.1 Naturalistic and spontaneous mental state recognition 
 
A review of relevant literature and the importance of utilising 
naturalistic, spontaneous and dynamic stimuli was deliberated in section 
2.3.3. As evidenced by a dearth of studies in the area, the development of 
new techniques to explore people’s capacity to interpret spontaneous and 
naturalistic stimuli is essential. Nonetheless past research has often 
investigated people’s ability to impute mental states via direct identification 
of a mental state (which has its own set of limitations as previously discussed 
in Chapter 1); hence a better method of mental state identification is 
warranted.  
As discussed in previous sections, although people with high-
functioning ASD are able to pass standard tests of mentalising, they continue 
to struggle in daily social interactions. This suggests that they may have 
subtle difficulties which have been frequently overlooked in the past. Given 
these striking yet inconspicuous difficulties, a technique to examine 
mentalising ability within the population with ASD is necessitated, in 
particular using naturalistic and spontaneous stimuli (i.e. that are ecologically 
valid and representative of real-world situations) as well as employing a 
method that is objective and empirical (i.e.  devoid of potential bias as 
associated with consensus-based mental state identification).  Other than 
consensus ratings of ‘correct’ mental state identification, another frequently 
used method of achieving mental state classification is by getting targets’ 
self-reports of their mental state labels, though this has been shown to be 
questionably accurate due to a myriad of factors, for instance the 
60 
 
heterogeneity of mental state labelling and the diversity of people’s 
understanding of mental states. The question remains, how can we better 
understand the mental state reasoning of those with ASD and how they 
utilise this knowledge to make sense of others’ behaviours in the social 
world? A novel approach is introduced and evaluated in the following 
section.  
2.4.2 Retrodictive mentalising 
 
What does it mean to have a proficient ability to mentalise? A large 
body of research conducted with both neurotypical and people with ASD 
focuses on the ability to predict future behaviour as a vital indicator of 
mentalising ability. For instance, Senju, Southgate, White, and Frith (2009) 
tested 19 individuals with Asperger’s disorder and 17 neurotypical individuals 
in a non-verbal false belief task involving spontaneous looking behaviour. 
Participants viewed an actor placing a ball into box A. Later a puppet is shown 
moving the ball into box B, unknown to the actor. Participants are then asked 
where the actor would look for the ball. Findings revealed that individuals 
with Asperger’s did not show spontaneous anticipatory gaze behaviour 
toward the correct location (based on the actor’s false belief) during the task 
while neurotypical participants did.   However both groups successfully 
predicted the location of the ball when explicitly asked to do so. More 
examples of studies such as that outlined above have been reviewed in 
Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter.  Based on the literature reviewed, it is 
known that mentalising cannot be measured in its entirety through methods 
that have been used over the years such as behaviour prediction through first 
and second-order false belief tasks and mental state reasoning through 
emotion recognition tasks, which are often further constrained by potential 
limitations in language ability. 
  A relatively new method to investigate mentalising in an innovative 
way tests something called ‘retrodiction’ (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In 
essence, retrodiction denotes one’s ability to determine the precursors of a 
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given mental state which is embodied in behavioural responses.  This is 
predicated on the view that in the real-world, people do not frequently think 
about another person‘s mental state or know of their intention before the 
behaviour has occurred (Milikan, 2005). In contrast, retrodiction can be 
practically applied in real-life situations in which individuals often 
discriminate and understand mental states and behaviours in retrospect, 
after the behaviour has occurred. 
 Robinson and Mitchell (1995) first used retrodiction (though they did 
not call it that) to investigate mentalising in their study of 3-5 year olds who 
were told a story about identical twins. The story involved a ball being moved 
from one drawer to another, unknown to one twin (not in room at time of 
moving) but known to the other. The twins then leave the room and return 
shortly after looking for the ball, with one twin going to the correct new 
drawer and the other going to the original drawer. The children in the study 
were then asked why one twin went towards the original drawer looking for 
the ball. Results showed that children were able to infer successfully that the 
twin who went to the original drawer must be the person who was not 
present in the room when the ball was moved from its original location. This 
qualifies as an example of retrodiction because in order to answer the 
question, the child must explain observed behaviour by considering the 
protagonist's previous mental state - in this case lack of knowledge about the 
object's current position.  
Now let us consider an example of retrodictive mentalising as follows. 
An employee is seen walking out of his superior‘s office after a meeting with 
a beaming smile on his face. Put into context, the employee‘s reaction could 
render several options as to what had just taken place within the office; a) He 
has just received a promotion; b) He has been awarded  ‘Employee of the 
Month‘; c) He has been selected to represent the company in an important 
annual conference. The possibilities are endless even within the context, 
though the probable explanations for his behaviour are often congruent with 
the situation. However in real-life settings, situations and behavioural 
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responses occur in a spontaneous fashion, short of being tightly wrapped 
within particular contexts. Hence people are required to decipher from a 
variety of possibilities the antecedent to an individual’s response, bearing in 
mind the variety in different individuals’ responses to the same situation.  
Imagine now that short clips of people’s behavioural responses during 
a meeting with their superior are presented to individuals and they are asked 
to infer what had taken place in the meeting. A choice of four possible 
antecedents are given; (a) informed that he or she is being considered for a 
job promotion; (b) told that his or her work performance has been 
unsatisfactory; (c) superior asks if he or she would be interested in going out 
on a date; and (d) asked to inform other staff members that certain internet 
sites (e.g. Facebook) will be banned from use during working hours. The 
range of behavioural responses resulting from the above mentioned four 
events could differ tremendously from person to person as each person may 
experience a variety of mental states. So how does one come to an accurate 
answer as to which event had occurred based on their brief observation of 
people’s behaviour? 
The reverse simulation framework developed by Goldman and 
Sripada (2005) offers an answer to this question involving retrodictive 
mentalising (see Figure 2.9). They proposed that the attributor processes his 
or her own mental state in the reverse direction. This is done in order to 
ascribe a mental state to the target which reflects the antecedent of the 
mental state which functions as evidence for the attribution. While it is 
known that the production of emotions can lead to distinguishing facial 
expressions (Ekman, 1992), Goldman and Sripada (2005) proposed that this 
relationship may also function in both directions. Evidence that the 
manipulation of facial musculature can produce an attenuated form of an 
emotional state has been supported by techniques such as holding a pen with 
one’s teeth (produces a smile) as well as holding a pen with one’s lips 
(produces a frown); which consequently has an influence on one’s emotional 
state (Goldman & Mason, 2007). Hence the reverse simulation model 
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proposes that the attributor first covertly mimics the facial expression of the 
observed target. As mentioned before, the mimicking of the facial expression 
normally results in the mild experiencing of that resultant mental state. The 
attributor then classifies his or her own mental state and subsequently 
ascribes the same state to the target.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: The reverse simulation model (adapted from Goldman & 
Sripada, 2005). 
 
How would this framework apply to the meeting situation formerly 
described? In this case the attributor would mimic the target’s facial 
expression (e.g. frown). The attributor then categorises his or her own mental 
state (e.g. disappointment) associated with that particular facial expression. 
The attributor then assigns this mental state to the target and subsequently 
uses  it to retrodict the corresponding antecedent of the target’s behavioural 
response (e.g. unsatisfactory work performance). The same process can be 
applied for the other situations. For instance a target’s behavioural response 
may comprise a smile. The attributor then mimics the expression and 
classifies his or her own mental state as happiness. Subsequently, this mental 
state is attributed to the target and is used to retrodict to the most befitting 
antecedent event, in this case being the job promotion. Nonetheless the 
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range of behavioural reactions (e.g. facial expressions) displayed by targets 
can be diverse. Being asked out on a date by a superior may cause some 
targets to feel confused and perhaps uncomfortable while others may feel 
pleasantly surprised. In the same line of thought, some targets might feel 
apprehensive while others may feel privileged that their superior has asked 
them to deliver the unpleasant news about restricted internet privileges to 
fellow colleagues. 
In order to successfully retrodict which situation occurred to the 
person, the attributor assigns the most suitable precursor event to the 
assigned mental state of the target. The primary task used in this thesis 
involved individuals being presented with short clips of targets’ natural 
reactions to four specific events (which will be referred to as scenarios). The 
scenarios were Joke, Waiting, Story, and Compliments. The genuine reactions 
to these scenarios were filmed during spontaneous interactions with the 
researcher. Individuals were asked to decide which of the four scenarios had 
occurred to the target. A comprehensive description of this task is described 
in Chapter 3. The paradigm used developed in this thesis allowed for the use 
of naturalistic and spontaneous expressions seen in everyday interactions 
rather than posed stimuli. Furthermore, individuals were not explicitly told to 
mentalise, though the method in which they come to the objectively correct 
answer (i.e. accurately identify the precursor scenario) does imply that 
retrodictive mentalising processes are being applied.  
 
 Though it has been shown that individuals with high-functioning ASD 
are able to perform as successfully as typically developing individuals in 
straightforward mental state recognition tasks, they often struggle with daily 
social interactions. As a result, the use of subtle and naturalistic stimuli in 
studies with this population is extremely relevant. Are people with ASD able 
to determine which scenario had just taken place by viewing short and 
spontaneous reactions of targets? This novel task (with an objectively correct 
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response) efficiently investigates the ability of individuals with ASD to explain 
others’ behaviours in a kind of backwards inference using true-to-life stimuli.  
 
In addition it explores the degree to which people are able to use 
another person‘s reactions to ‘view and experience‘ an event that they did 
not encounter first-hand. In the social world, it is essential that people have 
the ability to connect the observed with the unobserved by understanding 
the significance of behaviours through the process of inferring mental states. 
The faculty to mentalise is crucial, as without it the cause of observed 
behaviours may seem unclear and people‘s future behaviours become 
difficult to predict, making day-to-day communication with others 
challenging.  As such an important question to ask is: is it fair to suppose that 
because individuals with ASD show impairments in predictive mentalising 
ability, so their capacity in retrodictive mentalising is also compromised?  
 
2.5 Aims of thesis 
 
 The aim of the research described in this thesis was to create an 
experimental paradigm to study mentalising abilities in a way that closely 
approximates the subtleties of real-world situations. This new paradigm was 
used to examine mentalising abilities amongst healthy controls and 
individuals with ASD.  Much research on mentalising has focused on the 
prediction of future behaviour; here, retrodiction was used to assess people’s 
capacity to mentalise as it is believed that it is just as relevant in the social-
world. Furthermore, eye gaze behaviours were investigated as there is 
currently conflicting evidence in regards to eye gaze patterns of individuals 
with and without ASD. Although much research has been conducted in 
examining the ability of people with ASD to recognise facial expressions and 
emotions, little is known about their capacity for portraying facial 
expressions. As a consequence the natural and spontaneous behavioural 
reactions of individuals with ASD were also investigated. Chapter 3 examined 
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people’s ability to guess what happened to others from their brief 
behavioural responses. In Chapter 4, the mentalising abilities of individuals 
with ASD compared to healthy controls were investigated. The experiments 
described in Chapters 3 and 4 also investigated participants’ eye gaze 
patterns. Then in Chapter 5, people’s mentalising ability was examined when 
viewing videoclips of individuals with ASD as well as healthy controls.  
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CHAPTER 3 
   Can Individuals Guess What Happened To 
Others From Their Brief Behavioural 
Responses? 
 EXPERIMENT 1 
3.1 Introduction  
 
When two people are engaged in social interaction, they each react to 
the behaviour of the other, and these reactions could manifest as humour, 
irritation, sympathy, bashfulness, to name a few. Can we guess what 
provoked a reaction just by observing a person’s behaviour? If so, this might 
qualify as an instance of what Gallese and Goldman (1998) called 
‘retrodiction’, which is a kind of backwards inference from a mental state to 
its causal antecedent. In this case, the mental state is embodied in a reaction 
(humour, irritation, sympathy, bashfulness, etc.). Can participants guess, for 
example, what caused a person to manifest irritation? If so, then participants 
would effectively have access to an aspect of the world through the lens of 
another person’s mind (as embodied in behaviour). Indeed, the participants 
could perhaps learn something about a third party, by observing the effect 
the third party had on another person. This would be an important faculty in 
that participants could use other minds as a way of broadening their 
apprehension of the world – in this particular case, the social world. 
Apparently, this would qualify as a significant benefit of the participants’ 
capacity for mentalising, or imputing mental states. 
 
 Currently, not much research uses tasks that have presented 
participants with a sample of behaviour and asked them to infer or to 
‘retrodict’ the situation that resulted in that behaviour (although see 
Robinson & Mitchell, 1995 for an exception). Another aspect of 
understanding minds in the real world is that not all people will respond to 
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the same situation in the same way (the diversity problem). One-to-one 
correspondence between situation and behaviour in real life is uncommon 
and we might assume that the mental states that mediate between situation 
and behaviour will also vary.  Laboratory tasks that involve behavioural 
prediction tend to artificially generate one-to-one correspondence between 
situation and behaviour, ignoring this important feature. Paradigms are 
required that instead take account of this variability in responses with a view 
to discovering how we flexibly understand the behaviour of others, even 
where it departs from how we ourselves might act. 
 
 Some researchers have circumnavigated these issues by presenting 
participants with samples of behaviour (usually facial expressions) and asking 
them to identify the mental state of the individual concerned (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) usually without any further inference 
to the antecedent situation. Proponents of this approach have argued that 
mental states (such as admire, thoughtfulness, scheme) can be directly 
observable from facial expressions. They also argue that in our everyday lives 
we understand the mental states of others through a combination of high-
level and low-level mentalising processes. High-level processes involve 
reasoning in a “top-down” fashion about mental states based on our prior 
knowledge of the relationships between mental states and situations.  For 
example, based on our prior knowledge about the relationship between what 
a person sees and what they know, we might reason that someone has a 
false belief about an object being in a particular location because that 
individual did not witness it being moved elsewhere. In contrast, low-level 
mentalising processes involve “bottom-up” recognition of cues or indicators 
such as eye gaze behaviour or facial expressions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
The mechanisms for these two processes may well be different: mirror 
neurons have been proposed as a possible basis for low-level mentalising 
processes, while high-level mentalising is more likely to be grounded in a 
propositional (non-bodily) format (Goldman & Vignemont, 2009). 
Retrodictive mindreading as described above might involve a combination of 
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these processes. We may well recognise and decode the behaviour via a 
bodily format of representation, a relatively low-level process. However, this 
must be at some point integrated with some prior knowledge of situations 
that may give rise to that kind of feeling.  
 
 The stimuli used in studies involving identifying mental states from 
facial expressions have also been criticised for the following reasons. In real 
life, the behaviour we are trying to understand may be subtle. For example, 
facial expressions are often dynamic and brief. Most studies have not taken 
these considerations into account and have tended to portray static images 
of emotional responses, often displayed for several seconds (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976). As the expressions in such studies are posed by actors, the 
“correct” answer as to what that person is thinking or feeling is usually 
determined by consensus of viewers and may bear no relation to the actual 
mental state of the actor in question. As no event or situation in the world 
has given rise to the expression (other than the actor being asked to pose by 
the researcher), it is unclear how well results of such studies can inform us 
about the processes we use when reasoning about the relationship between 
an event or situation and observable behaviour. 
 
 In recognition of this last point some researchers have developed 
more naturalistic stimuli where expressions have either been induced or 
recorded in a real-world setting. For example, Matsumoto, Olide, Schug, 
Willingham, and Callan (2009) used facial expressions of athletes, captured at 
the end of Olympic Judo matches.  While we can be more confident that the 
individuals reacting in studies such as this are experiencing some kind of 
mental state, a problem remains in knowing the correct answer. Even if the 
individual him/herself is asked what he/she was thinking or feeling we cannot 
know for certain whether the verbal report is an accurate representation of 
the mental state experienced. Besides, the individual may feel a blend of 
emotions, thoughts, desires and so on, many of which cannot easily be 
described in words. It may also be that it is easier to perceive or interpret the 
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behaviour of an individual than to generate a mental state label that 
adequately captures an impression of his or her experience. Moreover, the 
very act of trying to verbalise what another person might be thinking or 
feeling could interfere with our ability to spontaneously interpret their 
behaviour in context. 
  
Concerns about difficulties associated with naming mental states (in 
this case, belief states) were taken into consideration by Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) when they devised the now widely known unexpected transfer test of 
false belief, in which child participants are invited to predict where a 
protagonist will search for chocolate (and are not asked to make any direct 
inferences about the protagonist’s belief state). In this task, participants must 
reflect on the belief state of the protagonist in order to predict his/her 
behaviour, but are not required to name or refer to any belief state directly. 
While that research undoubtedly represented a major breakthrough, it is 
open to the criticisms mentioned previously (i.e. one-to-one correspondence 
between situation and behaviour).  
 
The studies reported in this chapter include a paradigm that 
approximates many of the demands of real life situations where mental state 
reasoning might be required, and addresses some of the criticisms that might 
be levelled against previous research. Participants were shown people’s 
natural (and somewhat subtle) reactions to four specific scenarios, all of 
which were filmed during an interaction with the researcher, and asked to 
identify which of the four events had previously occurred. To succeed at this 
task, it is necessary to retrodict, that is, to reason backwards from behaviour 
to infer a situation that had already happened. Participants were not asked to 
identify the mental state of the individuals explicitly, thus overcoming any 
concerns about their being able to verbalise or label their inner subjective 
states and also avoiding the possibility of “instructing” participants to use a 
mentalising strategy. Instead, participants were required to identify the 
situation, about which there was a definite objectively correct answer. If a 
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small sample of behaviour is sufficient for people to get a feel for what 
circumstance may have led to that behaviour, then it is predicted that 
participants would systematically identify which of the four specific scenarios 
had previously occurred to the people in the videos that they viewed.  
 
 Participants’ eye movements were also recorded while viewing the 
videos. Previous research has suggested that when viewing static images 
containing people, individuals look more at the eye region compared to the 
rest of the face (Hernandez et al., 2009). Also, when freely viewing videos 
containing people, both adults (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002) 
and young children (Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008) tend to spend the majority of 
their time looking at the eye region of the face. Moreover, the eye region 
may convey crucial information for tasks that involve trying to name 
emotions or mental states from images of faces (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
Given the importance of the eye region that is documented in previous 
research, it was predicted that participants would spend more of their time 
looking at the eye region than the mouth region of the faces of the people in 
the videos. Another prediction was that total eye region gaze time would be 
negatively correlated with total mouth region gaze time, consistent with the 
findings of Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren, and Dziobek (2011). It was also 
hypothesised that time spent looking at the eye region would correlate with 
successful identification of the scenario that had previously occurred. In 
other words, it was predicted that participants who spent more time looking 
at the eye region when viewing the reaction videoclips would have the 
greatest success in identifying the scenarios. It was further hypothesised that 
this relationship would hold for each of the scenarios i.e. it was predicted 
that the amount of time spent looking at the eye region when viewing a 
particular scenario would positively correlate with identification of that 
scenario.   
 
 Empathy has been described as the “capacity to understand others 
and experience their feelings in relation to oneself” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, 
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p.71). The multifaceted construct of empathy has generally been viewed as 
consisting of two fundamental elements; affective and cognitive. The 
affective element relates to individuals‘ emotional responses to the mental 
states of others, whereas the cognitive element concentrates on individuals‘ 
understanding of the mental states of others (Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, 
2006). Furthermore, the cognitive component of empathy has been 
associated with the concept of mentalising. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
(2004) proposed that empathy is crucial in the understanding of others’ 
intentions, in predicting their behaviours, and in having insight and 
awareness into their emotions. Hence, the use of an instrument such as the 
Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) would in essence 
tap into one’s mentalising abilities. Therefore, the present study also 
predicted that empathising ability as measured by the EQ will positively 
relate with success in scenario discrimination (i.e. retrodiction). This may be 
associated with greater looking to the eye region in those with high empathic 
abilities; consequently it is hypothesised that eye region gaze time would be 
positively correlated with EQ scores and positively related with the ability to 
infer what happened to the person in the video.  It was further predicted that 
the EQ scores of the people in the reaction videoclips would be associated 
with participants’ ability in correctly identifying the scenarios.  
 
3.2 Methods 
 
The study was divided into two parts; Stimulus Development and 
Main Experiment. The procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee, 
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham. 
3.2.1 Stimulus Development 
 
The literature review in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 summarised the 
various studies that have investigated mentalising, each with their respective 
strengths and limitations. The objective of this phase of the study was to 
develop a procedure which examines mentalising in a novel manner, whilst 
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taking into account the shortcomings of previous work. An often mentioned 
drawback of mentalising research is its lab-based nature and how well the 
findings translate to real-world situations. Few studies have investigated 
people’s mentalising abilities in an ecologically valid social context (e.g. 
Matsumoto et al., 2009). The task of identifying mental states during a face-
to-face interaction or watching videos of naturalistic social scenes can be 
complex as multiple factors come into play. One must be able to incorporate 
body language cues, and aspects of social context while concurrently 
processing dynamic stimuli.  
 
Additionally, encounters in real-life often consist of subtle and brief 
reactions, as opposed to exaggerated and posed reactions frequently used in 
research. Participants in this project were shown people’s natural and subtle 
reactions to four specific scenarios. Though the primary focus of the four 
scenarios was to draw out an assortment of responses from participants, the 
concept of social emotions was also considered. Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & 
Blakemore (2008) stated that the representation of other people’s mental 
states is necessary in order to recognise and comprehend social emotions 
such as pride, embarrassment, shame and jealousy. Hence several events 
were created with foresight that people’s responses could embody forms of 
social emotion. Reactions to the four scenarios were filmed during an 
interaction with the researcher, and participants in the main study were 
asked to determine which of the four events had previously occurred; the 
task is useful with respect to Gallese and Goldman's (1998) concept of 
‘retrodiction’ i.e. to reason backwards from the presented behaviour to 
deduce an event that occurred in the past. This method is advantageous as it 
overcomes difficulties related to asking participants to name mental states as 
there is an objectively correct answer.  
 
The following section describes the Stimuli Development phase of the 
study. The experiments in the following two chapters of this thesis all 
included stimuli that were generated according to the general methods 
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outlined below (any differences in methodology will be highlighted in the 
respective chapters).  
Target Reaction Videoclips 
 
Participants (henceforth known as ‘targets’) were told that they would 
be filmed whilst posing some facial expressions to act as stimuli for a 
different study. However, the primary focus was actually to record targets’ 
responses to an apparently incidental event that occurred prior to 
commencing the recording of the posed expressions. 
 
Targets 
Forty students from the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom and 
Malaysia Campus) were recruited. A total of 19 males and 21 females across 
both campuses aged between 19 and 34 were filmed (mean age= 22.2 years).  
Targets were of various nationalities; 16 Malaysians, 12 British, 1 Spanish, 1 
Vietnamese, 1 Sri Lankan, 1 Botswanan, 1 Indian, 1 Italian, 1 Irish, 1 Nigerian, 
1 Polish, 1 Chinese, 1 Ugandan; and 1 Lithuanian. The targets from the 
Malaysian campus were given an inconvenience allowance in the form of 
chocolate whereas the targets from the UK campus were given three pounds 
each for their participation.  Written informed consent was obtained from all 
targets.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
A spacious room was utilised for testing within the School of Psychology. 
Targets were seated with their backs against a while wall, towards the main 
door and windows.  The researcher was seated across the table from the 
target participant.  
 
A Sony DCR-TRV460 video camera was used to film the targets during the 
experiment. The camera was positioned approximately 1.7 meters from the 
targets’ seats and was placed directly next to the researcher on a tripod. The 
camera was positioned in order for the target participants’ face, neck, 
shoulders, and chest to be seen. 
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The Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004, see Appendix 
A), a standardised testing instrument was distributed to the targets at the 
end of the experiment. The EQ is reported to have good construct and 
external validity as well test-retest reliability (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004).  It comprises 40 questions with four-option forced choice response 
format (strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, strongly disagree). 
The target participants were given as much time as they required to 
complete the questionnaire. 
 
Experimental and Filming Procedure 
Targets were invited to partake in the experiment and were told that they 
would be filmed posing specific facial expressions which would be used as 
video stimuli in a subsequent study. Four scenarios were created, one of 
which was performed by the researcher to each target participant. The 
scenarios were devised with a view of eliciting a range of responses from 
targets. The primary focus was to create scenarios that would provoke a 
reaction but would be unlikely to cause a major disturbance in the mood of 
the targets. The scenarios also needed to be plausible within the context of 
an experiment, as it was important that the targets did not guess that the 
researcher was in fact following a script.  
 
The four different scenarios were randomised between targets. Each target 
experienced only one of these scenarios. Descriptions of each scenario are 
listed below: 
 
Scenario 1 (Joke): As the target was ready and awaiting the start of the 
experiment, the researcher initiated a casual chat with him/her. The 
researcher then shared a simple joke with the target. The joke is listed below: 
 
“Why did the woman wear a helmet at the dinner table? Because she was on 
a crash diet!” 
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Scenario 2 (Waiting): As soon as the target entered the testing room, he/she 
was given the information statement and consent form. Once complete, the 
researcher stated that they would begin the experiment soon. However, the 
researcher kept the target waiting for about 5-8 minutes whilst she 
performed other irrelevant tasks (i.e. making a phone call, texting on mobile 
phone, having a drink of water) while seated in front of the target.  
 
Scenario 3 (Story): As the target was ready and waiting to start the 
experiment, the researcher chatted with him/her and related a story about a 
series of misfortunes that she experienced earlier that day. The researcher 
related minor ‘everyday’ misfortunes such as missed the bus to university, left 
mobile phone at home, starts raining and not having an umbrella, and 
flashdrive containing important work malfunctions.  
 
Scenario 4 (Compliments): As the target was waiting to start the experiment, 
the researcher gave instructions regarding the experiment. While doing so, 
the researcher offered a series of compliments. Examples are: 
 
i. Really nice pair of earrings you have there 
ii. You’ve got really good hair, what shampoo do you use? 
iii. That shirt really brings out the colour of your eyes! 
iv. Wow, your skin is so smooth and radiant. What moisturiser do you 
use? 
 
As the real aim was to record targets’ immediate responses to the four 
scenarios, the video camera was set to record as soon as targets were seated; 
they were unaware that the camera was recording at this stage. They were 
under the impression that the video recording would only begin during the 
posing of facial expressions. 
 
At the completion of any one of the four scenarios mentioned above, 
targets were then asked to look directly at the video camera and to form six 
facial expressions (surprise, happy, fear, anger, sad, disgust). The facial 
expression words were then dictated by the researcher in the same order 
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each time. As the targets were unaware that filming had already begun, the 
researcher pretended to switch on the camera prior to dictating the facial 
expression words. Once the targets had completed posing the six facial 
expressions, the researcher turned off the video camera. The targets then 
completed the EQ questionnaire. 
 
Prior to leaving the testing room, targets were debriefed about the true 
nature of the study and were given the opportunity to ask any questions in 
regard to the experiment. Targets’ consent to use the video recording of their 
reactions to the researcher in Scenario 1-4 was obtained. One target 
participant did not provide consent; hence the related video recordings were 
destroyed immediately (this target is not included in the 40 stated above).   
 
Editing  
The footage was transferred from the video camera to an Apple Macintosh 
computer and edited using video-editing software, iMovie HD 6. The 
videoclips were edited to capture targets’ reactions to the distinct scenarios 
at points where they were deemed to be most expressive (see Figure 3.1). 
Due to the naturalistic and temporally distinct context of the scenarios, there 
was no clear way of determining a definite start and end point to each 
reaction as every individual responded uniquely to the varying scenarios. This 
opened up the possibility of experimenter bias in picking the most 
stereotypical responses as the editor was not blind to the scenarios when 
viewing and editing the videoclips. Nevertheless, most of the videos captured 
responses around the end of the scenario enactment. The 40 edited 
videoclips (10 for each scenario) ranged from 3.64 to 8.96 seconds, based on 
the dynamic nature of the targets’ natural responses with the respective 
means being Joke: 6.59 (SD=.26); Waiting: 6.84 (SD=.23); Story: 6.86 (SD=.37); 
Compliments: 5.81 (SD=.40). A one-way ANOVA showed that the clip length 
did not vary systematically with the scenarios (p=.116). Video frames were 
720 pixels in width and 576 pixels in height. The rate of presentation was 25 
frames per second. The edited clips omitted the audio component as targets’ 
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verbal responses would have completely disambiguated the reactions in 
many cases. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sample screenshots of target reaction videoclips. 
 
Scenario Enactment Videoclips 
 
These videoclips were created in order to convey what the targets had 
experienced in the Stimulus Development phase of the study. 
 
Filming Procedure  
The researcher was filmed using a Sony DCR-TRV460 video camera in a quiet 
room within the School of Psychology. The researcher looked directly at the 
camera and acted as though addressing the targets from the Stimulus 
Development phase. The camera was positioned in order for the researcher’s 
face, neck, shoulders, and chest to be seen. 
 
Editing  
The footage was transferred from the video camera to an Apple Macintosh 
computer and edited using video-editing software, iMovie HD 6. The videos 
were further edited using VirtualDub (v1.9.10), a video capture and video 
processing software. VirtualDub was used to create coloured borders for 
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each scenario clip; Scenario 1 (Joke)- Green border, Scenario 2 (Waiting)- Red 
border, Scenario 3 (Story)- Blue border, and Scenario 4 (Compliments)- 
Yellow border (see Figure 3.2). The coloured borders were 0.5 centimetres in 
width. Each clip varied in length according to the content of the social scene; 
Scenario 1 (Joke)- 11 seconds, Scenario 2 (Waiting)- 89 seconds, Scenario 3 
(Story)- 34 seconds, and Scenario 4 (Compliments)- 27 seconds. These 
variations in length were inevitable because of the dynamics of the 
encounters themselves; the implications of this will be discussed later. Video 
frames were 720 pixels in width and 576 pixels in height. The rate of 
presentation was 25 frames per second. The bit rate for the audio track was 
352 kbps.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Sample screenshots of scenario enactment videoclips. 
 
Materials  
To correspond with the scenario enactment videoclips with coloured borders, 
four matching flashcards with the dimensions 10 centimetres x 14 
centimetres were created with borders of the same colours. The names of 
each scenario (Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) were printed in black font 
on white background. The coloured borders on the flashcards were 
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approximately 0.5 centimetres in width and were used to aid memory for the 
scenarios enacted by the researcher. Only the scenario clips and flashcards 
had corresponding coloured borders to aid memory recall; the 40 target 
reaction videoclips did not have coloured borders. The coloured borders in 
the scenario clips and flashcards could have influenced participants to 
respond a certain way, e.g. to pick the Waiting scenario more often because 
they liked the colour red. However, this would result in a higher false alarm 
rate, which is taken into account by d-prime calculation explained in the 
Results section.  
 
3.2.2 Main Experiment 
 
Participants  
Thirty-five participants (19 males and 16 females) aged between 18 and 35 
(mean age= 22.37 years) took part in this phase of the study. The experiment 
was conducted at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom and 
Malaysia campus). Participants were of various nationalities: 19 Malaysians, 7 
British, 3 Sudanese, 1 Dutch, 1 Japanese, 1 Singaporean, 1 Indonesian, 1 
Tanzanian, and 1 Chinese national. All were paid an inconvenience allowance 
and written informed consent was obtained.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
The previously described scenario enactment videoclips and 40 target 
reaction videoclips from the Stimulus Development phase of the study were 
used. All videoclips (scenario enactment as well as targets’ reactions) were 
shown on a 17 inch TFT monitor incorporated into the Tobii T60  Eye Tracker 
(data rate 60 Hz). The 40 stimuli were shown using Tobii Studio Analysis 
Software. The software randomised the presentation of the videoclips. Each 
videoclip was interspersed with an image of a fixation point (white central 
cross on a black background located at the centre of the screen). The fixation 
point remained on screen until the participant responded to the previously 
presented videoclip.  The Tobii T60 Eye Tracker was used to record 
participants’ looking behaviour. Participants also completed the EQ 
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questionnaire. IBM SPSS statistical analysis software was used to analyse the 
data in this thesis.  
 
Design  
A within-subjects design was used, where all participants viewed the four 
scenario enactment videoclips followed by the 40 target reaction videoclips.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. All video stimuli were 
presented to participants on the eye tracker screen. Participants sat 
approximately 60 centimetres from the monitor and the video stimuli 
subtended a horizontal visual angle of 22.5° and a vertical visual angle of 
11.4°. The videoclips of the researcher enacting the four scenarios were first 
shown to the participants.  The scenarios were presented in counterbalanced 
order and were only shown once to participants at the start of the 
experiment.  After the presentation of each scenario enactment videoclip, 
the corresponding flashcard for the scenario was shown to the participants 
and placed on the table in front of the monitor. The flashcards were thus 
displayed in the same counterbalanced order as the scenario videos had been 
presented. Presenting these scenario clips allowed participants to experience 
as closely as possible the experience of the participants in the Stimulus 
Development phase. As a result, participants had a clear understanding of 
what each scenario entailed, with both audio and visual information 
presented. Prior to the start of the experiment, a 9-point calibration 
procedure was conducted in which a moving red dot appeared in different 
locations on the screen, including the centre, the four corners and the mid-
points in between. Participants were required to follow the red dot with their 
eyes as it moved around the screen enabling the eye tracker to obtain 
baseline data with which to compare subsequent eye movement recordings. 
Following successful calibration, participants were then shown the 40 target 
reaction videoclips. The presentation of the videoclips was randomised via 
Tobii Studio Analysis Software. Participants were told to direct their gaze at a 
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central fixation point prior to the presentation of each of the 40 videoclips, 
which was controlled via a mouse-click by the researcher. After the clip was 
shown, the fixation point reappeared and participants were required to state 
which scenario they thought the person in the video was reacting to by either 
verbalising or pointing, using the flashcards as cues. The researcher asked a 
question each time “Which of these events had just happened?” and then 
briefly reminded the participants of the four options verbally (i.e. in the same 
counterbalanced sequence that the scenario enactment clips and flashcards 
were presented previously), while pointing to the flashcards: “Is it the joke, 
waiting, the story, or compliments?” The researcher recorded participants’ 
responses on a data sheet. This process continued for all 40 videoclips. The 
participants then completed the EQ questionnaire.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Were participants able to correctly identify the scenarios which 
targets reacted to?  
 
 The primary question was whether participants could discriminate 
between reactions to the four scenarios. Responses were analysed using a 
signal detection procedure to account for any bias in responding with a 
particular scenario. This generates an index d-prime (d’), from the hit rate 
(the proportion of occasions on which the participant correctly identified the 
scenario) and false alarm rate (the proportion of occasions on which the 
participant identified the scenario when it was the incorrect answer). In this 
experiment, the hit rate was calculated for the ten trials comprising a 
particular scenario, while the false alarm rate was calculated across the 
remaining thirty trials which did not comprise that scenario. The Snodgrass 
and Corwin (1988) correction factor was applied to the hit and false alarm 
rate calculations to correct for cells containing 0, by adding 0.5 to all cells. d’ 
is then calculated by subtracting the z-score for the false alarm rate from the 
z-score of the hit rate [d' = Z(hit rate) - Z(false alarm rate) where function 
Z(p), p ∈ [0,1], is the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribution. d’ is a 
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measure of the distance between signal and noise distributions and  is 
essentially an indicator of how well participants were able to correctly 
discriminate each scenario from the others. Table 3.1 displays the mean 
accuracy rates, false alarm rates and d’ scores for targets' reactions to the 
four scenarios. If participants did not systematically discriminate the correct 
scenarios that the targets were reacting to, the hit rate would be equal to the 
false alarm rate and their d’ score would be 0. d’ scores were significantly 
greater than 0  for reactions to all four scenarios [Joke t(34)=12.61, p<.001; 
Waiting t(34)=20.83, p<.001; Story t(34)=12.87, p<.001; Compliments 
t(34)=10.51, p<.001], indicating that participants were able to discriminate 
between them in a systematic manner.   
 
  
Accuracy 
 
 
False alarms  
 
 
d’  
(d-prime) 
Joke 4.54 (45.4%) 3.69 (12.3%) 1.06 
Waiting 9.00 (90.0%) 3.66 (12.2%) 2.49 
Story 5.66 (56.6%) 3.86 (12.9%) 1.32 
Compliments 5.11 (51.1%) 4.49 (15.0%) 1.05 
Table 3.1:  Participant mean accuracy rates, false alarm rates and d’ scores. 
(correct scenario discriminability). 
Accuracy    : Number correct out of 10 (% in brackets) 
False alarm: False alarms out of a possible 30 (% in brackets) 
 
To establish if there were differences between reactions to the 
scenarios in participants’ level of success, a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on the d’ scores, with scenario as the within-
participants factor. There was a main effect of scenario, F(3,102)=87.87, 
p<.001, Cohen’s f = 2.73 (large effect; Cohen, 1988). Posthoc t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction showed that this was due to reactions to the Waiting 
scenario being easier to discriminate than reactions to the other three 
scenarios (all ps<.001). Reactions to the Story scenario also approached 
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significance in being easier to discriminate than reactions to the Compliments 
scenario (p=.056).  
 
Chi-square analyses were then conducted to investigate participants’ 
pattern of error responses. Four separate chi-square analyses were 
performed for each scenario. Table 3.2 shows frequencies of participants’ 
error responses. Findings showed that participants’ error responses were not 
equally distributed for the Joke [X2(3, n= 188) = 30.71, p <.001] scenario, with 
participants primarily mistaking reactions to the Joke for reactions to 
Compliments. Their errors were also not equally distributed in the Waiting 
scenario [X2(3, n= 35) = 7.26, p =.03] with them mistaking it most often for 
reactions to the Story scenario. Furthermore, participants’ errors were not 
equally distributed for the Compliments scenario [X2(3, n= 163) = 8.63, p 
=.01], which participants mainly mistook for reactions to the Joke scenario. 
On the other hand, participants’ errors for the Story scenario were equally 
distributed across the three remaining options [X2(3, n= 151) = 2.16, p =.34].  
 
    Joke     Waiting          Compliments     
    (observed error responses) 
  Story Expected error 
responses 
Joke 
 
- 31 93 64 62.67 
Waiting 
 
12 - 5 18 11.67 
Compliments 
 
72 45 - 46 54.33 
Story 
 
42 53 56 - 50.33 
Table 3.2:  Participant error response distribution (in frequencies). 
 
3.3.2 What were participants’ eye gaze patterns and do they relate to 
correct scenario identification?   
 
The purpose of the eye tracking analyses was to determine whether 
participants’ ability to discriminate reactions to the various scenarios was 
associated with looking at specific parts of the scene. The eye-tracking data 
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were processed using Tobii Studio 3.0’s dynamic areas of interest (AOIs) 
function. This allows one to create AOIs that move and change shape with 
the movements of objects in the video (see Figure 3.3).  In order to calculate 
eye movement metrics, AOIs were defined separately on the eye and mouth 
regions of the video stimuli. The Total Fixation Duration (seconds) metric was 
used to measure the total duration for all fixations within a) the eye region, 
and b) the mouth region. Fixation is defined by the standard Tobii fixation 
filter as two or more consecutive samples falling within a 35 pixel radius.  
 
        
       Figure 3.3: Sample area of interest (AOI) used to analyse eye gaze. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the mean gaze time for the eye and mouth (as a 
percentage of total gaze time) for each of the four scenarios (please note that 
the standard errors bars in the figure reflect between-subject variance, and 
are therefore not suitable for assessing within-subject comparisons). 
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Figure 3.4: Mean percentage of total gaze time at the eye and mouth 
regions of targets across four scenarios.  
(Error bars represent standard errors of the mean) 
 
As the videoclips varied in length, the percentage of gaze time spent 
on the eyes and mouth regions for each clip was used (i.e. time spent looking 
at eye/mouth region ÷ total gaze time * 100%).  As the data were not 
normally distributed (i.e. Shapiro-Wilks tests showed that gaze time at the 
eye region was not normally distributed for targets in all 4 scenarios, all 
ps<.001. This was due to mild positive skew with all values >.14), the data 
were transformed using a square root transformation for the purpose of 
analysis (untransformed means are reported for the ease of interpretation). 
Following transformation, the data were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilks 
p>.1). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on gaze time, with 
scenario (Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) and region of the face (eyes or 
mouth) as within-participants factors. Scenario was included as a factor due 
to the possibility that participants might have used different viewing 
strategies for reactions to the different scenarios.  While the effect for 
scenario approached significance (p =.065), there was a significant effect for 
face region, F(1,34)= 17.51, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .69 (large effect), whereby 
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participants spent longer looking at the mouth region (M=5.47, SD=1.77) than 
the eye region (M=2.97, SD=2.10). This was  qualified by a significant 
interaction between scenario reacted to and face region indicating that gaze 
time to the critical regions (eyes and mouth) did vary depending on the 
scenario the target was responding to, F(3, 102)= 13.06, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 
1.02 (large effect) [see Figure 3.5].  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Interaction between face region and scenario for gaze time.  
(Error bars represent standard errors of the mean) 
 
Further analyses were conducted to establish the basis of this 
interaction. Separate one-way ANOVAs examined the effect of the scenario 
the target responded to on gaze time at the eyes, and the mouth. There was 
a significant effect of scenario on time spent looking at the eye region, 
F(3,102)= 5.05, p =.018, Greenhouse Geisser corrected, Cohen’s f = .59 (large 
effect). Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that participants 
spent more time looking at the eye region for targets in the Waiting scenario 
compared with the Story (p = .006) and Joke scenarios (p = .005). Similarly, 
there was a significant effect of scenario reacted to on time spent looking at 
the mouth region, F(3,102)= 11.46, p < .001, Greenhouse Geisser corrected, 
Cohen’s f = .95 (large effect). Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
revealed that participants spent more time looking at the mouth region of 
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targets in the Joke (p = .004), Compliments (p = .001), and Story (p = .011) 
scenarios compared with the Waiting scenario. 
 
Due to the Waiting scenario being easier to identify than the other 
three scenarios and due to its being associated with different eye gaze 
patterns, it was analysed separately from the other three scenarios when 
examining the relationship between gaze patterns and scenario 
identification. This was to ensure that any apparent relationships were not 
solely driven by performance in this particular condition. As predicted, it was 
found that total time spent looking at the eye region negatively correlated 
with total time spent looking at the mouth region for targets in the Waiting 
scenario (r=-.7, n=35, p< .001). Similar findings were revealed for the 
remaining three scenarios with participants who spend more time looking at 
the eye region having a tendency to look less at the mouth region (r=-.69, 
n=35, p< .001). 
 
 Do variations in gaze pattern relate to accuracy in detecting the 
scenario? Overall there was a significant negative correlation between mean 
eye region gaze time and mean d’ scores (correct scenario discriminability) 
across targets reacting to the remaining three scenarios, r = -.44, n =35, 
p=.008, suggesting that individuals who spent more time looking at the eye 
region in general were less successful at discriminating between the 
scenarios which targets were responding to. The relationship between mean 
mouth region gaze time and mean d’ scores was not significant, r=.15, n=35, 
p=.385, indicating no evidence of any relationship between looking at the 
mouth and successfully discriminating between the scenarios. The same 
relationships were also investigated for targets responding to each scenario 
individually. In other words, gaze time to the eye region for targets in each 
scenario and its relation to the d’ scores for the same scenario was examined. 
Eye region gaze time correlated negatively with d’ for targets in the 
Compliments scenario (r=-.34, n=35, p=.032) and the Story scenario (r=-.44, 
n=35, p=.008) and the Waiting scenario (r=-.45, n=35, p=.006), but not for 
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targets in the Joke scenario (r=.02, n=35, p=.912). There were no significant 
relationships between gaze time at the mouth region and d’ for targets in any 
of the four scenarios.  
 
3.3.3 Were participants’ EQ scores related with their eye gaze behaviours 
and ability to discriminate between the scenarios targets reacted to?  
 
Participants’ mean EQ score was 43.85 (SD=8.7) and thus similar to 
the normative value of 42.1 (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Are 
participants with higher EQ scores better able to discriminate between 
reactions to the scenarios? Four separate Pearson product-moment 
correlations with Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0125 were conducted. 
No relationships were found between correct scenario discrimination and 
participant EQ scores for reactions to all four scenarios (Joke: r= -.04, n=35, 
p=.862; Story:  r= .20, n=35, p=.263; Compliments:  r= -.01, n=35, p=.944; and 
Waiting: r= .36, n=35, p=.042).  
 
Are variations in participants’ eye gaze patterns associated with their 
EQ scores? It was found that there was no significant relationship between 
eye region gaze time and participant EQ scores (r= -.09, n=35, p=.621). The 
same finding was obtained for mouth region gaze time and EQ scores (r= .26, 
n=35, p=.134). No relationships were found for time spent looking at the eye 
and mouth regions and participant EQ scores across reactions to all scenarios 
[Bonferroni corrected] (Joke Eye: r=-.08, n=35, p=.647; Story Eye:  r=-.09, 
n=35, p=.595; Compliments Eye:  r=-.08, n=35, p=.673; Waiting Eye: r=-.12, 
n=35, p=.513; Compliments Mouth:  r=.26, n=35, p=.142;  Joke Mouth: r=.29, 
n=35, p=.095); Story Mouth: r=.30, n=352, p=.086; and Waiting Mouth (r=.32, 
n=35, p=.061). 
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3.3.4 Did the EQ scores of targets affect participants’ ability to deduce 
what had happened to them?  
 
  It was then examined whether the EQ scores of targets (i.e. people in 
the reaction videoclips) were associated with participants’ ability to correctly 
identify the scenarios they were reacting to. It was postulated that an 
alternative factor that may drive success in this task is the expressiveness of 
the targets in the reaction videoclips. One might think that people who have 
a higher EQ score and are more emotionally attuned to others might 
themselves be more expressive than those of lesser EQ scores. Table 3.3 
shows the targets’ mean EQ scores and participant accuracy rates broken 
down by scenario they responded to. The accuracy rates describe the 
percentage of participants who successfully identified the scenario the target 
was reacting to from the videoclips ([number of participants who correctly 
identified the scenario experienced by the target in the videoclip ÷ 35] * 100).   
There were a total of 40 videoclips (i.e. 10 videoclips for each of the 4 
scenarios) with 19 males and 21 females being filmed in the videos.  
 
 EQ scores 
 
Accuracy 
(in percentage) 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Joke  38.7  (10.22) 46.0  (25.25) 
Waiting 33.7  (12.94) 90.0  (4.52) 
Story 50.2  (5.49) 56.57  (17.34) 
Compliments  42.9  (9.52) 51.29  (24.29) 
            Table 3.3:  Targets’ mean EQ scores & participants’ accuracy rates. 
 
First, a one-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to explore 
whether there were differences in EQ scores of targets experiencing the 
different scenarios. As targets were allocated to the four scenarios in an 
unbiased manner, it was expected that no difference in EQ scores would be 
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found for those experiencing each scenario. However, there was a 
statistically significant difference in EQ scores between scenarios 
(F(3,36)=4.97, p=.006). Posthoc t-tests with Bonferonni correction showed 
that targets in the Story scenario had significantly higher EQ scores than 
targets in the Waiting scenario (p=.004). 
 
Then the relationship between the EQ scores of the targets and 
participants’ abilities in correctly detecting the scenario reacted to was 
investigated separately for responses to each scenario using a Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient (with Bonferroni adjusted alpha level 
of .0125). No significant relationships were found between target EQ and 
accuracy scores in all scenarios (Waiting: r =-.02, n =10, p=.944;. Story: r =.10, 
n =10, p =.782; Joke: r =.67, n =10, p=.035; and Compliments: r = .69, n =10, p 
=.033).  
 
3.4 Interim Discussion 
 
Prior to proceeding to the main Discussion section of this chapter, a 
finding which was presented in section 3.3.4 mentioned above gave rise to 
the need for a further experiment. Results showed a significant difference 
between the EQ scores of the target participants in the Waiting and Story 
scenarios, with targets in the Story scenario having higher EQ scores on the 
whole as compared to targets in the Waiting scenario. This surprising finding 
opened up the possibility that the scenarios themselves impacted on the way 
in which targets subsequently answered the EQ questionnaire. Targets in the 
Waiting scenario were kept waiting for a short period of time while the 
researcher performed irrelevant tasks whereas in the Story scenario, the 
researcher narrated a series of mishaps  experienced earlier that day. 
Considering the varying nature of these scenarios and their potential 
consequences on one’s mental state, is it possible that the scenario 
experienced influenced the way in which the target responded to the 
subsequently presented EQ questionnaire? Specifically, did the Waiting 
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scenario annoy or anger the participants such that they answered the 
questionnaire in an unempathising manner? Meanwhile, did the Story 
scenario engender empathic concern for the researcher, leading the targets 
who experienced this scenario to respond in an empathising manner on the 
EQ? While being tangential to the aims of this particular study, such findings, 
if replicated would imply that rather than being a measure of trait empathy, 
the EQ may be a measure of state empathy – responses being easily modified 
by our immediately preceding experiences. In order to examine the 
relationship between scenario and EQ scores further, Experiment 2 was 
carried out. The following section describes Experiment 2, which will be 
followed by the main Discussion of Experiment 1 and 2 (section 3.5).  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Did the Waiting and Story Scenarios 
Influence Targets’ Responses on the 
Empathy Quotient (EQ)?  
3.4.1 Rationale  
 
As mentioned above, the aim of conducting this follow-up study was to 
investigate the impact of the Waiting and Story scenario on peoples’ EQ 
scores. If scenarios have an   impact on how the target fills in the EQ 
questionnaire, then individuals who experienced the Waiting scenario 
perhaps may have responded un-empathically as they may have felt 
annoyed, bored or irritable. On the other hand, those who experienced the 
Story scenario may have responded to the EQ in a compassionate manner as 
the scenario may have evoked an empathic mental state.  
3.4.2 Methods 
 
The method employed in this experiment is similar to that described in 
section 3.2.1 (Target Reaction Videoclips). The primary differences are that; 
(i) only the scenarios in question were enacted i.e. Waiting and Story; (ii) 
although a videocamera was placed in the room during the experiment, 
targets’ reactions to the scenarios were not filmed (as the aim of this 
experiment was to investigate their EQ scores, rather than to develop 
stimuli). Ethical approval was obtained for this experiment from the Ethics 
Committee, School of Psychology, University of Nottingham. 
3.4.3 Targets  
 
Thirty undergraduate students (14 males and 16 females) aged between 18 
and 23 (mean age= 20.1 years) from University of Nottingham Malaysia 
Campus and another local institution of higher education were randomly 
assigned to either the Waiting or Story conditions.  Targets were of various 
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nationalities: 21 Malaysians, 3 Sri Lankan, 2 British, 2 Korean, 1 Pakistani and 
1 Zambian. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
 
3.4.4 Procedure 
 
Targets were told that they would be filmed while posing specific facial 
expressions which would be used as video stimuli in a subsequent study. As a 
consequence a video camera was set in position (approximately 1.7 meters in 
front of the participant) in order to replicate proper filming procedure as was 
conducted in the Stimuli Development phase of Experiment 1. At the 
completion of either the Waiting or Story scenarios, targets were asked to 
look directly at the video camera and to form six facial expressions (surprise, 
happy, fear, anger, sad, disgust). The facial expression words were dictated 
by the researcher in the same order each time. The researcher pretended to 
switch on the videocamera prior to dictating the facial expression words. 
Once the targets had completed posing the six expressions, the researcher 
pretended to turned off the video camera. Targets then completed the EQ 
questionnaire. Prior to leaving the testing room, targets were debriefed 
about the true nature of the study and given the opportunity to ask any 
questions.  
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3.4.5 Results 
 
Table 3.4 shows the EQ scores of targets in Experiment 2 for the 
Waiting and Story scenarios. The EQ scores of targets from Experiment 1 
have been added alongside for reference. 
 
    EQ scores 
Waiting scenario                 Story scenario 
              Mean (SD)             Mean (SD) 
Experiment 1 (n=20)             33.7  (12.94)            50.2  (5.49) 
Experiment 2 (n=30)             44.27 (10.65)           43.87 (11.83) 
Table 3.4:  Targets’ mean EQ scores in the Waiting and Story scenarios in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare target EQ 
scores for the Waiting and Story scenarios. There was no significant 
difference in EQ scores between the two scenarios, t(28)=.1, p=.916. This 
suggests that the scenario experienced did not influence the way in which 
targets in Experiment 2 responded to the EQ questionnaire. 
 
3.4.6 Discussion  
 
The findings of Experiment 1 with respect to how targets filled in the 
EQ questionnaire were not replicated in the current study suggesting that the 
scenario experienced does not impact on how targets self-reported their EQ. 
Therefore the difference in EQ scores obtained in Experiment 1 could be 
attributed to the coincidental allocation of individuals with inherently high or 
low empathy traits to the two scenarios. This conclusion is consistent with 
previous research wherein the EQ has been regarded as a measure with 
acceptable reliability and validity (Muncer & Ling, 2006) rendering it unlikely 
that the occurrence of a brief event would considerably alter an individual’s 
reporting of their empathic traits.  
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3.5 General Discussion (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
 Participants were able to deduce from relatively brief samples of 
behaviour which of four situations the targets had experienced. This implies 
that participants utilised successful strategies to retrodict the ‘cause’ of the 
specified response (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), despite considerable diversity 
in the manner in which targets reacted to each scenario. Thus, from 
observing just a few seconds of a person’s reaction, it appears we can gauge 
what kind of event might have happened to that individual with considerable 
success. It is not clear from the current results exactly how long a sample of 
behaviour needs to be in order to allow successful identification, and this 
may be a question for future research. Nevertheless, this capacity constitutes 
a powerful tool for learning about events in the world, enabling us to benefit 
indirectly from the experiences of others.  
 
Reactions to the Waiting scenario were identified more accurately in 
comparison to the other scenarios. This could be due to the nature of the 
behavioural responses themselves, as the responses in the Waiting scenario 
often included not only facial expressions but also gestures that could assist 
in identifying the scenario, such as yawning, sighing, or looking around. 
Responses to the other three scenarios were identified somewhat less 
successfully, presumably because the behaviours involved were more similar. 
For example, laughter was a fairly frequent response for all three scenarios. 
This is one shortcoming of a forced-choice procedure: success in selecting the 
correct answer is inevitably influenced by how similar it is to other incorrect 
options. The scenarios selected for this study elicited a range of reactions, 
but their degree of similarity was not easy to anticipate.  
 
An alternative explanation for the better discrimination of reactions 
to the Waiting scenario is that the video of the researcher enacting this 
scenario was longer than for the other three scenarios, because of the nature 
of the event itself, which was a period of waiting. It is not immediately 
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obvious that a longer event would necessarily be understood better than a 
shorter event, but this cannot be ruled out as a possibility. Nevertheless, the 
clips of the behavioural responses themselves did not systematically vary in 
length with the scenario experienced, so participants could not have used a 
low-level strategy such as the length of the clip they viewed to discriminate 
between reactions to the scenarios.  
 
Eye movement analyses revealed that participants varied their 
strategy according to the scenarios the targets experienced. For all four of 
the scenarios, participants focused primarily on the targets' mouth with less 
time spent looking at the eyes. Nevertheless, for targets in the Waiting 
scenario participants spent slightly more time looking at the eyes and less 
time looking at the mouth than for targets in the other three scenarios, 
suggesting that the eyes were more informative for this scenario than the 
others. As discrimination was better for targets in the Waiting scenario and 
participants looked more at the eyes when viewing reactions to this scenario 
than at the others, one might be tempted to conclude that spending longer 
looking at the eyes does indeed result in better identification. However, the 
increased looking at the eyes may have been caused by features of the eye 
gaze behaviour of the targets in the videoclips. The targets subjected to the 
Waiting scenario were not in direct interaction with the researcher, and so 
were more inclined to look around the scene rather than at the researcher 
compared to targets in the other scenarios. Hence the eye movements of the 
targets in the videoclips may have attracted the attention of the participants 
viewing them, and made the scenario easier to recognise. Given that the 
relatively strong discrimination performance in the Waiting scenario and the 
increased looking to the eyes might have been the result of lower-level 
strategies such as these, the relationship between gaze behaviour and 
scenario discrimination was analysed separately for reactions to the Waiting 
scenario and the other three (Joke, Compliments, Story).   
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Surprisingly, looking at the eye region was associated with poorer 
identification for targets in three of the four scenarios and was unrelated 
with success for the fourth (Joke). These results suggest that the eyes are not 
the most informative facial region when determining what happened to the 
people in the videos. This result stands in contradiction to some studies 
which imply that typically developing individuals look more at the eyes than 
the mouth when viewing videos of other people (Klin et al., 2002) and the 
result appears to contradict previous studies which have claimed that the 
eyes are crucial for mental state understanding (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
Instead, the results suggest that participants may find different parts of the 
face informative, depending on the specific situation. This is consistent with 
Cunningham, Kleiner, Bülthoff and Wallraven (2004) who reported that the 
mouth region is central in communicating information about certain mental 
states. More recently, Kirchner et al. (2011) reported increased fixation time 
in the mouth region as compared to the eye region in emotional recognition 
conditions (i.e. conditions high in social salience). It was interesting to find 
that individuals spent more time gazing at the eye and mouth regions for 
targets in the Joke and Compliments scenarios (as compared to the Waiting 
and Story scenarios) although the scenario discriminability for both the Joke 
and Compliments scenarios were the lowest. One would imagine that 
increased gaze time in the critical regions would increase accuracy of 
responses. On the other hand, it is possible  that participants found the Joke 
and Compliments videoclips to be hard to discriminate hence required more 
information from the critical facial regions of targets, resulting in increased 
gaze time behaviours, although this may not have directly influenced the 
accuracy of their responses. 
 
 It was previously mentioned that there are a number of differences 
between the demands of the task reported here and other mentalising tasks 
that have been reported previously. It is argued that one of the strengths of 
this paradigm is that participants were never asked to identify the mental 
state of the targets in the videos. It is possible that, if participants were told 
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to attempt to deduce the mental state, they might have gazed more at the 
eye region. Alternatively, the preference for the mouth could be a result of 
the dynamic nature of the videos. Blais, Roy, Fiset, Arguin and Gosselin (2012) 
propose that individuals’ utilisation of the mouth region in emotion 
recognition may be related to a brain strategy that has developed to handle 
dynamic stimuli as the mouth region produces the most distinguishing 
motions across facial expressions. They explained that this strategy may have 
developed over time due to the dynamic nature of information conveyed 
from the mouth region and its relevance in an ecological context.  
Furthermore, although the targets in the videoclips were not interacting with 
the participants who viewed them, they were interacting with the researcher 
at the time of filming, who was sitting directly next to the camera. This 
effectively placed the participants who viewed the videos within the 
interaction, which represents a departure from previous methodologies (Klin 
et al., 2002). 
 
 One might expect that empathising scores from the EQ would 
correlate with mentalising performance in this task as people who are good 
at empathising may be better at getting a feel for what had happened to the 
targets in the videoclips. In their study examining the validity and reliability of 
the EQ questionnaire among adults; Lawrence et al. (2004) found a moderate 
positive correlation (r =.29, n=48, p=.03) between EQ scores and performance 
on the ‘Reading the Eyes in the Mind’ Task among adult participants.  While 
the former study revealed only a modest relationship between EQ and the 
simple and un-naturalistic Eyes Task, the findings of the current study suggest 
that it does not stand up particularly well under more naturalistic 
circumstances. This may point to a relative weakness of the EQ questionnaire 
as it should relate to performance on a subtle and naturalistic mentalising 
task as used in this study.  Additionally, individuals who have a good 
understanding of others’ emotions and who spend more time looking at 
critical regions of the face for mental state information, should in essence 
perform better in the given mentalising task. Yet, this was found not to be 
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the case, thus implying that increased gaze time at the eye or mouth regions 
and elevated EQ scores do not have a substantial impact on increased 
scenario reaction discriminability in the present mentalising task.  
 
 Before considering the broader implications of these findings, there is 
a limitation of the current experiment that should be noted. The use of 
flashcards as a cue to recalling the various scenarios resulted in an inability to 
record response times for the task. Although participants were not instructed 
to respond quickly and were given as much time as they needed to make an 
accurate decision, response times could potentially have given additional 
information about how difficult participants found the task. A further 
problem with using flashcards is the possibility that some bias could have 
arisen from the researcher’s involvement in the procedure. However, the 
order of presentation of the cards was carefully counterbalanced to ensure 
that cues to the correct response were not provided. Nevertheless, to 
overcome this issue, flashcards were not used in the remaining experiments 
in this thesis. 
 
Is it possible that participants could infer what happened to the 
person in the video without mentalising at all? An argument could be 
advanced that participants ‘match’ behaviour to situation according to a 
system of behavioural rules (Perner & Ruffman, 2005). For example, is it 
possible that participants associated a smiling face with the Joke scenario? 
This seems implausible, given the wide range of behavioural responses 
produced by the people in reaction to the various scenarios: in most cases, 
there is no simple matching between the scenario and the facial expression.  
 
It has recently been argued that people may perform some 
mentalising tasks such as recognising emotions through activation of 
representations that have bodily formats (mirror neurons being a main 
candidate for this), without generating any higher-level propositional 
representations of mental states. Goldman and Vignemont (2009) and 
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Goldman (2012) refer to this as ‘low-level mentalising’, but argue that other 
non-embodied processes might be involved at later stages of emotion 
recognition, such as at the stage of attributing the emotion itself.  Similarly, 
Gallese (2005) acknowledges that emotions can be understood via either an 
embodied process, or a more explicit propositional route through “cognitive 
elaboration of their visual properties”. In this task where there was no 
requirement to identify the mental states of the targets in the videoclips at 
all, a stronger case might be made for the more direct route from observing 
the behaviour to understanding the situation.  
 
Research with infants has demonstrated that by the age of one, 
babies may be able to understand intentional goal-directed actions (Gergely, 
Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995) and appear to show sensitivity to the belief 
state of other individuals before two years of age (Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005). While it is surely the case that these abilities are supplemented by 
more sophisticated and explicit propositional representations of mental 
states with age, it seems unlikely that these low-level mindreading processes 
become obsolete. It is plausible to suggest that these processes might be 
engaged in this mentalising task due to its emphasis on making sense of 
behaviour rather than naming a mental state. Given the changing views on 
the nature of mentalising processes, it seems ever more important to 
channel efforts into devising tasks such as the one reported here that closely 
approximate how we understand other people’s behaviour in real life 
situations. 
 
In summary, from a brief sample of a few seconds of behaviour, adults 
are able to infer an event that happened to another individual. This appears 
to be evidence of a powerful retrodictive mindreading process, which might 
allow us to benefit indirectly from the experiences of others. Looking at the 
eyes was not a successful strategy for deducing what had happened to the 
individual in question, and participants tended to vary their viewing strategy 
according to what the individual in the video had actually experienced. This 
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suggests that participants are affected by the cues present in the person’s 
behaviour to attend to the parts that will be most informative for making 
sense of it.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Can Individuals With ASD Guess What 
Happened To Others From Their Brief 
Behavioural Responses? 
EXPERIMENT 3 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Impairments in social communication are one of the key diagnostic 
features of autism spectrum disorders (ASD; Schultz, 2005). One theory 
proposes that individuals with ASD are impaired in developing a ‘theory of 
mind,’ along with the associated mentalising skills (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith 1985), a capacity that enables us to impute mental states to others. 
Being able to identify mental states is an important cognitive process that 
equips us to understand a person’s behaviour. Mentalising thus allows us to 
make predictions about the future behaviour of an individual based on our 
knowledge of relevant aspects of the situation. Conversely, the same skills 
allow us to reason backwards from observed behaviour to an antecedent 
cause, a process sometimes referred to as retrodiction (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998). 
The majority of research conducted with both ASD and neurotypical 
populations has focused on behavioural prediction as a particular kind of 
mentalising. For example, in its typical form the classic false belief task 
involves predicting where an individual will look for an item based on his/her 
knowledge of the situation at hand (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), and numerous 
other tasks conceived subsequently have also involved behavioural 
prediction (Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White, & Frith, 2007; LeBlanc et al., 2003; 
Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). 
This is perhaps surprising given that another function of mentalising, 
retrodiction, is arguably more prevalent in everyday experience. In daily lives 
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we frequently observe people reacting or behaving in a particular manner, 
leading us to try to determine what provoked that reaction. If we are 
successful, then effectively we come to know an aspect of the world through 
the lens of another mind, where the mind in question is embodied in a 
behavioural reaction. Little is known about these retrodictive mentalising 
processes in people with ASD. In so far as mentalistic prediction is impaired in 
ASD, one might extrapolate to suppose that retrodiction is impaired also, but 
it does not necessarily follow. Hence, the current study will investigate the 
scope of mentalising impairments in ASD – do such impairments extend to 
retrodiction or is the process of retrodiction intact in ASD? 
On the other hand, considerable research has been conducted in 
which individuals with ASD were presented with samples of behaviour 
(usually facial expressions) and asked to identify the mental state of the 
individual, without requiring any inference about the situation that might 
have caused the mental state in question. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, 
and Robertson (1997) devised a task they called "Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes" and reported that individuals with ASD were impaired in identifying 
complex mental states from images of the eye region of the face. They 
argued, contrary to previous claims (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), that mental 
states are often directly observable from people’s behaviour, especially from 
facial expressions. In making this case,  Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) 
distinguished between high-level and low-level mentalising skills (see also 
Goldman & Vignemont, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2001). High-level mentalising 
involves reasoning about mental states based on prior knowledge of their 
relationships with one another and with specific situations; low-level 
mentalising involves inferring mental states from indicators such as 
behavioural cues, especially facial expressions.  
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) postulated that the eye region is crucial for 
identifying mental states in facial expressions (see also Smith, Cottrell, 
Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005) but that people with ASD are uniquely less able to 
use information from the eyes to infer such mental states. This appears to be 
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consistent with research which has found that individuals with ASD have a 
lesser tendency to look at the eye region than neurotypical individuals 
(Hernandez et al., 2009; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). The 
argument can be made that early differences in attention to social stimuli, 
especially to the eye region of the face, lead to difficulties acquiring social 
information, resulting in a myriad of social abnormalities including difficulties 
in interpreting facial expressions along with more general mentalising 
difficulties (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008).  
This viewpoint encounters some anomalous data. Firstly, a number of 
studies have either failed to report reduced looking at the eyes in those with 
ASD (Bar-Haim, Shulman, Lamy, & Reuveni, 2006; Freeth, Chapman, Ropar, & 
Mitchell, 2010; Freeth, Ropar, Chapman, & Mitchell, 2010; Freeth, Ropar, 
Mitchell, Chapman, & Loher, 2011; Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Van Der 
Geest, Kemner, Verbaten, & Van Engeland, 2002; Wagner, Hirsch, Vogel-
Farley, Redcay, & Nelson, 2013) or failed to support the claim that those with 
ASD are impaired specifically in interpreting information from the eyes (e.g. 
Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2007; Song, Kawabe, Hakoda, & Du, 2012). Secondly, 
a relationship between looking at the eye region and actual task performance 
has not always been found experimentally.  For example, Corden, Chilvers 
and Skuse (2008) found that the time spent looking at the eye region of faces 
correlated with success in identifying fearful faces, but no other facial 
expressions. Moreover, Boraston et al. (2007) found no relationship between 
expression identification and time spent looking at the eye region. Third, 
while some studies have found a relationship between severity of social 
symptoms of autism as measured by the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) and mentalising task performance 
including performance in looking at the eyes (e.g. Klin et al., 2002), others 
have not (e.g. Corden et al., 2008; Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004) 
questioning the causal relationship between mentalising deficits and the 
social difficulties in ASD. 
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One reason for inconsistencies in the literature may be the range of 
different paradigms that have been used. Perhaps group differences are most 
likely to be found in studies with naturalistic stimuli which closely 
approximate the complexities of everyday social interaction where facial 
expressions are dynamic, brief and subtle. The majority of previous studies 
used posed static images of exaggerated emotional expressions, frequently 
presented for several seconds (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; Tanaka, Kaiser, 
Butler, & Le Grand, 2012). Moreover, even those using dynamic stimuli have 
typically included expressions posed by actors making it unclear what the 
"correct" answer should be. Usually, the answer is agreed upon by 
consensus, yet this may not reflect the actual mental state of the actor.  
A notable exception to this was a study conducted by Boraston, 
Corden, Miles, Skuse and Blakemore (2008) who presented pictures or 
sounds of highly positive valence (such as a photo of kittens or a baby’s 
laugh) and filmed participants’ resulting spontaneous expressions. Later, 
participants with or without ASD were required to distinguish between these 
real "happy" expressions and other “happy” expressions posed by the same 
individuals. While both groups of participants could distinguish between real 
and posed expressions to some degree, participants with ASD were impaired. 
Moreover, those with ASD spent less time looking at the eyes than the 
comparison participants, suggesting the eyes may be crucial for interpreting 
naturalistic expressions, particularly genuine smiles. While the findings 
suggest that people with ASD are less able to see the difference between the 
two types of smile (genuine and posed), they do not tell us whether people 
with ASD are impaired in differentiating between different types of 
naturalistic expression.  
In light of the comments made above, a retrodictive mindreading task 
was developed to provide a measure of mentalising that requires participants 
to interpret naturalistic stimuli (see Chapter 3, Experiment 1). Participants 
were shown people’s (targets’) spontaneous reactions to four scenarios 
filmed during an interaction with the researcher; participants were then 
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asked to determine which of the four scenarios the target had experienced. A 
key strength of this task is that there is a definite correct answer against 
which the participant’s response can be compared. In other words, the 
researcher knows independently of the target’s reaction which scenario the 
target experienced. The participant, in contrast, can only base his or her 
judgment on the target’s reaction. In some ways, this might be seen as 
preferable to a task in which the participant is asked to estimate the target’s 
emotion, for there is no certain way of determining the target’s true state of 
emotion other than by interpreting his or her reaction.  
It was shown in Experiment 1 that neurotypical individuals could infer 
previous events from brief samples of behaviour with considerable success. 
Eye movements were also recorded and it was discovered surprisingly that 
most time was spent looking at the mouth not the eyes, and moreover that 
good performance in identifying the scenario was associated with looking less 
at the eyes and more at the mouth. These findings supported the view that 
looking at the eye region is not always conducive to good performance when 
interpreting facial expressions. 
This study used the same task as in Experiment 1 to investigate 
retrodictive mindreading in groups of individuals with and without ASD. It 
was predicted that a) people with ASD would have difficulty determining the 
scenario that the target had experienced, b) consistent with the previous 
study, it was hypothesised that neurotypical participants would look more at 
the mouth than the eyes. 
4.2 Methods 
 
The study was divided into two parts; Stimulus Development and Main 
Experiment. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee, 
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham. 
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4.2.1 Main Experiment 
 
The stimuli used in this study were exactly the same as used in Experiment 1. 
For a comprehensive description of how the stimuli were developed, please 
refer to Chapter 3 section 3.2.1. 
Participants  
Thirty male participants took part in the study. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all. Neurotypical participants (n=15) were recruited from the 
University of Nottingham United Kingdom while participants with an ASD 
(n=15) were recruited from across the United Kingdom through their 
respective schools or centres associated with the National Autistic Society. 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham for 
neurotypical participants and at their respective schools and centres for 
participants with ASD. Participants with ASD had been formally assessed by 
mental health professionals in line with DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) and subsequently received a Statement of Special 
Education Needs for autism or ASD. The Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) was conducted on the participants with 
ASD to independently confirm their diagnosis. Communication (M= 3.3), 
reciprocal social interaction (M= 7.3), and total ADOS (M= 10.67) scores were 
obtained.  Three of the fifteen participants did not meet the cut-off for ASD 
on the ADOS, but were included in the study as all had a previously 
established diagnosis of ASD or autism by trained mental health practitioners. 
Nevertheless, all analyses were repeated with the three participants who did 
not meet the cut-off for ASD removed from the data set and the pattern of 
results was identical to those reported in the following sections. All 
participants also completed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-
III; Wechsler, 1997) which provided measures of verbal IQ, performance IQ 
and full scale IQ. All participants completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001, see 
Appendix B) which measures levels of autistic traits in adults. An 
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independent-samples t-test showed that the ASD group scored significantly 
higher on the AQ than the comparison group t(28) = 4.45, p < .001. No 
significant differences were found in age or any IQ measures between the 
groups (all ps >.291). See Table 4.1 for summary details. 
  
ASD 
Mean  (SD) 
 
Neurotypical 
Mean  (SD) 
 
N 15 
 
15 
Age 
 
20.6   (5.6) 18.7   (3.7) 
Verbal IQ 
 
100.5  (21.7) 105.5  (18.0) 
Performance IQ 
 
95.5   (18.7) 101.1  (16.6) 
Full Scale IQ 
 
98.5   (21.1) 104.2  (18.3) 
AQ 
 
25.7   (7.0)*  16.7   (3.5)* 
 Table 4.1:  Participant characteristics.                                                                     
* Significant difference between groups, p < .001 
 
This study involved individuals with ASD. In testing individuals with ASD, the 
challenge lies in determining a suitable comparison group and most 
importantly, what measures will be used in matching participants. Some of 
the commonly used measures to compare groups include chronological age, 
mental age, gender, verbal IQ and performance IQ. Thus the selection of 
appropriate comparison groups plays a large role in ensuring that the 
differences in performance in a given experimental task are not due to trivial 
differences in intellectual functioning, verbal ability age or other related 
factors. In this study, participants with ASD were matched on a group basis 
with typically developing comparison participants with no reported 
neurodevelopmental diagnoses. They were matched based the following 
criteria; chronological age, gender, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale 
IQ. Individuals with a range of cognitive abilities were recruited; participants 
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with ASD obtained full scale IQ scores between 70 to 132 while the typically 
developing comparison group had IQ scores of 77 to 139. A participant pool 
with a wide range of abilities was selected in order to avoid the possibility of 
only selecting individuals with a particular intellectual ability level (i.e. high or 
low) and run the risk of the results of the study not being generalisable to all 
individuals with ASD as only a minority of the population was studied. 
Nevertheless, all participants had an IQ of over 70 which places them within 
the 'normal range' of intelligence, deemed to be high-functioning i.e. none of 
the participants could be regarded as having learning disabilities. This high 
functioning population was selected primarily to be able to deal with the 
verbal demands of the task and to allow comparison with a typically 
developing group. In addition all participants in this experiment were males, 
this resulted in a more homogeneous sample and the majority of individuals 
with ASD are male. Correlation analyses were conducted to determine if 
there were any relationships between participants’ age and intellectual 
ability and performance on the given mentalising task. 
 
Materials and Apparatus  
The four scenarios videoclips enacted by the researcher were used in this 
study. The main stimuli were the 40 edited videoclips showing targets’ 
reactions from the Stimulus Development phase of Experiment 1 (also used 
in Experiment 1). Each videoclip was interspersed with a rectangular image of 
the four scenario names (i.e. Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) in black font 
on white background. The rectangular shaped image was divided equally into 
four parts for each scenario name. Consistent with the coloured borders in 
the scenario videoclips, the perimeters enclosing each scenario name in the 
image had the same corresponding coloured borders. This was done in order 
to assist memory recall of the scenario videoclips as enacted by the 
researcher. The 40 videoclips showing the targets’ reactions did not have 
coloured borders. All videoclips (i.e. scenario clips enacted by researcher and 
target reaction clips from the Stimulus Development phase) were shown on a 
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17 inch TFT monitor which was incorporated into the Tobii T60 Eye Tracker 
(data rate 60 Hz) and presented using Tobii Studio software.   
 The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) consists of 50 questions with a four-
option forced choice response format (strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly 
disagree, strongly disagree). Participants were given as much time as they 
required to complete the questionnaire. 
Design  
A mixed design was used, where all participants in each group viewed the 
four scenario videoclips as enacted by the researcher followed by the 40 
target reaction videoclips. 
Procedure  
At the start of the experiment, participants were shown the scenario 
videoclips enacted by the researcher in a counterbalanced order. The 
purpose of presenting the scenario videoclips was to provide the participants 
with vivid information on what the targets experienced. Participants sat 
approximately 60 centimetres from the Tobii T60 screen, subtending a visual 
angle of 28 degrees horizontally and vertically. A 9-point eye-tracking 
calibration procedure was then conducted. Upon successful calibration, the 
40 target reaction videoclips were presented in random order by the Tobii 
studio software. After each videoclip was shown, an image of the four 
scenario names appeared and the researcher asked, “Which of these 
scenarios had just occurred?” This image remained on the screen until 
participants gave an answer verbally to the previously presented videoclip, 
whereupon the researcher clicked the mouse to move on to the next 
videoclip. Participants’ verbal responses were recorded on a data sheet for all 
40 videoclips. The participants then completed the AQ questionnaire. 
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4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Could participants determine the scenario which happened to a 
target from their spontaneous reactions? 
 
 As with the previous study (i.e. Experiment 1), signal detection theory 
was used to analyse participant responses in order to investigate the key 
question: Are there significant group differences in the success in 
discriminating between the four scenarios according to the target’s reaction? 
(refer to section 3.3.1 for description of signal detection method).  
The neurotypical participants were able to correctly discriminate 
differences between target reactions across scenarios as  d’ scores were 
significantly greater than 0  for all four scenarios [Joke t(14)=12.07, p<.001; 
Waiting t(14)=25.08, p<.001; Story t(14)=9.18, p<.001; Compliments 
t(14)=11.32, p<.001]. Participants with ASD also successfully discriminated 
between target reactions across all four scenarios: Joke t(14)=8.39, p<.001; 
Waiting t(14)=11.9, p<.001; Story t(14)=5.92, p<.001; and Compliments 
t(14)=3.38, p=.004.  See Figure 4.1 for participant mean d’ scores and Table 
4.2 for participant mean accuracy and false alarm rates. 
 
Figure 4.1: Correct scenario discriminability based on target reactions 
(mean d’ score). 
(Error bars represent standard errors of the mean) 
113 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Participant mean accuracy rates and false alarm rates. 
Accuracy    : Number correct out of 10 (% in brackets) 
False alarm: False alarms out of a possible 30 (% in brackets) 
 
 
 A 2x4 (group x scenario) ANOVA was performed in order to examine 
whether the groups (between participants factor) differed in how well they 
could discriminate between scenarios (within participants factor) based on 
their interpretation of the targets’ reactions. A main effect of scenario was 
found, F(3,84)=59.28, p<.001. Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction 
revealed that participants were better at discriminating when targets were 
reacting to the Waiting scenario than the other three scenarios (all ps<.001). 
Additionally, reactions to the Story scenario was easier to identify than the 
Compliments scenario (p<.001). There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 
28)= 8.95, p<.001, indicating that ASD participants were significantly poorer 
at discriminating between scenarios according to target reactions as 
compared to their neurotypical counterparts. The interaction between 
scenario and group was not significant (p=.230). 
Chi-square analyses were then employed to examine participants’ 
pattern of error responses. Four separate chi-square analyses were 
performed for each scenario in both the neurotypical and ASD groups. Table 
4.3 shows frequencies of neurotypical participants’ error responses. Findings 
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showed that neurotypical participants’ errors were not equally distributed for 
the Joke scenario [X2(3, n= 69) = 18.09, p <.001], which they primarily mistook 
for reactions to the Compliments scenario. Their errors were also not equally 
distributed for reactions to the Story scenario [X2(3, n= 49) = 10.45, p =.005] 
which they tended to mistake for reactions to the Waiting scenario. For 
reactions to the Compliments scenario participants' errors were also not 
equally distributed [X2(3, n= 64) = 13.72, p <.001], mainly confusing them 
with reactions to the Joke scenario. However their errors for the Waiting 
scenario were equally distributed across the three remaining response 
options [X2(3, n= 2) = .17, p =.60].  
    Joke     Waiting          Compliments     
    (observed error responses) 
  Story Expected 
error 
responses 
Joke 
 
- 7 35 27 23 
Waiting 
 
0 - 1 1 .67 
Compliments 
 
35 12 - 17 21.33 
Story 
 
11 27 11 - 16.33 
Table 4.3:  Neurotypical participants’ error response distribution (in 
frequencies). 
 
Table 4.4 shows frequencies of ASD participants’ error responses. The 
error responses of participants with ASD were not equally distributed for 
reactions to the Joke scenario [X2(3, n= 55) = 6.25, p =.04] whereby they 
mainly mistook them for reactions to the Compliments scenario. Their errors 
were also not equally distributed for reactions to the Waiting scenario [X2(3, 
n= 21) = 14, p <.001], with participants mainly mistaking them for reactions to 
the Story scenario. Furthermore, participants' errors were not equally 
distributed for reactions to the Compliments scenario [X2(3, n= 99) = 65.88, p 
<.001], which they mainly mistook for reactions to the Joke scenario. Their 
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error responses to the Story scenario were equally distributed across the 
three remaining response options [X2(3, n= 68) = 3.03, p =.22]. 
    Joke     Waiting          Compliments     
    (observed error responses) 
  Story Expected 
error 
responses 
Joke 
 
- 13 27 15 18.33 
Waiting 
 
7 - 0 14 7 
Compliments 
 
71 12 - 16 33 
Story 
 
16 27 25 - 22.67 
Table 4.4:  ASD participants’ error response distribution (in frequencies). 
 
As discriminability scores were much higher for reactions to the 
Waiting scenario compared with the other three scenarios, in further 
analyses data associated with the Waiting scenario were considered 
separately, as in Experiment 1. Overall success in discriminating between 
target reactions across the scenarios was positively related with full scale IQ, 
r=.38, n=30, p=.042. Similarly, the relationship between full scale IQ and 
discrimination of the targets’ reaction in the Waiting scenario approached 
significance (r=.33, n=30, p=.074). When considering each group separately, 
overall scenario discrimination (excluding the Waiting scenario) was 
positively related with full scale IQ in the ASD group (r=.54, n=15, p=.043). 
There was also a positive relationship between accuracy in detecting 
reactions to the Compliments scenario and full scale IQ scores in the ASD 
group (r=.63, n=15, p=.011). The same relationship approached significance 
for reactions to the Waiting scenario (r=.47, n=15, p=.083) and non-significant 
positive correlations were observed for responses to the other two scenarios. 
In the neurotypical group, all correlations between IQ and ability to 
discriminate the scenario based on targets' reactions were close to 0 apart 
from the Joke scenario where a negative relationship approached significance 
(r=-.47, n=15, p=.084), suggesting that the reported positive correlations for 
116 
 
full-scale IQ in the overall participant sample may be explained by the ASD 
group. Finally, as some significant correlations with IQ were observed for the 
ASD group, the ANOVA comparing the two groups for ability to discriminate 
scenarios based on targets' reactions was repeated with IQ entered as a 
covariate. This ANCOVA revealed the same pattern of main effects of 
scenario, F(3,81)=4.12, p=.009 and group, F(1,27)=7.96, p=.009, suggesting 
that any group differences in the ability to discriminate target reactions 
across the scenarios cannot be explained by the way IQ affected 
performance. 
4.3.2 What were participants’ eye gaze patterns? 
 
 The objectives of conducting eye-tracking analyses were to ascertain: 
(a) whether participants preferred to look at the mouth more than the eyes 
of the targets, (b) whether those with ASD had different looking preferences 
than neurotypical participants, and (c) whether participants’ ability to 
discriminate the scenarios according to target reactions was related with 
looking at certain regions of the target’s face (eye or mouth). The dynamic 
areas of interest (AOIs) function in Tobii Studio 3.0 was utilised to analyse 
and code the eye-tracking data (identical to Experiment 1). This enables the 
specification of AOIs which move and change form with the movements of 
the target. AOIs were outlined on the eye and mouth regions of the video 
stimuli to determine the eye movement metrics. The Total Fixation Duration 
(seconds) metric was used to calculate the total duration for all fixations 
within the AOIs separately. Fixation is defined by the standard Tobii fixation 
filter as two or more consecutive samples falling within a 35 pixel radius.  
Figure 4.2 shows the mean percentage of total gaze time for the eye 
and mouth of the target when reacting to each of the four scenarios. As the 
duration of the videoclips differed and the participants varied in their total 
time looking at the videos, the percentage of gaze time spent looking at the 
eye and mouth regions of targets for each videoclip was calculated (i.e. time 
spent looking at eye/mouth region ÷ total gaze time * 100). The data were 
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normalized by a square root transformation but untransformed means 
appear in the figure for ease of understanding.  
 
Figure 4.2: Mean percentage of total gaze time at the eye and mouth of 
targets across four scenarios.  
(Error bars represent standard errors of the mean) 
A 2x2x4 mixed ANOVA was performed on gaze time, with group (ASD 
or neurotypical) as a between-participants factor and scenario experienced 
by the target (Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) and region of the face (eyes 
or mouth) as within-participants factors. No main effects for scenario 
experienced by the target (p=.101) and group (p=.264) were found but there 
was a main effect for face region, F(1,28)= 6.86, p=.013, indicating that 
participants spent more time looking at the targets’ mouth as compared with 
the targets’ eyes. Furthermore, a significant interaction between scenario 
and face region was found, F(3, 84)= 27.6, p<.001. In order to interpret this 
interaction, separate one-way ANOVAs were performed to examine the 
effect of the scenario experienced by the target on gaze time for the target 
eye and mouth regions separately. There was a significant effect of scenario 
the target experienced on the time the participant spent looking at the 
targets’ eye region, F(3,87)=21.21, p<.001. Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction showed that participants spent more time looking at the targets’ 
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eye region when the targets were reacting to the Waiting scenario compared 
with the other three scenarios (all ps <.001). Participants also spent more 
time looking at the targets’ eye region when the targets were reacting to the 
Story scenario compared with the Joke scenario (p=.033). There was also a 
significant effect of scenario on time spent looking at the targets’ mouth 
region, F(3,87)= 19.21 p<.001. Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction 
revealed that participants spent more time looking at the targets’ mouth 
when the targets were reacting to the Joke, Story and Compliments scenarios 
compared with the Waiting scenario (p<.001). The interaction was further 
investigated using paired sample t-tests, to assess the effect of face region 
(eye or mouth) for each scenario. Participants spent more time looking at the 
targets’ mouth than eyes when the targets were reacting to the Compliments 
scenario, t(29)= -3.82, p< .001; the Joke scenario, t(29)=-4.15, p<.001; and the 
Story scenario t(29)= -2.57, p=.022. However, participants looked equally at 
both the eye and mouth regions when the targets were reacting to the 
Waiting scenario, t(29)=.84, p=.414.  All other main effects and interactions 
were not significant. Notably, there was no interaction between time spent 
looking at the different facial regions and participant group, meaning that 
there was no evidence to suggest that the two participant groups (i.e. ASD 
and neurotypical) differed in their attentional priority for the targets’ eyes 
and mouth. 
4.3.3 Did the differences in eye gaze behaviour relate to participants’ 
ability in distinguishing the scenarios targets reacted to? 
 
It was found that the Waiting scenario was easier to identify 
compared to the remaining three scenarios. Additionally, participants’ also 
displayed dissimilar eye gaze behaviours in the Waiting compared to the 
other three scenarios. Hence, reactions to the Waiting scenario was analysed 
separately from reactions to the Joke, Story and Compliments scenarios 
when investigating the relationship between eye gaze patterns and scenario 
identification. It was surprising to find that mean eye region gaze time did not 
correlate with accuracy of scenario identification (mean d’ scores) across 
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reactions to the three remaining scenarios (r=-.24, n=30, p=.201). Similar 
results were revealed for mean mouth region gaze time and success in 
detecting reactions to the scenarios (r=-.09, n=30, p=.641). The same 
relationships were also examined for responses to each scenario individually. 
Eye region gaze time did not correlate with d’ for the responses to the 
Compliments (r=-.13, n=30, p=.515) and the Joke scenarios (r=.03, n=30, 
p=.893), but approached significance for reactions to the Story scenario (r=-
.35, n=30, p=.057), indicating that participants who spent less time looking at 
the eye region were more accurate at discriminating reactions to the Story 
scenario. No significant relationships were found between mouth region gaze 
time and d’ for responses to all three individual scenarios (all ps>.145). The 
Waiting scenario was analysed separately, revealing a similar pattern in 
which eye region gaze time (r=-.19, n=30, p=.320) and mouth region gaze 
time (r=-.29, n=35, p=.119) were not associated with correct scenario 
discriminability.   
It is possible that the lack of relationships reported above were due to 
the inclusion of both groups (ASD and neurotypical) in the same analyses. 
Hence the analyses were repeated for each group in turn. No significant 
relationships were found between eye and/or mouth region gaze time and 
correct scenario identification within the ASD and neurotypical groups when 
analysed separately (all ps>.313). This suggests that individuals’ abilities to 
discriminate between scenarios were not related to time spent looking at the 
critical face regions (eye or mouth), although it should be noted that the 
number of individuals in each group was small (n=15).  
Nonetheless, other significant relationships associated with correct 
scenario discriminability were found. As with the analyses above, reactions to 
the Waiting scenario was examined separately. Overall success in detecting 
which scenario targets were reacting to was positively associated with full 
scale IQ scores across the three scenarios (r=.38, n=30, p=.042). Similarly, the 
relationship between full scale IQ scores and identification of reactions to the 
Waiting scenario approached significance (r= .33, n=30, p=.074). This suggests 
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that participants with higher IQ performed better in the scenario reaction 
identification task. A positive relationship was also found between full scale 
IQ scores and accuracy in detecting reactions to the Compliments scenario 
(r=.47, n=30, p=.013).  
In addition, participants’ AQ scores were negatively correlated with 
the overall d’ mean (excluding the Waiting scenario), r=-.55, n=30, p=.002, 
indicating that individuals who reported more autistic traits were less 
successful at discriminating the scenarios from one another. Furthermore, a 
negative relationship was found between participants’ AQ scores and correct 
scenario discriminability across each scenario independently, Compliments 
(r=-.42, n=30, p=.022); Joke (r=-.42, n=30, p=.024); Story (r=-.40, n=30, 
p=.032); and Waiting (r=-.53, n=30, p=.014). 
To address the possibility that these results were driven by the 
inclusion of the two participant groups in the analysis, the same analyses 
were conducted for each group in turn. Similar to the findings reported 
above, overall scenario reaction identification success (excluding Waiting 
scenario) was positively associated with full scale IQ scores in the ASD group 
(r=.54, n=15, p=.034). A positive relationship was also found between correct 
identification of reactions to the Compliments scenario and full scale IQ 
scores in the ASD group (r=.63, n=15, p=.013). Nevertheless, this relationship 
was not found for reactions to the other three scenarios (all ps>.05). 
Interestingly, accuracy in identifying reactions to the Compliments scenario 
was negatively associated with ADOS scores, (r=-.52, n=15, p=.045); and yet 
again not replicated in the Joke, Waiting and Story scenarios (all ps>.413). 
These findings suggest that ASD participants with higher IQs were more 
successful at detecting reactions to the Compliments scenario, whereas ASD 
participants with higher ADOS ratings were less successful at detecting 
reactions to the Compliments scenario. Nonetheless, it was surprising to find 
that scores of both the communication and reciprocal social interaction 
subscales on the ADOS were not associated with scenario reaction 
identification (all ps>.172). None of these relationships were found in the 
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neurotypical group (all ps>.484), suggesting that reported correlations for full 
scale IQ score in the overall participant sample may be explained by the ASD 
group. 
4.3.4 Did the EQ scores of targets affect participants’ ability to deduce 
what had happened to them?  
 
As in Experiment 1, analyses were conducted to investigate whether 
the EQ scores of targets (i.e. people in the reaction videoclips) had an impact 
on participants’ ability to correctly identify the scenarios they reacted to. 
Targets who rated themselves as having higher empathic abilities may in fact 
be more expressive; hence it was hypothesised that this may be a component 
factor that could influence participants’ ability in successfully identifying the 
scenarios.  Table 4.5 shows the targets’ mean EQ scores and participant 
accuracy rates broken down by scenario. The accuracy rates describe the 
percentage of participants who successfully identified the scenario from the 
target reaction videoclips ([number of participants who correctly identified 
the scenario in the videoclip ÷ 15] * 100).   There were a total of 40 videoclips 
(i.e. 10 videoclips for reactions to each of the 4 scenarios) with 19 males and 
21 females being filmed in the videos.  
 
Table 4.5:  Targets’ mean EQ scores and participants’ accuracy rates. 
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The relationship between the EQ scores of the targets and 
participants’ abilities in correctly detecting the scenario reacted to was 
investigated separately for each scenario using Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient with Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0125. No 
significant relationship was found between target EQ scores and the ability of 
neurotypical participants to correctly identify reactions to all scenarios (Joke: 
r=.50, n=10, p=.158; Waiting: r=.13, n=10, p=.725; Story: r= -.10, n=10, 
p=.783; and Compliments: r=.29, n=10, p=.425). Similarly for participants with 
ASD, no significant relationships were revealed between target EQ scores and 
participant accuracy rates for reactions to all scenarios (Joke: r=.44, n=10, 
p=.212; Waiting: r=-.15, n=10, p=.683; Story: r=-.27, n=10, p=.449; and 
Compliments: r .20, n=10, p=.578). 
4.4 Discussion  
 
Consistent with previous findings (i.e. Experiment 1) in spite of 
differences in the level of success across scenarios, participants were 
generally able to distinguish the event which took place merely by viewing 
several seconds of a target’s behavioural reaction. This suggests that both 
neurotypical and ASD participants employed effective strategies to determine 
the cause of the presented behavioural responses, and this qualifies as 
something that Gallese and Goldman (1998) call retrodiction. Effectively, 
participants could access something that happened in the world that they did 
not sense directly, through the window of another person’s mind – assuming 
that the other person’s mind is embodied in their behaviour.  
The findings in this study followed the same pattern as found in 
Experiment 1, with the Waiting scenario being identified more easily than the 
other three scenarios. This is likely to be because the actual responses of the 
targets in the videos were more distinctive in the Waiting scenario than in the 
other three scenarios. Because a forced choice format was used, the success 
of identifying one scenario was partly a function of being able to rule out 
other scenarios. While scenarios were selected which would give rise to a 
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range of expressive reactions, it was difficult to predict exactly how the 
targets would respond. In real life, different people respond in many ways to 
the same event. It is an impressive feat of human mentalising that we are 
able to estimate fairly accurately what caused a target’s reaction from a 
limited range of possible causes, despite the fact that the target’s reactions 
can be varied. Because the stimuli used were spontaneous rather than 
standardised target reactions, the current study effectively embraces this 
human capacity to connect a range of behavioural responses with a specific 
causal antecedent.  
The current study aimed to determine whether individuals with ASD 
would be less successful in interpreting target reactions and this proved to be 
the case. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that group differences 
in mentalising can be found in naturalistic tasks which reflect some of the 
demands of everyday social situations, where facial expressions are brief and 
subtle. The finding in this study is perhaps comparable with the report that 
individuals with ASD have difficulties in tasks that require them to infer 
complex emotions (e.g. Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006). Similarly, 
Sawyer, Williamson, and Young (2012) found that individuals with Asperger’s 
Syndrome were less accurate than neurotypical adults in recognising complex 
mental state expressions.  
It could be argued that in order to successfully identify the scenario in 
the mentalising task, one would only need to ‘match’ the responses using 
behavioural rules, while completely bypassing an inference of mental state 
that underlies the behavioural reaction (“Povinelli’s challenge”, Povinelli & 
Vonk, 2003). Nevertheless this is unlikely to be the case given the variety of 
reactions to the same scenario made by the targets in the videoclips- surely 
no simple behavioural matching strategy could be used. Besides, Perner 
(2010) pointed out that even behavioural rules are not ‘mind-blind 
behaviourism,’ implying that being able to acquire and use such rules is 
tantamount to having a ‘theory of mind’ of a kind. Nonetheless, if this task 
does involve matching responses using behavioural rules, the impaired 
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performance of those with ASD is still interesting insofar as it would suggest 
that people with ASD have difficulties in applying behavioural rules (or 
behavioural matching strategies) effectively.  
Participants spent longer looking at the mouth than the eye region for 
targets' reactions to all the scenarios apart from the Waiting scenario, for 
which participants spent a similar amount of time looking at the eyes and 
mouth. These findings are consistent with Experiment 1 where it was found 
that more time was spent looking at the mouth than the eye region for 
reactions to all four scenarios with this effect reduced (although not absent) 
for the Waiting scenario. Most importantly for the aims of the current study, 
there were no differences between the groups with and without ASD in the 
time spent looking at the eyes. This suggests that the impairment in 
interpreting the targets’ reactions in those with ASD is not explained by 
failure to use information from the eye region of the targets’ face. Instead it 
is concluded that both people with and without ASD approach this task by 
looking at the parts of the face that are most diagnostic for inferring which 
scenario caused the targets’ reaction, but that people with ASD for some as 
yet undetermined reason appear to be poorer at making the correct 
inference. 
Much previous research has emphasised the importance of using 
information from the eye region of the face to recognise facial expressions 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2005). Moreover, studies have 
suggested that impairments in mentalising in ASD may partly be explained by 
a tendency not to use information from the eye region of the face (e.g. 
Corden et al., 2008; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007). While the 
findings of this study may seem surprising in light of this, they are consistent 
with a growing body of research which suggests that the mouth may be more 
important than previously recognised. For example, Blais, Roy, Fiset, Arguin, 
and Gosselin (2012) conducted ideal observer analyses and found that the 
mouth region contains the most useful information for recognition of 
dynamic facial expressions. They speculate that this may be because the 
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movements of the mouth are most useful for recognising natural facial 
expressions. Furthermore, it has frequently proved difficult to find a 
relationship between facial viewing strategy and task performance (e.g. 
Sawyer et al., 2012) and this highlights a possible dissociation between where 
a person is looking and the information that is actually processed (Arizpe, 
Kravitz, Yovel, & Baker, 2012). 
Participants' ability as indexed by full scale IQ was related with 
success in discriminating between the scenarios based on the targets’ 
reaction, although this could not explain the group differences in interpreting 
the reaction of the target. Further analyses revealed that these relationships 
between IQ and task performance only held for those diagnosed with ASD. 
This suggests that in neurotypical individuals, the ability to discriminate the 
scenario to which a target is reacting is relatively independent of a person's 
IQ level. However, for the participants with ASD, the relationship could 
suggest that those who are higher functioning have worked out strategies for 
identifying the scenario to which the targets responded, strategies that might 
be different from those used by comparison participants. Similar to the 
findings in Experiment 1, no relationships were found between target EQ 
scores and participants’ accuracy in identifying scenarios the targets 
experienced. This suggests that the self-reported empathic abilities of targets 
did not influence both neurotypical and ASD participants’ performance in 
determining the preceding scenarios. 
In summary, the findings suggest that, despite focusing on the same 
regions of the face, individuals with ASD had difficulties inferring what event 
caused an individual to behave in a particular way. The ability to make such 
inferences may be useful not only because it enables us to make sense of 
others’ behaviour, but perhaps even enables us to benefit indirectly from the 
experiences of others. Through observing the reactions of others we may be 
able to learn something about events (both positive and negative) that we 
have not witnessed ourselves. Hence, participants effectively used the mind 
of the targets as a window to a view of the world that was beyond what they 
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could apprehend with their ordinary senses. If individuals with ASD do not 
perform well in making such inferences, this could indicate not only that they 
have difficulty understanding other minds but also that they experience a 
barrier to aspects of the world that most of us can see through the lens of 
other minds.  
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CHAPTER 5 
   Can People Determine What Happened 
To Individuals With ASD From Their Brief 
Behavioural Responses? 
EXPERIMENT 4 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (Experiment 3), individuals with ASD 
compared to neurotypical controls were shown to have significant difficulties 
in accurately distinguishing the scenarios that people experienced. One of the 
key differentiating factors of the approach used in this thesis was to not have 
participants infer and verbally label the mental states of the spontaneous 
responses of others. Rather, participants were asked to identify an 
objectively correct response i.e. the scenario which they believed was the 
antecedent to the presented spontaneous responses. Under these 
circumstances even, participants with ASD were found to struggle. It is 
plausible to suppose that one of the ways in which an individual comes to the 
correct scenario is by ‘putting themselves in the other person’s shoes’, 
perhaps through a process of simulation. One explanation for the difficulties 
of those with ASD is that they were unable to perform such a mental 
simulation. Another explanation is that even though they can perform mental 
simulation, it is of no help in this task because they themselves would 
respond in a different or attenuated manner from the targets in the 
videoclips when faced with the same scenarios. If this were the case, then a 
process of simulation would be rendered considerably less effective for 
determining the scenarios to which the targets were responding. In 
consequence, this chapter asks the question- how would individuals with ASD 
respond to the four scenarios if they themselves were to experience them?  
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While the notion that individuals with ASD are incapable of feeling or 
expressing emotions (Kanner, 1971) is no longer prominent, the socioemotive 
and communication difficulties in ASD remain a hallmark and one of the most 
prominent features of the disorder.  Indeed the difficulties associated with 
inferring and identifying mental states have been long researched in the 
population with ASD (as discussed in Chapter 2). Studies have shown that 
individuals with ASD have the ability to recognise basic mental states such as 
happiness, fear and anger (Loveland et al., 1997) but have difficulties with 
certain self-conscious mental states such as pride (Kasari, Sigman, 
Baumgartner, & Stipek, 1993) as well as  shame and embarrassment (Heerey, 
Keltner, & Capps, 2003). Loveland et al. (1997) found that despite the ability 
to perform as well as typically developing individuals in emotion recognition 
tasks in laboratory settings, people with ASD often struggle in real-life 
situations. These difficulties are known to impact on their overall social 
functioning as they frequently have problems in everyday social-interactive 
spheres such as forming and maintaining friendships, sharing interests with 
others, and behaving appropriately at work, school as well as other social 
settings.  
 
While much research has been conducted in the area of mental state 
recognition in people with ASD, there is a dearth of knowledge in regard to 
their ability for affective expression and response. Still, there have been a 
few studies which have endeavoured to illustrate the affective capabilities of 
individuals with ASD through the use of a variety of methods. Loveland et al. 
(1994) examined imitation and expression of facial affect in a group of 18 
children with ASD and 24 children with Down syndrome (control group) 
matched for chronological age, mental age and cognitive ability. The 
participants were filmed and instructed to imitate five of the experimenter’s 
facial expressions (imitation task) and to demonstrate five emotional states 
named by the experimenter (expression task). The five affective labels were 
happy, sad, angry, surprise and neutral.  The findings showed that 
participants with ASD had equal difficulty in both tasks (imitation and 
129 
 
expression) and they produced less recognisable expressions as compared to 
the individuals with Down syndrome in the expression task (where there was 
no model to imitate). Loveland et al. (1994) also reported that the responses 
of participants with ASD in both tasks encompassed odd behaviours and 
peculiar facial expressions, some of which looked ‘rigid and mechanical’. 
Although this study tells us children with ASD may have difficulty producing 
expressions on request, it does not tell us whether there are differences in 
their expressivity when responding to actual events in real life. 
 
One of the more commonly used ways of measuring affect expression 
is via direct observation of spontaneous facial expressions during social 
interactions. Snow, Hertzig and Shapiro (1987) investigated the expression of 
emotion in 10 preschool aged children with ASD along with 10 children who 
were developmentally delayed (both groups were matched for mental and 
chronological age). The children were individually filmed for 15 minutes in 
interactions with their mother, child psychiatrist as well as their kindergarten 
teacher.  The findings revealed that while there were no differences in the 
occurrence of negative affect between groups, children with ASD exhibited 
less positive affect compared to their developmentally delayed counterparts. 
In addition, while the positive affect displayed by the control group was more 
likely to be linked to partner-interactions, the positive affect demonstrated 
by children with ASD was more often related with self-absorbed activities and 
less towards their social partners. Yirmiya, Kasari, Sigman, and Mundy (1989) 
investigated the spontaneous expressions of facial affect among children with 
ASD, mental retardation and typically developing controls. Facial affect was 
coded using the Maximally Discriminative Movement Coding System (Izard, 
1979). They found that children with ASD displayed more flat and neutral 
facial affect as compared to controls. Findings also indicated that children 
with ASD presented a range of incongruous and vague expressions which 
were not seen in the comparison children. 
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 Bieberich and Morgan (1998) examined facial affect expression in 
children with ASD (n=18) and Down syndrome (n=18) between the ages of 5 
and 15 years of age. The children along with their mothers were discreetly 
filmed during a 25 minute play session.  The quality of facial expressions in 
this study was measured by the Minnesota Preschool Affect Rating Scale 
(MN-PARS; Shapiro, McPhee, Abbott, & Sulzbacher, 1994). In like manner 
with previous findings, Bieberich and Morgan (1998) reported that children 
with ASD displayed less positive and more negative affect as compared to the 
children with Down syndrome during the semi-structured play session with 
their mothers. They also found that self-regulation was a strong 
distinguishing factor between both groups. Self-regulation includes 
components of behaviour expressed during play such as attention, 
distractibility, object orientation, adaptability and persistence. In summary, 
Bieberich and Morgan (1998) reported that children with ASD compared to 
those with Down syndrome showed more impairments in organisational and 
attentional skills expressed during the play session.  
 
 Some studies have looked into parental perceptions of children’s 
emotional expressiveness. For instance, Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, and Sigman 
(1993) conducted two studies, one with older high-functioning children with 
ASD and healthy controls and the second with younger low-functioning 
children with ASD and matched controls.  The results revealed that the 
children with ASD in both studies were perceived by their parents as 
displaying more negative than positive affect. While the studies described 
above suggest that people with ASD may not express affect in the typical way 
in their everyday interactions, one of the shortcomings of this approach is 
that the methodology does not permit control over exactly what the child 
experiences. Specifically, parents themselves may have varying approaches to 
interaction and differing degrees of expressivity within these interactions. 
Therefore it is difficult to tease apart the extent to which differences in the 
behaviour of the interaction partners (parents/ teachers/psychologists etc.) 
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might have contributed to the observed differences in expressivity amongst 
the children. 
 
 Other studies have investigated the reactions of people with ASD to 
displays of positive or negative affect in others. Kasari et al. (1993) examined 
the expression of pride in children with ASD, mental retardation and typically 
developing controls. The children completed developmentally appropriate 
puzzles, both with and without praise. The findings revealed that the children 
with ASD showed satisfaction (i.e. smile) at completing the puzzles, however 
only a few shared this affect with either the experimenter or the parent as 
compared to the controls. In addition, children with ASD were found to 
respond to praise by showing avoidant responses (i.e. turning away).  
 
 In addition, Dawson, Hill, Spencer, Galpert, and Watson (1990) 
examined the affect, social behaviour and eye gaze patterns in naturalistic 
exchanges between 16 children with ASD and their mothers. The children 
with ASD were aged between 30 to 70 months while the control group 
consisted of 16 typically developing children (matched on receptive language 
ability as measured by the Reynell Verbal Comprehension Scale). The children 
and their mothers were filmed in three social conditions; free play (low 
communicative demand); put toys away (high communicative demand); and 
snack time (face-to-face interaction). The results of the study demonstrated 
that children from both groups did not differ in the frequency and total gaze 
time at the mothers’ face. In the snack time condition, children did not 
display frowning behaviour and their display of smiling did not vary between 
groups. However, it was found that children with ASD were less likely to fuse 
their affect expression with appropriate eye contact.  The researchers 
suggest that this reflects a qualitative difficulty in merging eye contact and 
emotional expression concurrently in order to convey communicative intent. 
This implies that although children with ASD may be able to express emotions 
as much as others, they may not as easily convey these emotions to people 
around them. In addition, Dawson et al. (1990) also reported that children 
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with ASD were much less likely to smile in response to their mothers’ smiles 
as compared to the children in the control group. It must be noted however 
that the children with ASD in this study were low-functioning, with many 
fulfilling the criteria for mental retardation; hence the differences between 
groups may not be completely attributable to ASD. The studies reviewed 
above demonstrate that individuals with ASD show differences in the 
integration of affect with attention. In particular, they suggest that those 
with ASD are less likely to display positive affect together with attentional 
behaviours (e.g. joint attention) as well as eye contact in social situations. 
Hence it could be conjectured that the view of ‘flat’ or ‘blunted’ affect 
amongst people with ASD may not be due to a deficit in emotional 
responsiveness per se, rather from sporadic efforts in social referencing 
which in turn surface as impaired emotion reactions.  
 
 In contrast to the studies directly investigating emotional affect, 
Hobson and  Lee (1998) conducted a study assessing ‘intersubjective 
engagement’ (said to be a vital aspect of social understanding) of individuals 
with ASD in a semi-structured condition which filmed the spontaneous or 
prompted hellos and goodbyes to an unacquainted adult. The results 
revealed that compared to controls, individuals with ASD displayed less 
spontaneous verbal and nonverbal gestures of hellos and goodbyes. 
Furthermore, they also showed less eye contact when offered a greeting. By 
the same token, Attwood, Frith, and Hermelin (1988) demonstrated that 
children with ASD are generally less emotionally expressive in social 
situations and have difficulty understanding simple instrumental social 
gestures compared to children with Down syndrome and mental retardation. 
This was coupled with the finding that children with ASD did not use any 
expressive gestures (i.e. gestures signalling own inner states or in response to 
the inner states of others such as consolation and embarrassment) while they 
did display the use of instrumental gestures (i.e. gestures used to prompt 
immediate action such as ‘be quiet’ and ‘come here’). On the other hand, 
Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, and Corte (2005) found that the expressive 
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behaviours (as measured by displays of gazing, stimulatory gestures and 
verbalisations) of individuals with ASD did not differ significantly from healthy 
controls during initial conversations with a typically developing stranger.  
 
The literature reviewed above indicates that individuals with ASD do 
make expressive responses but they may be attenuated in their intensity, and 
different kinds of behavioural responses may be combined in atypical ways 
(such as gestures, eye gaze and facial expressions). Studies have either 
analysed posed expressions which may tell us relatively little about how 
individuals with ASD express themselves in daily life; or they have observed 
children behaving in naturalistic or semi-structured settings which closely 
approximate the demands of real life but lack experimental control. In most 
cases, the expressions produced have been ‘coded’ by raters for their 
affective content or expressivity. As yet (to the researcher’s knowledge), 
there has been no experimental study examining expressions of people with 
ASD. Moreover, almost all of the previous studies have involved children with 
ASD and little is known about the expressive behaviour of adolescents and 
adults with ASD.  
The experiment described in this chapter operates with the same 
paradigm used in the previous two experiments (i.e. as described in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4) to address these gaps in our knowledge. However in this 
study, individuals with ASD were subjected to the four scenarios and their 
naturalistic responses were surreptitiously filmed. The primary aim was to 
investigate the ability of typically developing adults to determine which 
scenario individuals were responding to by viewing brief dynamic video clips 
of individuals with ASD and matched healthy controls. As in the previous 
experiments, the advantage of this method is that there is an objectively 
correct answer to this question; no ratings of emotional expressivity or 
labelling of mental states is involved. Can people distinguish the scenarios to 
which the targets responded and are there any differences in people’s 
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performance in identifying the scenarios when watching clips of people with 
ASD vs. typically developing individuals?   
5.2 Methods 
 
The entire procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee, School 
of Psychology, University of Nottingham. 
5.2.1 Stimulus Development 
Target Reaction Videoclips 
 
The primary aim of this phase of the study was to create video stimuli to be 
used in the Main Experiment. The same procedure used in creating target 
reaction stimuli for the previous studies was employed here. Participants 
(from now on referred to as targets) were informed that they would be 
filmed while modelling several facial expressions to act as stimuli for another 
study. However the targets were unaware that the actual purpose was to film 
their natural reactions to an aspect of the researcher’s behaviour that 
occurred prior to recording the posed facial expressions.  Further details are 
presented below. 
Participants 
 
Forty males aged between 13 and 21 (mean age= 15.4 years) were filmed 
responding to a seemingly incidental aspect of the researcher’s behaviour. All 
targets were native speakers of the English language. Targets with ASD (n=20) 
were enlisted from educational establishments in the United Kingdom and 
were all British nationals. Written informed consent was obtained from the 
teachers of targets with ASD.  Targets with ASD were officially evaluated by 
mental health professionals according to the DSM-IV criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and consequently received a Statement of 
Special Education Needs for Autism or ASD. Neurotypical targets (n=15) were 
recruited from an international school in Malaysia. Written informed consent 
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was obtained from the parents of neurotypical targets. All targets (both ASD 
and neurotypical) were involved in either General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE), A-Levels or tertiary education courses. Five additional 
neurotypical individuals from the Stimulus Development stage in the previous 
study (see section 3.2.1- Target Reaction Videoclips) were included in this 
study. Of the 20 neurotypical targets, there were 15 British nationals, 3 
Australians, 1 Polish and 1 French national. The ASD and neurotypical target 
groups were all Caucasian and matched for chronological age. This was to 
ensure that any differences in participants’ ability to determine the scenarios 
to which targets with and without ASD responded were not due to age or 
race of the targets. All targets completed the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). An independent-samples t-test showed that 
the neurotypical targets had higher EQ scores than the ASD targets, t(38) =-
2.4, p=.02.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Target participant characteristics. 
* Significant difference between groups, p < .05 
 
 
Materials and Apparatus  
A large and quiet room within the respective institutions was used for 
the filming procedure. In order to avoid any disruptions, targets were seated 
in front of a plain wall with their back towards the main entrance and 
windows. A Sony DCR-SR60 video camera was placed about 1.7 meters 
directly opposite the target participant across the table on a tripod. The 
 ASD 
 
Mean  (SD) 
Neurotypical 
 
Mean  (SD) 
N 20 
 
20 
Age 
 
15.7   (2.27) 16.6   (3.32) 
EQ 
 
31.45   (9.52)* 38.7   (9.59)* 
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camera was set up in order for the targets’ face and upper body be filmed. 
The researcher was seated next to the tripod. 
 
Procedure  
Targets were informed that they would be filmed while enacting certain facial 
expressions which would be used as video stimuli in a later study. The same 
four scenarios (Joke, Story, Compliments & Waiting) were used with the aim 
of provoking an array of natural behavioural responses from the targets 
(please refer to Chapter 3 section 3.2.1 for full description of the scenarios). 
The primary focus was to create scenarios that would elicit a reaction but 
would be unlikely to cause a change in the mood of the participants. It was 
imperative that target participants were unaware that the researcher was 
acting; as such it was essential that the scenarios appeared believable within 
the context of the experiment. The four different scenarios were randomised 
between targets in each group, such that five individuals in each group 
experienced each scenario. Each target experienced only one of the 
scenarios.  
Editing  
The video recordings were edited using Windows Live Movie Maker software. 
A set of editing criteria was developed in order to facilitate objective  
procedures across both neurotypical and ASD target groups. For each of the 
scenarios the aim was to generate videoclips that covered the period of time 
when neurotypical targets showed the greatest response to the event. The 
Compliments footage was edited to begin at the end of the last said 
compliment, while the Joke recordings was edited at the point at which the 
researcher said “on a crash diet!”. The Story and Waiting footage was edited 
approximately three seconds before the end of the scenario enactment. 
Refer to Figure 5.1 for samples of neurotypical target reactions and Figure 5.2 
for samples of ASD target reactions. There was a total of 40 edited videoclips 
(20 for each group with a total of 5 clips per scenario for each group) with a 
mean of 7.22 seconds. The mean videoclip length in seconds for the 
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neurotypical target group were; Joke: 7.12 (SD=.77); Waiting: 7.08 (SD=.65); 
Story: 7.24 (SD=.18); Compliments: 7.22 (SD=.10).  A one-way ANOVA 
revealed that videoclip length did not differ with the scenarios (p=.98). The 
videoclips for the ASD target group had means of; Joke: 7.18 (SD=.18); 
Waiting: 7.16 (SD=.25); Story: 7.3 (SD=.12); and Compliments: 7.44 (SD=.44).  
Similarly, it was found that videoclip length did not systematically vary with 
the scenarios (p=.385). Four independent samples t-tests examining each 
scenario across the target groups showed that videoclip length did not differ 
between groups (all ps >.431). 
 
   The videoclips were 1080 pixels in width and 720 pixels in height, 
presented at 25 frames per second. Similar to the previously used videoclips, 
targets’ verbalisations (i.e. auditory component of footage) were not 
included in the edited videoclips as in many cases it would have 
disambiguated the scenario entirely.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Sample screenshots of neurotypical target reaction videoclips. 
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Figure 5.2: Sample screenshots of ASD target reaction videoclips. 
 
5.2.2 Main Experiment 
 
Participants  
Thirty participants (15 males and 15 females) aged between 18 and 35 (mean 
age= 23.2 years) took part in this phase of the study. Participants were largely 
recruited from University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus while others were 
volunteers from the community. Participants were of several nationalities: 26 
Malaysian, 2 Pakistani, 1 British and 1 Chinese national.  All participants 
spoke English as their first language. Participants completed the EQ (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004)  with a mean score of 39.3 (SD=8.0). All 
participants provided written informed consent. Participants were 
compensated with an inconvenience allowance for their involvement in the 
study. 
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Materials and Apparatus  
The same four video-recordings of the researcher performing each of the 
four scenarios (while looking directly at the camera) were used in this study 
(see Chapter 3 section 3.2.1 for further details).  
 
The main stimuli for this study were the 40 target behavioural response 
videoclips from the Stimulus Development phase of this study. All videoclips 
(both the researcher enacting the scenarios and targets’ behavioural 
responses) were shown on a 15 inch laptop monitor. The target reaction 
videoclips were presented using PsychoPy2 version 1.74 which randomised 
the order of presentation. Each videoclip was interspersed with a rectangular 
image of the four scenario names (i.e. Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) in 
black font on white background. The rectangular shaped image was divided 
equally into four parts for each scenario name. Consistent with the coloured 
borders in the scenario videoclips, the perimeters enclosing each scenario 
name in the image had the same corresponding coloured borders. This was 
done in order to assist memory recall of the scenario videoclips as enacted by 
the researcher. The 40 behavioural response videoclips did not have coloured 
borders.  
 
Design  
A within-subjects design was employed, whereby all participants watched the 
four scenario videoclips followed by the 40 target reaction videoclips.  
 
Procedure  
Every participant was assessed individually. They were first shown the 
researcher enacted scenario videoclips which were randomised by 
PsychoPy2.  The purpose of showing the scenario videoclips was for 
participants to familiarise themselves with the experience of the targets in 
the Stimulus Development phase, hence having good knowledge of what 
each scenario involved. Participants were subsequently shown the 40 target 
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behavioural response videoclips, again randomised by PsychoPy2. After each 
videoclip was presented, the scenario names image appeared on the screen 
and participants were instructed to state which scenario the target in the 
videoclip was reacting to by pointing to the screen or directly verbalising the 
answer. The image stayed on the screen until the participant gave an answer 
to the previously presented target behavioural response videoclip.  The 
researcher asked, “Which of these events had just happened?” while pointing 
to the image on the screen. Participants’ responses were documented on 
data sheets by the researcher.  Importantly, no indication was given to the 
participants that some of the individuals in the videos had an ASD. The 
participants then filled out the EQ questionnaire. Participants were then 
debriefed and it is important to note that all participants reported being 
unaware that half the videoclips presented contained targets with ASD.  
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Were participants able to correctly identify the scenarios which 
targets reacted to?  
 
The aim of the analysis was to determine whether participants could 
distinguish targets responding to each of the four scenarios as well as if there 
were differences in their ability in identifying scenarios for the neurotypical 
and ASD target videoclips. Signal detection method was utilised to analyse 
participants’ responses (refer to section 3.3.1 for description). In this study, 
the neurotypical and ASD target videoclips (i.e. 20 videoclips in each group) 
were analysed separately by computing the hit rate for the responses to the 
five videoclips showing reactions to a particular scenario whereas false alarm 
rate was computed for the responses to the remaining fifteen videoclips 
which did not depict the scenario in question.  
Eight one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0063 
were conducted. It was found that participants were able to correctly 
discriminate which scenario neurotypical targets were responding to as  d’ 
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scores were significantly greater than 0  for all four scenarios [Joke 
t(29)=9.69, p<.001; Waiting t(29)=16.98, p<.001; Story t(29)=8.96, p<.001; 
Compliments t(29)=7.20, p<.001]. Conversely, only the Joke [t(29)=9.69, 
p<.001] and Waiting [t(29)=16.98, p<.001] scenario clips yielded d’ scores 
significantly larger than 0 when viewing the videoclips of  ASD targets. 
Participants were not able to distinguish reactions to the Story [t(29)=1.13, 
p=.267] and Compliments scenarios [t(29)=2.03, p=.056] when watching 
videoclips of targets with ASD. Please refer to Figure 5.3 for participant mean 
d’ scores and Table 5.2 for participant mean accuracy and false alarm rates. 
 
Figure 5.3: Correct scenario discriminability across neurotypical and ASD 
target videoclips (mean d’ score). 
(Error bars represent standard errors of the mean) 
 
142 
 
 
Table 5.2: Participant mean accuracy rates and false alarm rates. 
 
Accuracy    : Number correct out of 5 (% in brackets) 
False alarm: False alarms out of a possible 15 (% in brackets) 
 
Chi-square analyses were performed to investigate participants’ 
pattern of error responses. Four separate chi-square analyses were 
performed for each scenario in both the neurotypical and ASD target video 
groups. Table 5.3 shows participants’ error responses when viewing videos of 
neurotypical targets. Findings showed that when participants watched 
neurotypical target videos, their error responses were not equally distributed 
for reactions to the Joke scenario [X2(3, n= 93) = 66.84, p <.001] which was 
most often mistaken for reactions to the Compliments scenario. Their error 
responses were not equally distributed for reactions to the Waiting scenario 
[X2(3, n= 11) = 7.82, p =.02], which tended to be confused with reactions to 
the Story scenario. Their error responses were also not equally distributed for 
reactions to the Compliments scenario [X2(3, n= 67) = 16.6, p <.001], which 
tended to be confused with both the Story and Joke scenarios, but seldom 
the Waiting scenario. Finally, their error responses were not equally 
distributed for reactions to the Story scenario [X2(3, n= 70) = 9.29, p =.009] 
which were most often mistaken for reactions to the Compliments scenario.  
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    Joke     Waiting          Compliments     
    (observed error responses) 
  Story Expected 
error 
responses 
Joke 
 
- 5 67 21 31 
Waiting 
 
1 - 2 8 3.67 
Compliments 
 
27 7 - 33 22.33 
Story 
 
15 20 35 - 23.33 
Table 5.3:  Participant error response distribution when viewing 
neurotypical target videos (in frequencies). 
 
Similarly, it was found that when participants watched ASD target 
videos, their error responses were not equally distributed in all scenarios. 
Participants tended to mistake reactions to the Joke scenario [X2(3, n= 86) = 
25.42, p <.001] for the Compliments scenario. They tended to mistake 
reactions to the Waiting scenario [X2(3, n= 20) = 9.7, p =.007] for reactions to 
the Story scenario. They most often mistook reactions to the Compliments 
scenario [X2(3, n= 115) = 49.58, p <.001] for the Joke scenario. Finally, they 
confused reactions to the Story scenario [X2(3, n= 106) = 8.85, p =.001] for 
reactions to the Waiting and Compliments scenarios. Table 5.4 shows 
participants’ error responses when viewing videos of ASD targets. 
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    Joke     Waiting          Compliments     
    (observed error responses) 
  Story Expected 
error 
responses 
Joke 
 
- 13 27 15 28.67 
Waiting 
 
7 - 0 14 6.67 
Compliments 
 
71 12 - 16 38.33 
Story 
 
16 27 25 - 35.33 
Table 5.4:  Participant error response distribution when viewing ASD target 
videos (in frequencies). 
 
5.3.2 Were there differences in participants’ ability in identifying 
scenarios when watching videoclips of neurotypical vs. ASD targets? 
 
A 2x4 (target group x scenario) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed in order to examine whether there were differences in 
participants’ abilities in identifying the scenarios responded to in the 
neurotypical and ASD target videos. A main effect of video group was found, 
F(1,29)=38.16, p<.001, which shows that participants were better at 
identifying the scenario responded to when viewing the videoclips of 
neurotypical targets as compared to the videoclips of targets with ASD. A 
main effect of scenario was also found, F(3,87)=100.15, p<.001. Posthoc t-
tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that participants were better at 
differentiating targets responding to the Waiting scenario than the other 
three scenarios (all ps<.001). It was also found that responses to the Joke 
scenario were easier to identify than the Story and Compliments scenarios 
(p<.001). However participants showed no significant differences in the 
identification of responses to the Story and Compliments scenarios (p=1.0). In 
addition, a significant interaction effect between scenario and target group 
was found, F(3,87)=13.78, p<.001; indicating that the effects of scenario 
differed for the two target groups. To further investigate this interaction, 
separate one-way ANOVAs were performed to examine the effect of the 
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scenario responded to on correct discriminability for the neurotypical and 
ASD target groups. There was a significant effect of the scenario reacted to in 
the videoclips of neurotypical targets, F(2.19,63.46)=62.10, p<.001 
(Greenhouse Geisser corrected). Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrected 
alpha level of .0125 revealed that participants better identified responses to 
the Waiting scenario than the remaining three scenarios (all ps<.001). 
Similarly for the videoclips showing targets with ASD, a significant effect of 
scenario responded to was found, F(3,87)=70.37, p<.001. Posthoc t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .0125 showed that participants again 
found the Waiting scenario easier to identify as compared to the other three 
scenarios (all ps<.001). They were also better at discriminating responses to 
the Joke scenario compared to the Story and Compliments scenarios (all 
ps<.001). The interaction was further examined using paired sample t-tests to 
assess the effect of target groups (neurotypical and ASD) for each scenario 
response. Participants were better at discriminating the videos showing 
neurotypical compared to the ASD targets reacting to the Waiting, t(29)= -
5.19, p< .001; Story, t(29)= -7.14, p< .001; and Compliments scenarios, t(29)= 
-4.09, p< .001. However, findings revealed that participants identified 
reactions to the Joke scenario equally for videos of neurotypical and ASD 
targets, t(29)=1.13, p=.278.   
 
5.3.3 Were participants’ EQ scores related to their ability to correctly 
discriminate between reactions to the scenarios?  
 
It was then investigated if there was a relationship between 
participants’ reported empathic traits (i.e. EQ score) and their ability in 
distinguishing the scenarios targets in the videoclips were reacting to. Four 
separate Pearson product-moment correlations with Bonferroni correction 
(alpha level .0125) were conducted. No significant relationships between 
mean EQ score and mean d’ scores (correct scenario discriminability) were 
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found (Joke: r=.12, n=30, p=.519; Story: r =.35, n =30, p= .058; Compliments: r 
=.24, n =30, p= .204; and Waiting: r =.37, n =30, p= .045). 
The same analyses mentioned above were then conducted for each 
target group (separate Pearson product-moment correlations with 
Bonferroni correction). When individuals viewed videos of the neurotypical 
targets, no relationships were found between participant reported empathic 
traits and ability to discriminate which scenario they were reacting to for all 
scenarios (Joke: r=-.17, n=30, p=.375; Story: r =.329, n =30, p= .076; 
Compliments: r =.15, n =30, p= .432; and Waiting: r =.28, n =30, p= .131). 
Similarly, when individuals viewed videos of targets with ASD, no 
relationships were found in participant EQ scores and their ability to correctly 
discriminate the scenarios (Joke: r=.29, n=30, p=.123; Story: r =.20, n =30, p= 
.284; Compliments: r =.19, n =30, p= .346; and Waiting: r =.40, n =30, p= 
.031). 
This shows that participants’ empathic scores were not correlated 
with their ability to determine the scenario to which neurotypical and ASD 
targets responded to.  
5.3.4 Did the EQ scores of targets affect participants’ ability to deduce 
what had happened to them?  
 
 The relationship between the EQ scores of neurotypical and ASD 
targets and participants’ abilities to correctly identify the scenario to which 
they responded was investigated. As it is probable that targets’ 
expressiveness is a factor in people’s ability to guess the scenario a target is 
reacting to, it can also be conceived that individuals who have a higher EQ 
score and are more emotionally attuned with others may in fact be more 
expressive themselves. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show targets’ mean EQ scores 
and participants’ correct scenario discriminability, broken down by scenario. 
The accuracy rates are the percentage of participants who successfully 
identified the scenario from the videoclips ([number of participants who 
accurately identified the scenario in the videoclip ÷ 30] x 100).   There were a 
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total of 20 videos in each target group (i.e. 5 videos for each of the 4 
scenarios).   
 Target EQ scores 
 
Participant accuracy 
 
 Mean (SD) Means in percentage (SD) 
Joke  29.2   (6.7) 37.3%   (5.5) 
Waiting 39.4   (11.1) 92.0%  (5.6) 
Story 41.6    (6.5) 51.3%  (18.6) 
Compliments  44.6   (7.6) 53.3%   (24.6) 
 Table 5.5: Neurotypical targets’ mean EQ scores & participants’ accuracy 
rates. 
 
 Target EQ scores 
 
Participant accuracy 
 
 Mean (SD) Means in percentage (SD) 
Joke    28.2    (11.2) 39.3%    (21.5) 
Waiting 32.8    (8.2) 84.0%    (19.4) 
Story 28.0    (8.0) 28.7%    (14.1) 
Compliments   36.8    (10.4) 21.3%    (27.4) 
Table 5.6: ASD targets’ mean EQ scores & participants’ accuracy rates. 
 
 Neurotypical targets (M= 38.7, SD= 9.6) had significantly higher EQ 
scores than targets with ASD (M= 31.5, SD= 9.5), t(38)=-2.4, p=.023. A one-
way between groups ANOVA was conducted to explore whether there were 
differences in target EQ scores in the different scenarios. As participants were 
allocated to the four scenarios in an unbiased way, it was expected that no 
differences would be found in EQ scores for those experiencing each 
scenario. Accordingly, no significant differences in EQ scores between 
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scenarios were found in targets with ASD (F(3,16)=.97, p=.437). However, 
there was a statistically significant difference in EQ scores between scenarios 
experienced by neurotypical targets (F(3,16)=3.3, p=.052). Posthoc t-tests 
showed that neurotypical targets who experienced the Compliments scenario 
had significantly higher EQ scores than participants who witnessed the Joke 
scenario (p=.051). 
A 2 by 2 between-group analysis of covariance was conducted to 
explore whether the target video group differences remained when target EQ 
scores were controlled for.  A significant main effect was found for target 
video group [F(1,31)=6.14, p=.019] which suggests that the effect of target 
group is not explained by any group differences in EQ. This indicates that the 
variability in EQ found between and within the ASD and neurotypical targets 
is not driving the differences between the groups.  
5.4 Discussion 
 
 The aim in this chapter was to investigate people’s ability to correctly 
identify the scenario reacted to when presented with videoclips of typically 
developing targets as well as targets with ASD. In concordance with the 
findings in Chapter 3 (Experiment 1), it was found that people successfully 
inferred the four scenarios when watching videoclips of neurotypical targets. 
What about people’s ability to distinguish the scenarios when presented with 
videoclips of targets with ASD? For the most part, the results indicate that 
individuals successfully deduced the scenarios reacted to in ASD target 
videoclips to a certain degree, with the exception of the Story and 
Compliments scenarios. For all scenarios participants were less successful for 
ASD than neurotypical targets aside from the Joke Scenario.  
 The findings challenge the archaic standpoint that ASD entails the 
"absence of emotional reaction" as was described in the DSM-III (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987, p. 35) as they generally show that individuals 
with ASD do make expressive responses, and in at least one scenario (i.e. 
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Joke) their reactions were as easy to interpret as their typically developing 
peers. On the other hand, for the remaining three scenarios, people found it 
harder to guess the scenario responded to by targets with ASD than by those 
without. A plausible explanation for this may be that individuals with ASD are 
generally less expressive as compared to typically developing individuals, 
perhaps exhibiting more flat and neutral affect (Yirmiya et al., 1989). 
Moreover it has also been suggested that elements such as language and 
emotional expressions in naturalistic social interactions may cause 
overstimulation for individuals with ASD due to the capricious and 
multifaceted nature of the stimuli, which in turn can result in the loss of 
interest or reduced attention to the stimuli (Dawson & Lewy, 1989). This 
explanation would imply that those with ASD produce a qualitatively similar 
response but with less intensity than neurotypical individuals. However an 
alternative explanation is that the targets with ASD responded in qualitatively 
different ways from the neurotypical targets in some scenarios, rendering 
their reactions difficult to interpret. The question remains as to how people 
successfully deduced the Joke scenario and the Waiting scenario to some 
extent but not the Story and Compliments scenarios when watching 
videoclips of targets with ASD.  
Why did the Story and Compliments scenarios elicit uninterpretable 
behavioural responses in targets with ASD? Though the exact mental states 
experienced by the targets are not the central point of interest in the study, 
one might speculate how people may have felt in these two scenarios in 
order to make sense of their subsequent behavioural responses. It is 
reasonable to conjecture that in the Story scenario most targets would 
empathise by showing understanding or offering comfort to the researcher 
(although others may feel uncomfortable with the sharing of personal 
information, while there may be some who are plain uninterested). If it were 
the case that the Story scenario evoked a mental state of empathy amongst 
the majority of targets, this would make for a compelling case for why targets 
with ASD produced unusual responses to this scenario. Multiple studies have 
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shown that individuals with ASD have difficulties in empathising (e.g. Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Studies have shown that typically developing 
infants as young as three months are able to tune their emotional reactions 
in accordance to the responses of others (Bertin & Striano, 2006). 
Furthermore in their review, Roth-Hanania, Busch-Rossnagel, and Higgins-
D’Alessandro (2000) stated that toddlers and pre-schoolers can display more 
advanced empathic responses such as showing comfort in order to influence 
one’s emotional state. On the other hand, individuals with ASD often respond 
to the emotional expressions of others with less interest, offer a reduced 
amount of comforting behaviour and on the whole communicate less affect 
with their interaction partners (Kasari, Sigman, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990; 
Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & Yirmiya, 1992).  
This may be because those with ASD have fundamental difficulties 
simulating the mental states of others. Lynne Soraya, a disability advocate 
and writer with Asperger’s Syndrome,  fittingly stated “I absolutely 
understand that other people have their own plans, thoughts, and points of 
view — but those plans, thoughts and points of view are often a mystery to 
me. ‘Putting myself in someone else’s shoes’ would have me doing something 
very different than what another person might envisage doing in a similar 
situation” (Soraya, 2008). Studies have shown that individuals with ASD have 
deficits in empathy-related processes such as emotional contagion (i.e. the 
production of meaningful affect in individuals who view the emotional 
responses of others) as well as the swift and spontaneous mimicry of 
emotional expression (Stel, van den Heuvel, & Smeets, 2008). Clark, 
Winkielman, and McIntosh (2008) examined people with ASD, reading 
disability and typically developing individuals in their ability to detect mental 
states from faces (happy or angry), gender from neutral faces (male or 
female) and  neutral non-face stimuli (animal or object). Participants were 
presented with images for 15 and 30 microseconds, which is typically the 
range of micro-expressions. They found no group differences in identifying 
gender and animal-object conditions, however individuals with ASD 
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performed significantly worse than the controls in the mental state condition. 
They further noted that this deficit persisted even after controlling for age, 
gender and verbal ability and was not accounted for by concessions in speed 
and accuracy. Clark et al. (2008) highlighted the importance of rapid 
emotional processing in functional everyday social-communication and 
stated that the inadequacies in rapidly processing emotional information may 
contribute to the challenges people with ASD experience in empathy and 
mimicry. Hence in the Story scenario, the targets might have had difficulties 
in swiftly processing multiple channels of information (e.g. context of story, 
researcher’s body language, facial affect) which may have in consequence 
resulted in diminished ability to engage in mimicry and empathic related 
behaviours.  
In regards to the Compliments scenario, some neurotypical targets 
may have felt flattered, while a handful perhaps a little confused and others 
may have been embarrassed or experienced a sense of pride. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, embarrassment and pride are types of self-conscious emotions 
which individuals with ASD seem to have difficulty recognising. Colonnesi, 
Engelhard, and Bögels (2010) proposed that mentalising ability is an 
important component in the development of self-conscious emotion 
attribution to self and others. In order to experience embarrassment, one 
must have a representation of another’s mind (Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & 
Blakemore, 2008), encompassing  the understanding of social  norms and 
conventions as well as the awareness of others’ evaluation (Tager-Flusberg, 
1999). Hillier and Allinson (2002) found that mentalising ability and the 
understanding of embarrassment was correlated among adults with high-
functioning ASD. If the targets with ASD did not experience these self-
conscious emotions then this might explain the difficulty neurotypical 
participants had in detecting their responses to the Compliments scenario.  
Participants’ ability to identify reactions to the Joke scenario to the 
same degree in both neurotypical and ASD target videos suggest that the 
behavioural responses of targets from both groups contained the same 
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degree of useful information. It is plausible that the targets with ASD may 
have an understanding of humour given the simplicity of the joke presented. 
A classic study by Ricks  and Wing (1975) showed that children with ASD have 
the ability to comprehend simple jokes and slapstick comedy. In addition, Van 
Bourgondien and Mesibov (1987) demonstrated that adults with high-
functioning ASD were able to tell jokes that were at a lower grade of humour 
level than their developmental level. For instance, many individuals with ASD 
found it possible to understand pre-riddles and jokes that were based on 
phonological and lexical inconsistencies. Studies have also shown that 
children with ASD are able to create and appreciate humour to a certain 
extent in a naturalistic setting, though at a lower level compared to matched 
controls (St James & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). As the joke expressed in the 
scenario was simple and straightforward, it is possible that targets with ASD 
understood the joke, and responded in broadly similar ways to neurotypical 
individuals. Nonetheless it must be noted that even though there was no 
differences in the identification of responses to the Joke scenario for the 
neurotypical and ASD target groups, the joke still elicited a variety of 
responses such as giggling, fake smile, rolling of the eyes, as well looking 
baffled or discontented.  
 
Similar to the findings in Chapter 3 (Experiment 1), no relationship 
was found between participants’ self-reported empathising abilities (i.e. EQ 
ratings) and correct scenario identification when viewing videoclips of 
neurotypical targets. It was also found that the targets’ self-reported 
empathic traits did not influence participants’ ability to correctly distinguish 
the scenarios (similar to the findings in Experiment 1 and 3). However, it 
should be noted that the number of targets in each group was small so 
correlations need to be interpreted with caution. This suggests that individual 
differences in empathic abilities and the ensuing behavioural response do not 
necessarily have an impact on people’s ability to infer one’s behavioural 
reaction. 
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A final outstanding question is whether the difference in the 
behavioural responses of targets with ASD reflects differences in expressivity 
of the same internal states (be it qualitative or quantitative differences) or 
whether they reflect fundamental differences in the actual underlying mental 
states felt. The ability of individuals with ASD for understanding affect shows 
disparities when compared with typically developing individuals. Hill, Berthoz, 
and Frith (2004) reported that individuals with ASD had difficulties in 
distinguishing and describing their own emotions, a condition sometimes 
referred to as alexithymia.  Similarly, it has been shown that children with 
high-functioning ASD have problems characterising their own emotions and 
had less developed conceptions of emotion (Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & 
Kotronopoulou, 2006). Losh and Capps (2006) looked into the emotional 
understanding of 50 children aged between 7 and 13 years of age (28 with 
high- functioning ASD and 22 healthy controls). The paradigm they employed 
comprised a discourse analytic framework designed to assess the 
participants’ approach to construing emotional and non-emotional situation 
circumstances. Participants’ responses were evaluated for dialogue structure 
and thematic content. They found that while the group with ASD were able 
to provide contextually applicable interpretations of simple emotions (e.g. 
happy, sad, afraid) and non-emotions (e.g. tired, sick); they were less able to 
provide proper descriptions of complex emotions (e.g. curious, disappointed) 
and self-conscious emotions (e.g. embarrassed, guilty, ashamed). They also 
found that children with ASD were less likely to consolidate their emotional 
narratives through personalised and causal explanations and were more 
inclined to describe visibly relevant aspects of their experiences; this was 
hardly observed amongst healthy controls. The authors stated that although 
children with ASD are able to distinguish appropriate contexts for simple 
emotions, they generally have less articulate accounts of emotional 
experiences and employ different strategies to interpret emotionally charged 
situations.  
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Such findings could be taken as support for the notion that the mental 
states of those with ASD may be subjectively different from those of 
neurotypical individuals. On the other hand, it has also been suggested that 
the facial feedback mechanism (i.e. recreated affect when mimicking others’ 
emotional responses) is different in individuals with ASD and that this may be 
an indicator of the deficit in the connection between felt emotion and 
expressed emotions (Stel et al., 2008). They suggested that if individuals with 
ASD display distinctive and attenuated facial expressions, it is a possibility 
that the association between expressed facial affect and felt emotion has not 
been properly established in those individuals. Furthermore, the disconnect 
between felt emotion and expressed emotion would further impact on  
situations in which another’s emotional response may not be directly 
observable but instead must be inferred i.e. affective mentalising (Hooker, 
Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2008).  This in turn would have 
substantial implications for the understanding and expression of own 
emotions, as well as the understanding of others’ emotions. This is consistent 
with the idea that those with ASD experience the same mental states as 
neurotypical individuals but just express them differently. Whatever the case, 
given that there is no way to measure their mental states directly, inferences 
must always be made indirectly from some form of behaviour. Advances in 
neuroimaging may facilitate the process of coming closer to being able to 
answer this question. 
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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 Research Overview 
 
Mentalising was brought to the forefront of research with Premack 
and Woodruff’s (1978) classic study involving chimpanzees. A chimpanzee 
was shown a series of filmed scenes of an actor struggling with several 
problems of varying difficulty. For instance, trying to get hold of bananas 
which were out of reach as well as attempting to escape from a locked cage. 
The chimpanzee was then presented with two images depicting two different 
subsequent actions, only one of which was the correct action to solving the 
previously presented problem. Premack and Woodruff (1978) reported that 
the chimpanzee reliably selected the accurate solutions to the presented 
problems a majority of time hence implying that the chimpanzee ascribed 
mental states to the actor. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) described 
mentalising as the ability to ascribe mental states such as intentions, desires 
and beliefs to oneself and others. Techniques for assessing mentalising have 
evolved considerably  over the years, from the use of standard first-order 
false-belief tasks (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983), to second-order false-belief 
tasks (e.g. Perner & Wimmer, 1985) as well as advanced mentalising tasks 
(e.g. Happé, 1994) in order to examine people with higher mentalising 
abilities. While some studies utilising the abovementioned tasks have shown 
that individuals with ASD have the ability to infer the mental states of others 
(Rutherford & Towns, 2008) others have shown that they have significant 
difficulties compared to healthy controls in identifying certain mental states 
(Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010). Another recent 
development is Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore and Robertson's (1997) idea 
that mental states are directly discernible from people’s behaviour, contrary 
to Premack and Woodruff (1978).  In particular, some evidence suggests that 
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the eye region of the face is vital in the identification of mental states (Smith, 
Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005) and that people with ASD have a tendency 
to look less at this region and consequently are less able to use information 
from the eyes (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008). On the other hand, there 
has also been counter-evidence to suggest that the mouth region is essential 
in the recognition of mental states through dynamic facial expressions (Blais, 
Roy, Fiset, Arguin, & Gosselin, 2012).  
Nonetheless the majority of research conducted in the area of 
mentalising has lacked an essential component- the representation of the 
naturalistic social world which resembles the context in which mentalising 
skills are often employed. A large number of mentalising studies utilise posed 
static pictures depicting extreme expressions (e.g. Tanaka, Kaiser, Butler, & 
Le Grand, 2012); not representative of actual day-to-day social interactions. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the true capabilities of 
individuals with and without ASD to mentalise are still shrouded with 
uncertainty. The primary aim in this thesis was to investigate the mentalising 
abilities in individuals with and without ASD using a task that more closely 
approximates some of the demands of the social world.  
Are people with and without ASD able to deduce the mental states of 
others in a naturalistic context? While a large body of research has focussed 
on the ability to predict future behaviour as an indicator of mentalising ability 
(e.g. Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009), an alternate way of evaluating 
mentalising ability involves ‘retrodiction’, (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) which is 
a sort of backwards deduction from a mental state to its underlying 
precursor. Milikan (2005) explained that people seldom use mental states to 
predict behaviour in real life as we often only learn of a person’s mental state 
after the behaviour has occurred. As such retrodictive mentalising serves an 
important social utility; that is, to understand and make sense of others’ 
behaviours as we observe or learn about them. With this in mind, a novel 
retrodictive mentalising task was developed to measure mentalising abilities 
of individuals with and without ASD. Chapter 3 described the newly 
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developed mentalising task and investigated the performance of typically 
developing individuals in this task. Then in Chapter 4, the retrodictive 
mentalising ability of individuals with and without ASD was examined. The 
experiment in Chapter 5 subsequently investigated people’s mentalising 
ability when viewing videoclips of targets with ASD as well as healthy 
controls.  
Were people with ASD able to distinguish the correct scenario and did 
they perform less well compared to their neurotypical counterparts? Did 
people with ASD look less at the eye region than neurotypical individuals? 
Was cognitive ability related to task performance? Did participants’ and 
targets’ scores on the EQ questionnaire influence performance on the 
retrodictive mentalising task? Were people able to correctly identify the 
scenarios when viewing videoclips of targets with ASD? These are some of 
the questions which were investigated in this thesis. This chapter will start 
with a summary of experimental findings from each study followed by a 
discussion of theoretical and practical implications. Thenceforth limitations of 
the present studies, followed by directions for future research will be 
considered. Finally overall conclusions will be drawn. 
6.2 Summary of Results  
6.2.1 Experiment 1   -    Can Individuals Guess What Happened to Others 
from Their Brief Behavioural Responses? 
 
In this study, the ability of typically developing individuals to 
discriminate between individuals’ reactions to four scenarios was examined.  
Participants viewed videoclips of targets responding to the four scenarios; 
Joke (being told a joke), Waiting (kept waiting for an experiment to 
commence), Story (told about a series of mishaps experienced by the 
researcher), and Compliments (given several compliments in succession). The 
participants then determined which scenario the target in the videoclip was 
reacting to. It was found that participants successfully deduced all scenarios – 
albeit to a limited extent - and were better at identifying reactions to the 
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Waiting scenario compared to the remaining three scenarios. In addition, 
reactions to the Story scenario were more easily identified than the 
Compliments scenario. Participants’ eye gaze behaviours were also recorded 
in this study. Contrary to the hypothesis, it was found that participants 
looked more at the mouth region as compared to the eye region of the face 
when viewing target videoclips. Furthermore, findings also suggested that 
increased gaze time at the eye region was associated with decreased scenario 
reaction discriminability for the Waiting, Story and Compliments scenarios 
(and unrelated to the Joke scenario). Participants also completed the 
Empathy Quotient questionnaire (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
Surprisingly, it was found that EQ scores did not relate to ability to deduce 
which scenario targets were reacting in all scenarios. In addition, no 
relationship was found between eye region gaze time and participant EQ 
scores. It was then investigated if the EQ scores of targets had an impact on 
participants’ ability to deduce what had happened to them. Findings revealed 
that target EQ scores did not influence participants’ ability in deducing 
reactions to all scenarios.  
Interpretation 
 Despite the extensive variation of responses, participants’ ability to 
deduce the four scenarios from brief samples of targets’ behaviour suggest 
that they used retrodictive mentalising to come to the correct antecedent of 
the viewed responses (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Participants were better at 
identifying responses to the Waiting scenario in comparison to the other 
three scenarios. This may be attributed to the inherent nature of the Waiting 
scenario in itself as additional information such as gestures i.e. looking 
around and sighing were often included in the target videoclips. On the other 
hand, behavioural responses to the Joke, Compliments and Story scenarios 
were somewhat more alike hence increasing the difficulty in discriminating 
between these scenarios. Participants spent more time looking at the mouth 
region compared to the eye region of the targets’ face in all four scenarios.  
Furthermore, looking at the eye region was associated with poorer 
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identification of the scenario responded to for the Story, Compliments and 
Waiting scenarios and was unrelated with success for the Joke scenario. 
These findings suggest that the eyes are not the most informative facial 
region when determining what happened to the targets in the videoclips. 
Instead they indicate that the mouth region provided useful information for 
the deduction of the scenarios reacted to, consistent with Kirchner, Hatri, 
Heekeren, and Dziobek (2011) who reported increased fixation time in the 
mouth region in emotional recognition conditions  as well as Cunningham, 
Kleiner, Bülthoff and Wallraven (2004) who proposed that the mouth area 
was central in communicating vital information about certain mental states.  
 It was conjectured that individuals who are good at empathising may 
have a better understanding of what had just happened to the targets in the 
videoclips. As such it was expected that empathising scores from the EQ 
questionnaire would correlate with mentalising performance in this task; 
however it was not found to be so (with the exception to the rule being the 
Waiting scenario). This suggests that the EQ questionnaire may not 
consistently relate well to performance on a naturalistic and subtle 
mentalising task i.e. scenario identification task. Furthermore, the EQ scores 
of targets in the videoclips were also not related to participants’ ability in 
identifying all scenarios.  
6.2.2 Experiment 2   -    Did the Waiting and Story Scenarios Influence 
Targets’ Responses on the Empathy Quotient (EQ)?  
 
The analysis of target EQ scores revealed a significant difference 
between EQ scores of the target participants in the Waiting and Story 
scenarios, with targets in the Story scenario having higher EQ scores on the 
whole as compared to targets in the Waiting scenario. This was surprising as 
targets had been allocated to the different scenarios in an unbiased fashion 
and hence it had been assumed that those in each scenario would have 
similar EQ scores. This study was conducted to examine whether the scenario 
experienced by participants could have influenced the way in which they 
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responded to the subsequently presented EQ questionnaire. Is it possible 
that the people in the Waiting scenario felt annoyed or angry as they were 
kept waiting and consequently answered the EQ in an unempathic manner? 
Meanwhile could it be that individuals subjected to the Story scenario felt 
empathy for the researcher as she narrated the mishaps she experienced and 
subsequently completed the EQ questionnaire in a similar manner? The 
present study aimed to examine the relationship between experiencing the 
Story and Waiting scenarios and EQ scores. New targets were recruited and 
they experienced either the Story or the Waiting scenario then completed 
the EQ. Findings showed that there was no difference in EQ scores between 
individuals experiencing the Story and Waiting scenarios suggesting that the 
scenario experienced did not influence the way in which targets in 
Experiment 2 responded to the EQ questionnaire. 
Interpretation 
Differences were found in the way in which targets from the Story and 
Waiting scenarios in Experiment 1 responded to the EQ questionnaire; 
however these findings were not replicated in the current study. This 
suggests that the scenario experienced does not impact on how people self-
report their level of empathic ability. As targets were randomly allocated into 
the respective scenario groups, the difference in reported EQ scores in 
Experiment 1 appears to be explained by pure chance allocation of people 
with intrinsically low or high empathic traits to the Story and Waiting 
scenarios. This is important as it suggests that the EQ did act as a valid 
measure of empathic traits in Experiment 1, rather than merely a measure of 
state empathy. It is unlikely that experiencing a brief incident would 
significantly change one’s reporting of  empathic traits as the EQ has been 
shown to be a stable measure with adequate validity and reliability (Muncer 
& Ling, 2006). 
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6.2.3 Experiment 3   -    Can Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) Guess What Happened to Others from Their Brief Behavioural 
Responses?  
 
 This study used the same task as in Experiment 1 to investigate 
retrodictive mentalising in groups of individuals with and without ASD. It was 
found that both neurotypical and participants with ASD successfully 
discriminated between target reactions across all four scenarios. Similar to 
the findings in Experiment 1, all participants identified reactions to the 
Waiting scenario more easily than the other three scenarios. Furthermore, 
reactions to the Story scenario approached significance in being more easily 
identified than responses to the Compliments scenario, again similar to 
Experiment 1. It was predicted that people with ASD would have more 
difficulty determining the scenario that the target had experienced compared 
to their typically developing counterparts.  In line with the hypothesis, 
findings showed that ASD participants were significantly poorer at 
discriminating between scenarios according to target reactions.  Analyses of 
participant IQ scores revealed that overall scenario discrimination and the 
identification of reactions to the Compliments scenario were positively 
associated with full scale IQ scores only in the ASD group. 
 What were participants’ eye gaze behaviours? Findings showed that 
neurotypical and ASD participants spent more time looking at the mouth 
compared to the eye region of the targets in the videoclips, with this effect 
reduced (although not absent) for the Waiting scenario. Importantly, there 
was no evidence to suggest that the neurotypical and ASD participants varied 
in their attentional priority for the targets’ eyes and mouth. Additionally, 
findings showed that there were no relationships between eye region and 
mouth region gaze time and scenario identification. It was found that target 
EQ scores did not influence people’s ability to guess the scenario the target 
responded to for all scenarios, for both ASD and neurotypical participants.  
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Interpretation 
Consistent with the findings in Experiment 1, participants successfully 
deduced the scenarios by viewing targets’ brief behavioural responses 
implying that participants with ASD and healthy controls utilised retrodictive 
mentalising strategies in order to distinguish the scenario which had 
occurred. Once again, the Waiting scenario was more easily identified than 
the other three scenarios, likely due to the distinctive responses of the 
targets in this particular condition. The poorer performance of participants 
with ASD in discriminating the scenarios compared to neurotypicals is 
consistent with the suggestion that subtle mentalising deficits can be found 
in naturalistic tasks which reflect the challenges of everyday social conditions. 
This is comparable to Sawyer, Williamson and Young's (2012) recent finding 
that that people with Asperger’s Syndrome were poorer at distinguishing 
complex mental state expressions than neurotypical adults. Similar to the 
findings in Experiment 1, participants generally spent more time gazing at the 
mouth compared to the eye region of targets.  As the findings of Experiment 
1 in this respect were replicated with a fresh sample of participants this 
implies that this looking pattern is relatively robust and the observed 
preference for mouth over eyes is genuine.  
Furthermore, no differences in gaze at critical regions of the face (eye 
and mouth) were found for neurotypicals and participants with ASD. This 
suggests that the difficulty people with ASD have in deducing the scenarios 
targets responded to is not due to reduced looking at the eye region, 
contrary to Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley and Piven (2007) who suggested that 
individuals with ASD do not use information from the eyes. Instead it appears 
that people with and without ASD look at parts of the face which are most 
useful for inferring the targets’ reaction; however people with ASD are still 
poorer at making accurate judgements compared to neurotypical individuals.  
The relationship between the cognitive ability (IQ) of individuals with 
ASD and mentalising task performance might suggest that higher-functioning 
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individuals have strategies in place to work out the correct scenarios, albeit 
less effectively than neurotypical individuals. This stands in contrast to the 
neurotypical participants in whom task performance was independent of IQ 
level. Similar to the findings in Experiment 1, no relationships were found 
between target EQ scores and participants’ performance in identifying 
reactions to the scenarios. This suggests that self-reported empathic abilities 
and level of expressiveness may not be related. It also implies that EQ scores 
may not have an impact on actual task performance  
6.2.4 Experiment 4   -    Can People Determine What Happened to 
Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) from Their Brief 
Behavioural Responses?  
 
 Results in Experiment 3 revealed that individuals with ASD compared 
to neurotypical controls had significant difficulties in correctly distinguishing 
the scenarios that targets experienced. It was conjectured that one of the 
ways in which people identify the correct scenario is by ‘putting themselves 
in the other person’s shoes’, possibly through a process of simulation. 
However what if it is the case that individuals with ASD are able to simulate 
adequately but identify the wrong scenarios because they respond in a 
different way from the targets in the videoclips? This experiment operated 
with the same paradigm used in Experiment 1 and 3 and asked the primary 
question- how do individuals with ASD respond to the scenarios themselves? 
Individuals with ASD (along with matched neurotypical comparison 
participants) were subjected to the four scenarios and their natural 
responses were secretly filmed. Participants successfully identified all 
scenarios responded to when viewing videoclips of neurotypical targets to 
some extent. However when viewing videoclips containing targets with ASD, 
participants were only able to identify the Joke and Waiting scenarios at all; 
and were unable to identify the reactions to the Compliments and Story 
scenarios. Participants were better at distinguishing the scenarios when 
viewing neurotypical targets compared to targets with ASD for all scenarios 
aside from the Joke scenario. Similar to Experiments 1 and 3, the Waiting 
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scenario was more easily identified compared to the other three scenarios. 
Similar to the findings in Experiment 1, no relationship was found between 
participants’ self-reported empathic abilities and performance in the scenario 
identification task when viewing videoclips of both neurotypical as well as 
ASD targets. Did the EQ scores of targets affect participants’ ability to deduce 
what had happened to them? Similar to the findings in Experiments 1 and 3, 
no relationships were found between EQ scores of both ASD and neurotypical 
targets and participants’ ability to correctly guess the scenario to which they 
were responding to.  
Interpretation 
 It was found that people were able to successfully deduce the 
scenarios reacted to by neurotypical targets to a certain degree. Moreover, 
individuals were better at discriminating the scenarios when watching 
reactions of neurotypical compared to ASD targets with the exception of 
reactions to the Joke scenario which were equally identified. Hence despite 
there being a range of responses within the Joke scenario, targets with ASD 
responded in a manner comparable to the neurotypical targets providing 
valuable information for the reaction to be inferred. Nevertheless people’s 
ability to better identify the remaining three scenarios in neurotypical targets 
as opposed to ASD targets perhaps implies that people with ASD may be 
largely less expressive compared to healthy controls (Yirmiya, Kasari, Sigman, 
& Mundy, 1989). On the other hand, it could also be that individuals with ASD 
respond in dissimilar ways from matched controls in some scenarios, making 
their reactions more challenging to interpret. This would be a possible 
justification for why participants were unable to deduce the reactions of 
targets with ASD in the Story and Compliments scenarios at all. Targets with 
ASD may have made indecipherable responses in the Story scenario due to its 
close association with empathic reactions, an area people with ASD are 
known to have difficulties in (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
Meanwhile, difficulties in experiencing self-conscious emotions (e.g. Heerey, 
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Keltner, & Capps, 2003) may have impacted the way in which targets with 
ASD responded in the Compliments scenario. 
Findings in the current experiment and Experiment 1 showed that 
participants’ EQ scores were not associated with correct scenario 
identification when viewing videoclips of neurotypical and ASD targets. 
Similarly, targets’ EQ scores were found not to influence participants’ ability 
in correctly inferring the scenarios, supporting the findings in Experiments 1 
and 3. This suggests that individual differences in self-reported empathic 
abilities and the resultant behavioural reactions do not influence people’s 
capacity in inferring others’ brief responses. 
6.3 Practical & Theoretical Implications  
 
6.3.1 Retrodictive Mentalising  
 
 People with and without ASD were generally able to infer from a 
range of brief samples of natural behaviour which scenario the target in 
question had experienced. Although people with ASD were less effective at 
deducing the scenarios as compared to neurotypical individuals, they did not 
demonstrate a complete deficit in inferring the mental states of others which 
has implications for Baron-Cohen's (1995) theory of mindblindness.  
Furthermore, the results also indicate that people employed successful 
strategies (i.e. retrodictive mentalising) in order to determine the antecedent 
of the behavioural responses (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In essence, this 
implies that individuals were able to access an event in the social world 
through the window of another person’s mind- as embodied by their 
behavioural reactions. The practical implications of this ability will be 
discussed a little later. 
 
 A potential criticism of this paradigm is that to correctly identify the 
scenarios, participants merely need to ‘match’ the reactions using 
behavioural rules; entirely circumventing the underlying mental state 
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inference. Povinelli and Vonk (2003) termed this reasoning as “Povinelli’s 
challenge”. This challenge actually applies to all tests of mentalising - any 
pattern of responding in any test could theoretically be achieved through the 
application of a system of rules and principles without considering mental 
states themselves. It is certainly the case that we cannot rule out this 
explanation for the findings presented in this thesis. Nevertheless given the 
variety of behavioural reactions of targets to the same scenario, no simple 
matching strategy would appear to be appropriate. For example, a laughing 
response does not automatically correspond as a reaction to the Joke 
scenario as laughing responses were observed in the Story and Compliments 
scenarios as well. Moreover, Perner (2010) explained that even behavioural 
rules are not ‘mind-blind behaviourism’; suggesting that it is essentially the 
product of the mind which is reflected in behavioural learning and rules. 
Finally, it is argued that even if the task is solved by matching according to 
behavioural rules, the poor performance of people with ASD point towards 
impairments in effectively applying these behavioural matching strategies, 
which would be just as worthy of investigation as impairments in mentalising.  
 
Whilst most mentalising research has used the strategy of predicting 
mental states following a specific event or behaviour, the model employed in 
this thesis is novel in that it aimed to systematically examine the process in 
the reverse approach; as was proposed by Goldman and Sripada (2005) who 
called the process ‘reverse simulation’. While it is known that mental states 
causally produce facial emotional expressions, the same process can be 
employed in a backwards direction for the purpose of reverse simulation. In 
the context of this model, it is proposed that the attributor first observes the 
behavioural responses (i.e. facial expressions) of a target and proceeds to 
mimic the observed expressions (automatically, extremely rapid and at a sub-
threshold level). The attributor experiences the generated mental state and 
consequently classifies his or her own mental state. In accordance with a 
simulation heuristic, the attributor then categorises the target’s mental state 
as the same as produced in him or herself. This model offers a reasonable 
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account for the findings in this thesis. By this account, participants observe 
the behavioural reaction of the target, mimic his or her expression and as a 
consequence simulate the mental state of the target. Once the mental state 
is simulated, participants would then need to relate this feeling to a 
particular situation based on prior knowledge of the relationship between 
mental states and particular situational factors. According to the reverse 
simulation heuristic, if people are unable to simulate the above mentioned 
mental states, they would in consequence not be able to experience and 
subsequently recognise or interpret them.  
Goldman and Sripada (2005) further elaborated that individuals who 
have impairments in producing, experiencing and expressing a mental state 
may also struggle in recognising the same mental state when it is seen in 
others. To reiterate, the basic premise in facial expression based mental state 
recognition is the requisite for facial mimicry of the observed expressions 
followed by subtle experiencing of the mimicked expression. This is then used 
to recognise the observed expressions in the other person. The difficulties in 
scenario identification displayed by people with ASD may be attributed to 
either step in the reverse simulation process i.e. the instantaneous mimicry 
or the experiencing or simulating of the mental state. It is also possible that 
people with ASD experience difficulty at the final stage of the process - 
matching simulated mental state with a particular situation. However, given 
that people with ASD were found to produce unusual (and difficult to 
interpret) responses themselves to the same events, it can be assumed that 
the performance of people with ASD is at least in part due to problems with 
either or both of the first two processes (mimicry and simulation). 
Contrastingly, Wright et al. (2008) reported that individuals with ASD 
compared to neurotypical controls were more likely to mimic observed facial 
expressions in an emotion expression recognition task, implying that they 
may be utilising specific simulation procedures as a compensatory strategy. 
However it does not come as a surprise that while these compensatory 
strategies may be effectively utilised in experimental conditions, they may 
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not be as functional in an unstructured, fast-paced and naturalistic social 
context which often requires adaptable and context-appropriate reasoning 
ability.  
 On the other hand, Stel, van den Heuvel and Smeets (2008) reported 
that individuals with ASD showed impairments in automatic but not in 
intentional mimicry and that the deficits were present in both facial and 
behavioural mimicry. They also found that impairments in facial feedback 
mechanism played a role in emotion recognition difficulties displayed by 
people with ASD. This was evidenced by the fact that mimicry assisted 
neurotypical individuals to identify others’ emotions however even 
instructing people with ASD to mimic did not improve their empathic 
abilities. Hence they concluded that mimicry and facial feedback play a vital 
role in understanding others’ mental states as this facilitates perspective 
taking (Stel et al., 2008). As such it can be conjectured that mentalising 
deficits is partly influenced by mimicry and facial feedback processes. These 
impairments in mimicry and facial feedback processes have implications for 
the experience and expression of mental states in people with ASD as well as 
their understanding of others’ mental states. The mirror neuron system can 
be considered as the potential biological instantiation of this process. Typical 
mirror neuron simulation is often ‘automatic, unconscious, and pre-reflexive’ 
and may function as a mechanism to detect mental states of others, hence 
possibly acting as a forerunner for or being a part of global mentalising 
abilities. Hence researchers have put forward that mirror neurons provide 
the foundation for one’s ability simulate and understand the mental states of 
others, which is regarded as low-level mentalising. 
 The findings of this thesis have functional implications for the 
understanding and evaluation of mentalising ability in people with and 
without ASD. The paradigm used in this thesis differed from typically utilised 
measures of mentalising (i.e. false belief tasks, emotion recognition) with the 
development of a retrodictive mentalising task that attempts to tap into 
169 
 
people’s ability to ascribe mental states in the real world. While false belief 
tasks often focus on the prediction of future behaviour, Milikan (2005) stated 
that in the social world people make sense of people’s behaviours only after 
the fact. Additionally, in real life people do not simply ascribe mental states 
from dynamic or static facial expression without there being a purpose and a 
valid social context. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that people are 
able to correctly identify the scenarios above chance level despite the 
heterogeneous and sometimes ambiguous behavioural reactions, with 
people with ASD performing less successfully compared to their typically 
developing counterparts. People with ASD showed impairments in correctly 
identifying the antecedent scenario implying that they had difficulties making 
sense of the targets’ responses.  
 
Several factors were found to be associated with the poor ability of 
people with ASD to correctly distinguish the scenarios. It was found that 
neurotypical participants’ performance on the retrodictive mentalising task 
was independent of IQ ability, consistent with the findings of Rajkumar, 
Yovan, Raveendran, & Russell (2008) who concluded that mentalising skills 
exist as an independent cognitive domain not related to general intelligence. 
On the other hand, the ability of people with ASD to correctly identify the 
scenarios was related to cognitive ability; with higher IQ scores being 
associated with better scenario discrimination. Buitelaar, van der Wees, 
Swaab-Barneveld and van der Gaag (1999) conducted a study to examine the 
developmental components of theory of mind and emotion recognition 
ability in children with ASD and in a psychiatric control group individually 
matched for age and verbal IQ. Forty participants were administered a series 
of tasks including first and second order theory of mind tasks as well as a task 
of emotional expression recognition. They found that verbal memory, 
performance IQ and age were the best predictors of social cognitive ability. 
The findings reported in this thesis showed a positive correlation between 
full scale IQ scores and the ability to correctly identify the scenarios for 
individuals with ASD implying that heightened cognitive ability is associated 
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with the facility to infer the mental states of others. On the other hand, a 
recent comprehensive meta-analysis of emotion recognition in ASD revealed 
that IQ level did not influence performance on emotion recognition tasks 
(Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013).  
It was also found that high scores on the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) was 
related to a reduced capacity to  correctly identify the scenarios. This implies 
that those who reported more autistic traits demonstrated poorer 
performance on the mentalising task. This is consistent with past research 
which has suggested that individuals with ASD have difficulties in tasks that 
require mentalising and the inferring of complex emotions (Golan, Baron-
Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006). It can be construed that the social-
communication difficulties characteristic of ASD have an impact on the ability 
to infer others’ minds.  
6.3.2 Emotional Expression  
 
Findings from the work presented in this thesis revealed that people 
more easily identified the reactions to scenarios when viewing videoclips of 
neurotypical compared to targets with ASD. While targets with ASD displayed 
inferable reactions for the Joke and Waiting scenarios, their behavioural 
responses were undecipherable for the Compliments and Story scenarios, 
likely due to the possible self-conscious mental states associated with these 
reactions (e.g. Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003). Therefore, it may be 
conjectured that there is a relationship between the mentalising impairments 
of targets with ASD and the quality of their behavioural responses to the four 
scenarios. Could it be that people with ASD have difficulty in distinguishing 
the scenarios targets were reacting to because they are impaired in putting 
themselves in others’ shoes? Another explanation could be that though they 
may be able to engage in simulation, their responses may be qualitatively 
different from typically developing individuals. Both the abovementioned 
explanations should be taken into consideration.  It is plausible to assume 
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that people with ASD have the capacity to simulate, as they successfully 
inferred the scenarios to a certain degree. However, it could also be that they 
have difficulty in simulating certain reactions, perhaps ones which are 
unfamiliar or with a strong social component. On the other hand while their 
responses to some scenarios were identifiable, their un-interpretable 
behavioural responses in some scenarios indicate that their reactions were 
qualitatively different from neurotypical individuals.  
 
The implications for retrodictive mentalising in the social world is 
manifold. In particular, it sheds light into the challenges individuals with ASD 
experience in day-to-day life. In line with the findings of this thesis, if people 
with ASD have problems in correctly inferring people’s mental states to make 
sense of their behaviours, consequent challenges in social-communicative 
interactions are inevitable. In the same line of thought, if people are unable 
to infer the mental states of those with ASD, the same challenges will ensue. 
This underlines the two-way nature of normal social communication and the 
social-communicative deficits experienced by those with ASD. Implications 
for treatment strategies for people with ASD would involve not only 
improving understanding of others’ mental states as embodied in their 
behaviour but also the understanding and appropriate expression of one’s 
own mental state. The findings in this thesis highlight the subtle mentalising 
deficits that may be present in real-world settings in those with ASD.  
 
 Imagine attempting to understand and interact with others short of 
knowing their beliefs, feelings or thoughts. Though it is a given that we may 
not know exactly the content of another person’s mind, the ability to infer 
others’ mental states is an imperative skill set for successful social 
interactions. The example scenario described in Chapter 1 is now 
reconsidered in a different context. An employee is seen walking out of her 
superior’s office looking slightly disgruntled. It would be fair to assume that 
this person may not be feeling particularly happy perhaps due to an 
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unpleasant conversation with her superior. A person with ASD on the other 
hand, may not pick up on the employee’s subtle facial expressions and may 
consequently fail to infer that an upsetting event may have taken place 
during the meeting. Without this knowledge, the person with ASD may 
proceed to interact with the employee as if nothing had happened; hence not 
showing concern or empathising with her situation. People with ASD would 
most likely behave in a different manner compared to typically developing 
individuals in a situation like this as a result of not being privy to the mental 
states of others. This along with multiple other instances of social situations 
wherein others’ mental states are not taken into consideration would 
significantly impact on the quality of social relationships that people with ASD 
have. It is often taken for granted the extent to which typically developing 
people use others’ thoughts and feelings to facilitate successful socio-
communicative interactions. People with ASD often present with subtle 
mentalising deficits in real life due to the many social norms to adhere by as 
well as various situational and social contexts. Compensatory strategies that 
may have been successfully utilised in experimental conditions may not be 
supported in real-world settings due to the dynamic, spontaneous and 
multifaceted nature of social interactions. Therefore it is possible that the 
retrodictive mentalising difficulties displayed by individuals with ASD can 
account for some of the social impediments in day-to-day functioning- their 
difficulty in gauging the mental states of others would manifest in their 
subsequent behaviours which may not be conducive for effective social 
interactions.  
6.3.3 Gaze Behaviour 
 
A large sum of research has shown that individuals with ASD have face 
processing impairments (e.g. Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr, & Rhodes, 2007). 
Studies utilising eye tracking techniques have in general consistently 
demonstrated that both adults and children with ASD show reduced 
attention to the facial region compared to healthy controls (e.g. Falck-Ytter, 
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Fernell, Gillberg, & von Hofsten, 2010). However the same cannot be said for 
findings of visual attention to specific parts of the facial region, namely eye or 
mouth. While some studies have reported that individuals with ASD show 
reduced gaze time at the eye region (e.g. Hernandez et al., 2009), others have 
found reduced fixation at the mouth region (e.g. Chawarska, Macari, & Shic, 
2012). On the other hand, there have also been studies which have found no 
differences in visual fixation patterns to specific facial regions between 
individuals with and without ASD (Bar-Haim, Shulman, Lamy, & Reuveni, 
2006; Freeth, Ropar, Mitchell, Chapman, & Loher, 2011; Rutherford & Towns, 
2008; Wagner, Hirsch, Vogel-Farley, Redcay, & Nelson, 2013).  
 
 The studies in this thesis showed that individuals (both neurotypical 
and ASD) had a preference for the mouth over the eye region, in support of 
Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren and Dziobek (2010) who found increased fixation 
time in the mouth region as compared to the eye region in emotional 
recognition conditions (i.e. conditions high in social salience). Of great 
importance is that no differences were found between visual attention to the 
eye or mouth between neurotypical and individuals with ASD. This finding 
was contrary to studies (e.g. Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Spezio, 
Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007) which have shown that individuals with ASD 
compared to neurotypical controls did not utilise information from the eye 
region of the face and instead tended to focus on information from the 
mouth region. As such, the findings indicate that the poor performance of 
individuals with ASD in identifying the scenarios is not merely due to reduced 
looking at the eye region.  Instead it appears that individuals with and 
without ASD focus their visual attention on face regions which are most 
informative for deducing targets’ behavioural reactions. In spite of this, 
individuals with ASD are still inferior compared to neurotypical individuals at 
making correct judgments about the scenarios to which targets responded.  
 A number of recent studies are consistent with these findings. 
McPartland, Webb, Keehn, & Dawson (2011) employed eye tracking to 
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investigate the gaze behaviours to objects and faces in adolescents with ASD 
and matched typically developing controls. Participants viewed images of 
upright human faces, inverted human faces, monkey faces, two-dimensional 
geometric designs as well as three-dimensional curvilinear objects. The 
results indicated that while individuals with ASD obtained lower scores on the 
face recognition task compared to controls, both groups demonstrated 
comparable patterns of gaze attention i.e. increased focus on the upper 
region compared to the lower region of the face. These findings refute the 
idea that people with ASD do not focus on the eye region of the face. 
Nevertheless, individuals with ASD showed impairments in face processing 
compared to their neurotypical counterparts i.e. results which are 
comparable to the present findings.  
 Sawyer, Williamson and Young (2012) examined whether the 
differences in visual attention to faces displayed by those with ASD can 
account for their impairments in emotion recognition from facial expressions. 
The study consisted of three emotion recognition conditions- full face, mouth 
only and eyes only. Their findings revealed that there were no differences in 
the way people with and without ASD viewed faces. Furthermore, there was 
no evidence of gaze avoidance compared to neurotypical controls. 
Nevertheless, individuals with ASD were less skilled at accurately identifying 
the emotions in all conditions compared to typically developing comparison 
participants.  
 Blais, Roy, Fiset, Arguin, and Gosselin (2012) conducted an innovative 
study using the Bubbles technique to evaluate the most informative facial 
cue when discriminating between facial expressions (eight static and eight 
dynamic stimuli) consisting of six basic emotions, pain and a neutral 
expression. Their findings revealed that the mouth was in fact the most 
important facial cue when distinguishing both static as well as dynamic 
stimuli. In addition, participants compared to the ideal observer displayed 
underuse of the eye area. Blais et al. (2012) proposed that people’s utilisation 
of the mouth region may be related to its function of having the most 
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discriminative motions across facial expressions. They further explained that 
this strategy may have evolved over time due to the dynamic nature of 
information conveyed from the mouth region and its relevance in an 
ecological context.  Another explanation for the inclination towards the 
mouth region is the preference for audiovisual synchrony (Jones et al., 2008); 
that is the integration of dynamic visual stimuli and auditory signals  to form 
a strong perceptual foundation. 
 A majority of research has emphasised the importance of the eye 
region in  recognising certain mental states (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Jolliffe, & Therese, 1997; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005). And as a 
key characteristic of ASD is the impaired use of eye contact coupled with 
social-communication difficulties, it is not surprising that the visual attention 
patterns and mental state recognition of people with ASD have been widely 
studied. In line with this, it has been proposed that the poor performance on  
face recognition tasks (e.g. Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008; Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002) of children with ASD may be related to their 
propensity to avoid eye contact as the eyes are often acknowledged as a 
crucial component of face processing. The findings in this thesis do not 
undermine the possibility that the eyes play an important part in the 
development of social communication skills in children who are typically 
developing; neither do they suggest that there are no abnormalities in eye 
gaze behaviour in those with ASD. However, these and the studies reviewed 
above suggest that group differences in eye gaze behaviour may be limited to 
certain circumstances and may be dependent on the specific task employed. 
This brings rise to the question-  why is it that individuals with ASD who 
display similar visual attention to the eye region as typically developing 
individuals still struggle with these tasks? The answer must surely lie within 
not merely where one’s gaze is directed, but rather how the information 
taken in is actually used to assist in mental state identification. If it is the case 
that individuals with ASD have impairments in their ability to mimic others' 
facial expressions and/or to simulate their mental states as described in the 
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sections above, then it is quite possible that attending to the "right" parts of 
the face is not sufficient to overcome these difficulties. 
6.3.4 Empathy  
 
Empathy has been described as the “capacity to understand others 
and experience their feelings in relation to oneself” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, 
p.71). Both the affective and cognitive components of empathy play 
important roles in successful development of empathic abilities which in turn 
aid in effective interactions in the social world.  While some researchers have 
emphasised the discrepancies between the two components of empathy, 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) assert the distinction is theoretical and 
that these two elements often coincide in reality. They also stated that 
empathic skills are vital in the development of high-order social functioning 
as well as the maintenance of long-term social engagements (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). Ickes (1993) put forward that being perceptive of others’ 
emotional states and appropriately responding to them are crucial 
constituents of empathic behaviour. In recognition of this, the relationship 
between self-reported trait empathic ability (as measured by the EQ) and 
retrodictive mentalising ability (as measured by performance in scenario 
identification) was investigated. 
 Two of the studies in this thesis found that people’s self-reported 
empathic ability was not associated with correct scenario identification when 
viewing videoclips of neurotypical targets. This finding was surprising given 
the literature which has shown a positive correlation between self-reported 
affective empathy and identification of facial affect (e.g. Gery, Miljkovitch, 
Berthoz, & Soussignan, 2009; Martin, Berry, Dobranski, Horne, & Dodgson, 
1996). A recent study by Besel and Yuille (2010) also found that scores on the 
EQ were positively related to accuracy during brief exposure in an emotion 
recognition task operationalised through Ekman’s Pictures of Facial Affect. 
Nonetheless it is important to note that while the EQ was developed as a 
global measure of empathy, studies have shown that it strongly highlights 
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cognitive empathy and social knowledge as compared to aspects of affective 
empathy (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004; Muncer & 
Ling, 2006). If empathising is not a unitary construct this might explain the 
lack of relationship with task performance in this thesis. 
 
It was however, revealed that people’s empathic ability was in fact 
positively associated with scenario identification when viewing videoclips of 
targets with ASD only, lending support to previous studies which have shown 
positive relationships between empathic ability and mental state recognition 
(e.g. Gery et al., 2009). This finding calls for an explanation and might possibly 
be accounted for by the generalised difficulty in interpreting the reactions 
portrayed specifically by targets with ASD and not the neurotypical controls. 
Perhaps higher trait empathic abilities were required to correctly decipher 
the obscure reactions of targets with ASD. 
 
In addition to investigating the relationship of performance to the 
participants' EQ scores, the relationship between performance on the 
retrodictive mentalising task and the EQ scores of targets was also examined. 
This was based on the assumption that targets who have higher EQ would 
have empathised more strongly with the researcher and thus her behaviour 
might have induced a greater degree of expressivity from them. Gross and 
John (1997) stated that if targets are highly expressive and respond suitably 
according to their experienced affect, it may be easier for people to 
distinguish what they experienced as more relevant information is available 
for evaluation. Overall, the findings in this thesis were ambiguous regarding 
the relationship between targets’ EQ scores and people’s ability in identifying 
the scenarios. There were relationships for some of the scenarios and not 
others, but these were not found consistently across experiments (although 
the small sample sizes render the findings inconclusive). It may be that 
relationships do hold for some scenarios but further research is needed.  
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Zaki, Bolger and Ochsner (2008) conducted an elegant study which 
provides an explanation of empathic accuracy ability with both the perceiver 
and target in mind. Their study consisted of two phases; target phase and 
perceiver phase. In the target phase, 14 participants completed the Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1995) which measured 
individuals’ insight into how much of their affective experience is observable 
to others. They were then filmed while discussing four positive and four 
negative personal events. Participants then watched their own films and gave 
ratings on a scale ranking their feelings from negative to positive. In the 
perceiver phase of the study, 33 fresh participants completed the Balanced 
Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) which 
measured individuals’ self-reported affective empathy.  Participants 
subsequently watched the films of the targets and rated how negative or 
positive they perceived the target was feeling. Zaki et al. (2008) defined their 
measure of empathic accuracy as the correlation between the targets’ ratings 
of their own feelings and perceivers’ ratings of what they believed the targets 
were feeling. The findings revealed that perceivers’ trait affective empathy 
was not associated with empathic accuracy unless targets’ emotion 
expressivity was taken into consideration. As a result, perceivers’ self-
reported empathic level predicted accuracy only for targets who were 
expressive. This suggests that one’s self-reported empathic ability can predict 
their subsequent empathic accuracy, but only when targets are sufficiently 
expressive. Zaki et al. (2008) also suggest that targets who showed low levels 
of expressiveness do provide useful affective indicators, however empathic 
perceivers may less effectively interpret their emotions as they may be more 
acclimatised to more expressive stimuli. To explain further, it is possible that 
the expressions of targets who displayed low expressivity were not as 
temporally dynamic as high expressivity targets; as such perceivers may 
interpret subtle changes in affect exhibited only by expressive targets.  
 
While the current thesis only employed the EQ to measure levels of 
empathic ability, perhaps utilising a measure of self-expression such as the 
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BEQ (Gross & John, 1995) would have rendered supplementary yet pertinent 
information in order to examine the relationship between performance in the 
mentalising task, self-reported empathic ability as well as emotional 
expressiveness. Moreover, Zaki et al.'s (2008) findings highlighted the 
importance of taking into account targets’ expressivity  as it has an influence 
on empathy related behaviours. In addition, while it is understood that there 
may be an overlap between cognitive and affective empathy, the studies in 
the present thesis aimed to tap into mentalising ability which has been 
closely associated with cognitive empathy. Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright 
(2004) put forward that while they may be related, impairments in cognitive 
empathy may coincide with advanced abilities in affective empathy. As such 
it is a possibility that these individual measures may relate to the scenario 
identification task in varying ways. 
  
The value of measures of empathy in predicting actual empathic 
behaviour has been called into question, as evidenced by the poor and 
sometimes non-existent relationship between measures of empathic ability 
and performance on empathy related tasks.   Nonetheless, the findings from 
the studies in this thesis indicate that there is indeed a connection between 
empathic ability, emotion expressivity and retrodictive mentalising ability, 
although not consistently so.  
6.4 Limitations  
 
There are several limitations to the studies in this thesis which must 
be acknowledged. A forced-choice response system was used for the primary 
task of accurate scenario identification. The use of forced-choice formats 
have been criticised in emotion recognition studies whereby it may be the 
case that relative judgment occurs in which people tend to select the answer 
that seems most likely (Russell, 1993). In three different trials of his study, a 
majority of participants identified the ‘anger’ expression as ‘contempt’, 
‘disgust’ and ‘frustration’ via forced-choice format options.  Then when 
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shown the ‘anger’ expression in a forced-choice format with very closely 
related options such ‘anger’ and ‘frustration’, only 12.5% of participants on 
average correctly selected ‘anger’ for stimuli depicting angry expressions. 
Hence Russell (1993) contended that forced-choice formats can yield 
consensus on the wrong answers (as seen in the first three trials of the 
study). And despite ‘anger’ being the accurate response, forced choice may 
fail to concede consensus on the correct answer. However recent findings 
have contested the notion that forced-choice formats do not effectively 
reveal performance in emotion recognition tasks (Limbrecht-Ecklundt et al., 
2013). In this thesis, the problem of naming mental states from a list of 
options is surpassed as individuals are required to name the scenarios which 
they think took place prior to targets’ presented behavioural responses. 
Nonetheless, it might be interesting to conduct a similar study using a free-
response format. While one might not expect participants to accurately guess 
exactly what had happened, it is possible that they would provide responses 
with a degree of similarity to the actual event.  
The studies involving participants with ASD were all males. It is not 
surprising however that males make up the large majority of participants and 
are hence often over represented in the ASD literature as they are five times 
more likely to have ASD compared to females (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2012). Nonetheless, the performance of female participants with 
ASD should be considered in future; Lai et al. (2011) found that females 
compared to males with ASD presented with higher level of autistic traits on 
the AQ. However, they had fewer socio-communication difficulties as 
measured by the ADOS compared to males. As the manifestation of the 
symptomatic characteristics of ASD may differ between males and females, it 
would be appropriate to investigate if females with ASD present with similar 
gaze patterns and performance in the present retrodictive mentalising task.  
The studies in this thesis utilized self-report measures of empathy. 
However one’s own reporting is confounded by social desirability bias as well 
as minimal insight into judging own empathic ability. Hence second person 
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assessment of empathy would be advantageous in order to strengthen the 
findings  (Bartels, Boomsma, Hudziak, van Beijsterveldt, & van den Oord, 
2007). Furthermore, it may have been advantageous to use other 
standardised mentalising tasks (i.e., Strange Stories Test & Faux-Pas Test) to 
further corroborate the findings of this newly developed retrodictive 
mentalising task. While it is proposed that the current retrodictive 
mentalising paradigm is potentially a more compelling measure of 
mentalising ability, it would be interesting nonetheless to compare and 
contrast the findings. If differences in findings are found, they may be 
attributed to the inherent nature of the current task which utilises 
naturalistic video stimuli which most closely represents real-world 
interactions hence tapping into more subtle mentalising deficits compared to 
standard tasks of mentalising.   
 
It may be contended that acculturation effects may be present in the 
reported studies due the varying cultural backgrounds of both targets and 
participants. Jack, Blais, Scheepers, Schyns, and Caldara (2009) reported 
cultural differences in the way Easterners and Westerners recognise 
emotional expressions.  Furthermore, Masuda et al. (2008) suggested that 
emotion recognition is impacted by cultural differences in attentional 
patterns to contextual components; whereby Japanese participants’ ratings 
were influenced by surrounding people’s emotions whereas Westerners’ 
ratings were not. This points to the differences in the way people from 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures attend to emotions and their 
contextual information. Nevertheless in this thesis, direct recognition and 
labelling of emotions were not employed. As such in order to preserve the 
real-world component of the studies, it was considered reasonable to include 
participants and targets (portraying varying behavioural reactions) of 
different cultural backgrounds to closely approximate real life encounters. 
Furthermore, in the studies which compared groups of participants with and 
without ASD, the groups were matched in ethnicity so this could not have 
acted as a confound or explain any group differences. Nonetheless, future 
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research should attempt to investigate the cross-cultural effects of the ability 
of people with and without ASD to infer mental states. 
In addition, it may be beneficial to broaden the scope of future 
studies by not just examining fixations to eye and mouth regions but also 
other areas of interest such as the nose. This is of particular interest in a 
cross-cultural context as studies have shown that East Asians  tend to fixate 
on the central area of the face (i.e. nose) while Western Caucasians displayed 
triangular looking patterns (scattered between eye and mouth) during facial 
recognition tasks (Blais, Jack, Scheepers, Fiset, & Caldara, 2008). In this thesis 
the studies follow typical ASD research conventions whereby gaze behaviours 
towards eye and mouth regions of the face were the focus of investigation 
(e.g. Hernandez et al., 2009; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; 
Rutherford & Towns, 2008) but it is possible that considering gaze at the nose 
would have furnished us with further useful information.  
 
 The findings of the studies presented in this thesis suggest that 
people with and without ASD looked more at the mouth as compared to the 
eye region. This is consistent with several other recent studies which have 
supported the importance of the mouth when dynamic stimuli are used. For 
instance, Vatikiotis-Bateson, Eigsti, Yano and Munhall (1998) investigated 
people’s eye movements during an audio-visual perception task. Participants 
(native English and native Japanese speakers) were shown conversational 
monologues of different image sizes and varying levels of acoustic masking 
noise. It was found that irrespective of image size, all participants gazed more 
at the mouth as masking noise levels increased.  In contrast, Võ, Smith, Mital, 
and Henderson (2012) reported that people’s fixations to the mouth 
increased when the facial stimuli was speaking; however, when the speech 
component was removed, fixation time to the face and specifically the mouth 
region decreased significantly. In this thesis, auditory information was 
omitted from the videoclips, yet the dynamic motions of the mouth 
persisted. This suggests that there are individual differences in the way in 
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which people prioritise gaze towards critical regions to support a functional 
purpose and that the importance of information from the mouth when 
understanding others may have been underestimated by previous studies 
using static stimuli.  
The videoclips of target behavioural reactions were captured using 
naturalistic methods. Hence the responses displayed were targets‘ 
spontaneous and genuine responses to the scenarios. On the other hand, 
when the videoclips were displayed in the main experiment, while the 
reactions itself were natural responses, the videoclips comprised mainly faces 
and upper-bodies with no distracting information such as objects, landscapes 
which could have captured one‘s attention. Furthermore, it is acknowledged 
that despite all efforts to create stimuli which are as naturalistic and 
ecologically valid as possible, the stimuli had to be presented in a controlled, 
experimental environment on a computer monitor. This in turn does not fully 
correspond and translate to the features of real-world social relations. 
 
6.5 Directions for Future Research  
 
There are a number of possibilities for future research in the current area 
of study. The findings in this thesis revealed that individuals with ASD have 
the capacity to infer others’ mental states to a certain extent. It was also 
found that people with ASD are capable of portraying intelligible behavioural 
reactions to certain scenarios. It would be interesting to examine other 
factors that may be related to one’s abilities in these domains; both in 
identifying mental states as well as the self-expression of mental states. For 
instance; does one’s level of adaptive behaviour functioning have an impact 
on their capacity to understand and express mental states? What about the 
performance of individuals with ASD who had exposure to early intervention 
and/or social skills training as compared to those who have not? And does 
opportunity of peer interaction have an impact on this ability? Perhaps 
comparing individuals educated in standard schooling system vs. home-
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schooling environment would be a way at answering some of these 
questions.  Another factor to consider would be the impact of siblings in a 
family. These variables may or may not influence one’s capacity to mentalise; 
however if such a connection exists, they can be utilised as indicators to 
guide appropriate intervention.  
While the current task successfully utilised natural stimuli presented 
through film, the task of inferring one’s mental state in real world settings 
would involve the integration of other complex facets of social interaction 
which are known areas of difficulty for people with ASD such as prosody, 
language, body language as well as context (e.g. Paul, Augustyn, Klin, & 
Volkmar, 2005). Therefore, investigations using real-time processing and 
examining physiological responses would provide greater insight into the 
ability of people to infer others’ mental states.  Furthermore, in accordance 
with the model used in the present thesis, new scenarios could be created to 
further investigate people’s ability to mentalise in various social situations. 
For instance, to examine the capacity of people with and without ASD to 
experience vicarious embarrassment, incorporated into this model of 
retrodictive mentalising.  It has been shown that the empathic process is an 
essential prerequisite to experience vicarious embarrassment (Krach et al., 
2011). Moreover, Paulus, Kamp-Becker and Krach (2013) reported that 
people with ASD showed deficits in reporting of vicarious embarrassment in 
social situations as it required the understanding of another person’s  mental 
state.  
The participants in the studies reported in this thesis had a wide range of 
cognitive abilities, although all were within the normal range of intellectual 
functioning. As a consequence the performance of individuals with lower 
cognitive abilities is unknown in this task.  It was previously discussed that 
while a large number of children with ASD are unable to pass complex 
mentalising tasks, high-functioning adults with ASD on the other hand often 
show success in such tasks. Thus it has been suggested that the mentalising 
impairments of adults with ASD are more subtle as compared to children 
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with ASD.  Hence, it would be of interest to administer this task to children 
with ASD. In the same line of thought, research has also shown that 
mentalising abilities may decline with age (e.g. Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007); 
therefore the abilities of older adults in this naturalistic retrodictive 
mentalising should also be investigated.  It will also be interesting to conduct 
these studies with other populations known to have deficits in mentalising, 
such as individuals with schizophrenia or borderline personality disorder.   
Future research should incorporate neuroimaging studies to complement 
the present behavioural paradigm to better understand the neural networks 
which facilitates retrodictive mentalising. While it is known that social and 
situational circumstances play a vital role in everyday mentalising, a clearer 
understanding at a neuroscientific level along with the incorporation of 
knowledge from corresponding domains such as low-level mentalising, 
mirroring, simulation, perspective-taking, emotion contagion and empathy 
will provide a more complete picture of people’s capacity to infer others’ 
mental states and make sense of behaviour.  
 
6.6 Conclusions  
 
In summary, people with and without ASD were able to infer events 
that occurred to target participants by viewing brief samples of behavioural 
reactions. Despite focusing on the same regions of the face, individuals with 
ASD showed deficits in deducing the scenarios compared to typically 
developing individuals. People varied their visual attention according to the 
scenario experienced by the targets in the videoclips suggesting that people 
tended to change their viewing strategies towards the most informative 
areas based on targets’ behavioural cues. Participant and target self-reported 
empathic ability was associated with participants’ performance in correct 
scenario identification to a certain degree, however not consistently so.  
Findings also showed that individuals with ASD expressed inferable 
behavioural reactions to some scenarios only.  
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The retrodictive mentalising task presented in this thesis objectively 
examined people’s ability to infer others’ mental states using naturalistic 
video stimuli. While other studies have increased the difficulty of such tasks 
by ambiguating the facial expressions (for example through the morphing of 
stimuli, Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010); the present 
task consisted of stimuli which were filmed in a naturalistic and genuine 
social interaction, representative of encounters in the real world. As subtle 
mentalising impairments of people with ASD seem to be most evident during 
dynamic, unstructured and naturalistic tasks (Pelphrey, Morris, McCarthy, & 
LaBar, 2007), the mentalising task employed in this thesis accounted for the 
abovementioned components and further provides insight into the 
retrodictive abilities of people with and without ASD in determining what 
they believe happened to someone simply by watching their brief 
behavioural reactions. The advantage of this novel paradigm is its simplistic 
yet efficient way of learning about one’s deduction of others’ mental states in 
a given situational context, without directly labelling a mental state, which 
has long been an issue with mentalising research. 
While there is no explicit mention of mental state identification, it is 
implied that one will utilise retrodictive mentalising skills in order to 
successfully discern one situation from the other. The ability of individuals 
with ASD to pass certain advanced tasks of mentalising demonstrates that 
their capacity to infer the minds of others’ should not be undervalued. 
Nonetheless this does not go so far as to imply that their ability to 
successfully infer others’ minds in contrived experimental conditions would 
be reflected in appropriate social behaviours and interpersonal relationships 
in the real world. As such, Astington (2003) put forward that while people 
with ASD may demonstrate some mentalising skills, they may not be  
sufficient  for effective social functioning in day-to-day life. Additional studies 
are needed to shed more light on this issue. Furthermore, future studies of 
mental state understanding of individuals with ASD should bear in mind that 
time spent looking at the critical regions of the face may not necessarily 
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reflect the processing of relevant information. As evidenced in the work 
presented in this thesis; while people with and without ASD showed similar 
patterns of visual attention, people with ASD were less successful than 
neurotypicals in correctly identifying the scenarios. Nonetheless, further 
explication in regards to the psychological and neuroanatomical factors of 
the often reported socio-communicative gaze irregularities in ASD may assist 
in more sensitive early diagnostic evaluations and subsequent intervention.  
The facility to make such inferences about others may be functional 
not only because it permits us to make sense of others’ behaviour, but 
perhaps even enables us to benefit indirectly from the experiences of others, 
and hence can be used as an effective tool for learning about events in the 
world. The ability to engage in retrodictive mentalising is an imperative skill 
required in the social world today as our daily lives often entail observing 
people’s reactions and behaviours and further attempting to determine what 
motivated those responses. The findings from the work presented in this 
thesis have highlighted the significance of investigating subtle naturalistic 
expressions and social cues as well as the ability to “put oneself in another 
person‘s shoes” as vital for successful social communication in daily living. 
Further studies addressing the gaps in knowledge in the literature is 
necessary in order to obtain critical insights into the causes of deficient social 
cognition in people with ASD and the association between neurological, 
developmental and socio-communicative information processing.  Moreover, 
a greater understanding of the profound real-world challenges faced by 
people with ASD in everyday social situations and interactions will steer the 
way for improved functional intervention and support.   
Pillai, Dhanya R. (2014) Retrodictive mentalising abilities 
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Appendix A 
Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a 
conversation. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
2. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I 
understand easily, when they don't understand it 
first time. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
 
3. I really enjoy caring for other people. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
4. I find it hard to know what to do in a social 
situation. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
5. People often tell me that I went too far in driving 
my point home in a discussion. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
6. It doesn't bother me too much if I am late 
meeting a friend. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
7. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, 
so I tend not to bother with them. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
8. I often find it difficult to judge if something is 
rude or polite. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
9. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own 
thoughts rather than on what my listener might 
be thinking. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
10. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to 
see what would happen. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
11. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing 
but means another. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
12. It is hard for me to see why some things upset 
people so much. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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13. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's 
shoes. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
14. I am good at predicting how someone will feel. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
 
15. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is 
feeling awkward or uncomfortable. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
16. If I say something that someone else is offended 
by, I think that that's their problem, not mine. 
 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
17. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would 
reply truthfully, even if I didn't like it. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
18. I can't always see why someone should have felt 
offended by a remark. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
19. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
20. I am very blunt, which some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is unintentional. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
21. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
22. Other people tell me I am good at understanding 
how they are feeling and what they are thinking. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
23. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their 
experiences rather than my own. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
24. It upsets me to see an animal in pain. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
25. I am able to make decisions without being 
influenced by people's feelings. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
26. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or 
bored with what I am saying. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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27. I get upset if I see people suffering on news 
programmes. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
28. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as 
they say that I am very understanding. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
29. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other 
person doesn't tell me. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
30. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far 
with teasing. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
31. Other people often say that I am insensitive, 
though I don’t always see why. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
32. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to 
them to make an effort to join in. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
33. I usually stay emotionally detached when 
watching a film. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
34. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly 
and intuitively. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
35. I can easily work out what another person might 
want to talk about. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
36. I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
37. I don't consciously work out the rules of social 
situations. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
38. I am good at predicting what someone will do. strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
39. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's 
problems. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
 
 
40. I can usually appreciate the other person's 
viewpoint, even if I don't agree with it. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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Appendix B 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
1. I prefer to do things with others rather than 
on my own. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
2. I prefer to do things the same way over and 
over again. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very 
easy to create a picture in my mind. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 
thing that I lose sight of other things. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
5. I often notice small sounds when others do 
not. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 
strings of information. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
7. Other people frequently tell me that what 
I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is 
polite. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily 
imagine what the characters might look like. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
9. I am fascinated by dates. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 
several different people’s conversations. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
11. I find social situations easy. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
12. I tend to notice details that others do not. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
13. I would rather go to a library than a party. definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
14. I find making up stories easy. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people 
than to things. 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
16. I tend to have very strong interests which I 
get upset about if I can’t pursue. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
17. I enjoy social chit-chat. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to 
get a word in edgeways. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
19. I am fascinated by numbers. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 
work out the characters’ intentions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
22. I find it hard to make new friends. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
23. I notice patterns in things all the time. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
24. I would rather go to the theatre than a 
museum. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is 
disturbed. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to 
keep a conversation going. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” 
when someone is talking to me. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole 
picture, rather than the small details. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
29. I am not very good at remembering phone 
numbers. 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 
situation, or a person’s appearance. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to 
me is getting bored. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at 
once. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure 
when it’s my turn to speak. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
35. I am often the last to understand the point 
of a joke. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 
thinking or feeling just by looking at their 
face. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back 
to what I was doing very quickly.  
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
38. I am good at social chit-chat. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
39. People often tell me that I keep going on 
and on about the same thing. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 
games involving pretending with other 
children. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
41. I like to collect information about categories 
of things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, 
types of train, types of plant, etc.). 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be 
like to be someone else. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
43. I like to plan any activities I participate in 
carefully. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
44. I enjoy social occasions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s 
intentions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
46. New situations make me anxious. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
47. I enjoy meeting new people definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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48. I am a good diplomat definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
49. I am not very good at remembering 
people’s date of birth. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
50. I find it very easy to play games with 
children that involve pretending. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
